4. To the Proofs of the Second Antecedent

389. To the proofs of the second antecedent, about minimal parts [nn.292-300], I reply:

To the first [n.292] that the Philosopher has enough against Anaxagoras if the whole is diminished by a taking away from the whole such that an equal amount cannot go on being taken from it forever; for Anaxagoras had to say (as Aristotle imputed to him [Averroes Physics 1 com.37]) that, after separation of anything generable out of flesh has been made from the flesh, there would still remain as much flesh as could have anything generable further separated off from it; and this is impossible, because however much the flesh can be divided and diminished ad infinitum, not as much flesh at any rate would remain as could have anything generable generated from it, because anything generable requires a determinate quantity of that from which it is generated (especially if, as is imputed to Anaxagoras, generation is only separation or local motion, and the flesh is diminished, by continual separation of other parts from it, beyond the total quantity that generation might come from). So one is not required by Aristotle’s intention there [n.292] to posit also a separate minimum in natural things which exists per se and not in the whole.

390. To the statement of the Philosopher On Sense and Sensibles [n.294] I say that properties are divisible as much as may be, so that a quantum cannot be divided without dividing the property; and yet the property is not divided ad infinitum as it is sensible (that is, insofar as it is perceptible by sense), just as Aristotle maintains there that ‘a part, however minimal, can be sensible virtually although not in act’; that is, that such a part can cooperate along with other parts so as to affect the senses - and yet, although division could also be made in it as it is a per se existent, it would not however affect the senses.

And then the response to the argument of Aristotle adduced for the opposite [n.294 ‘the senses could be intensified infinitely’] is plain, that ‘the senses grow ad infinitum in intensity if a property divisible ad infinitum is presented to them’; and this is true if the sensible, insofar as it is actually perceptible by the senses, could be divided ad infinitum - but the same does not follow if the thing that is sensible can be divided ad infinitum.

391. As to the statement from On the Soul [n.293], it is plain that Aristotle is speaking of the quantity of something capable of increase and decrease; and this I concede, because the quantity that is a perfect quantity for any natural thing is determinate as to being greater or smaller, speaking of the quantity in which the natural thing is naturally produced; or at any rate it is determinate as to being smaller in the case of animate things, speaking of the quantity which diminution leads to. However, the Philosopher is only speaking there [sc. in the passage from On the Soul] of the limit of size and increase; and so he is precisely in this place understanding the perfect quantity of any natural thing to be determinate as to being greater - and from this he gets his conclusion, which he intended to prove, namely that ‘fire is not the principle of increase in any generation or in any species’; for the principal agent in any species must be determinate to the perfect quantity of that species, so that it may produce that quantity and not more than it; but fire is not determinate as to determinate quantity in any species, because - as for as concerns itself - it would go on producing a greater amount, for it grows ad infinitum if combustible material is added to it ad infinitum.

392. And when the antecedent about the minimum [n.290] is proved through the premise [n.295] that ‘it is possible to take a first part of motion’, the consequence can be denied [n.295, ‘therefore it is possible to take a smallest part of motion’], because those who asserted a first part in motion asserted that change is this first part of motion; however I deny a first in both ways (both a first motion and a first change), because the

Philosopher in Physics 6.6.236b32-7b22 of express intention shows the opposite, namely that every moving is preceded by a having moved ad infinitum, and conversely [n.297].

393. And he gives proof of this as follows: that if fire were to cause some first in motion, by parity of reason it would cause something equal to that first, simultaneous with it, and immediate. And so one would need to imagine that between the first simultaneous caused thing and the second one - equal to it - the agent would either have to be at rest, and so motion would be composed of motions and intermediate rests, or the agent would, after having introduced the first, need to introduce the attained successive whole, which seems thoroughly irrational, because, since the agent is of equal virtue for, and equally near to, the passive subject, then just as the agent can simultaneously introduce any (first) degree simultaneously caused, so it can, simultaneous with that introduced degree, introduce the whole thing, and so the whole motion would be caused immediately of immediate changes, or composed of changes - whether motions or rests -that are intermediate.

394. So here is the following process. Let there be a form subject to change needing to be corrupted by motion, for instance, in the case of an alteration, under a heat that is at rest. Of this motion, I say, it is possible to take a last, namely the terminating change, because a movable thing is now disposed indivisibly as previously it was disposed divisibly, and this ‘being affected’ - just like ‘being changed’ - is a being now indivisibly disposed otherwise than it was disposed divisibly before [n.181]. Now for this reason it is under the same form - under which it was at rest - in the instant of change, because then the agent that ought to be moving it did nothing before, and is not now doing anything in respect of it. From this instant the movable begins to move, and that successively - either because of the parts of the movable, for no parts of the movable are equally close to the agent but one part is nearer ad infinitum than another (only a point of the movable is with all of itself immediate to the agent, and a point is not movable), or because of the parts of the form according to which there must be motion, each of which parts can be introduced before another by the present mover, since the extrinsic reason why a minimum cannot exist per se in natural things is the presence of a corrupter - but this is removed by the presence of the agent, which corrupts everything corruptive of its own effect [nn.349-353].

395. Therefore, from this instant of change, the heat that was present is continually diminished and coldness takes over. For it is not likely that there is only a movement of diminishing up to some instant and then first some coldness is introduced; for in that case either the heat to be diminished would have an ultimate of its being (which the Philosopher denies in Physics 8.8.263b20-26), or, if not, at least the coldness immediately following it would have a first of its being, and then there would be a first change of the motion of cooling, which is as unacceptable as that there is a first diminishing of the motion of the heat. It also seems unacceptable that an agent should diminish heat save by causing in it something according to some degree incompossible with it, and, as it causes that incompossible something in greater or lesser degree, it corrupts degree after degree of the existing heat; now Aristotle manifestly maintains this in Physics 6 [n.302], that everything moved has something of both extremes - and it seems manifest to sense that there is something of heat in water being successively heated, while the coldness still remains and is not yet wholly corrupted.

396. So, from the instant of change, the motion of remission of heat and the motion of intensifying of coldness run together - and of neither of these is anything first and in some instant in which, by a sudden change, some degree of coldness is introduced that is altogether incompossible with the heat; in the first there is no heat and up to it there was heat - such that heat has no ultimate of its being but did have an ultimate in its being at rest; and coldness has no first simply of its being, although it have a first in being of rest (namely what it receives through the change, although this is not rest).

397. When therefore the proof is given by the Philosopher in Physics 8 [n.297], I say that the intention of the Philosopher is this, namely to prove that not everything is always in motion. And against those who say that ‘everything is always in motion’ he says that they are manifestly refuted if we consider the motions by which they were moved; for the motions - for their positing of this view - were taken from the increase and decrease of animate things, which they saw coming about in some great length of time (as in a year), and yet from this fact they concluded for no reason that these motions were coming about throughout the whole time but not perceptibly in any part of the time. To them Aristotle objects that such a movable can very well be at rest for a certain time and be moved in some small period of time, so that there is no need that it be always moving with that motion; and he proves this with an example about drops of water wearing away a stone, which drops fall in some certain number and take nothing away from the stone - eventually, however, one falling drop (let it be the hundredth) takes away, by virtue of all the drops, some part of the stone, and this part is taken away whole at once and not part before part.The Vatican Editors point out that, in his interpretation of Aristotle here, Scotus is in agreement with the like interpretation of Aquinas in his commentary, ad loc., on the Physics. ³⁵

398. Hereby the Philosopher does not intend that this taking away of a part of the stone happen in an instant and be in this way whole at once, for this taking away belongs to local motion (and so the motion is local), which cannot at all happen unless a part of the movable pass over the space before the whole movable does; but although this one part of the stone - which is taken away by the last drop in virtue of all the preceding drops - is taken away successively, yet the taking away of it is not successive corresponding to the whole succession of the falling of the drops; for it is not the case that there were as many parts of this taking away of a part from the stone as there were falling drops, but this whole small part is taken away by the last drop, albeit successively. The Philosopher, therefore, is denying a succession corresponding to this succession, namely to the whole falling of the succession of drops - and for this reason the moving of the stone was not always being moved, although when it was being moved by the last drop it was then being successively moved.

399. And, in accord with this intention, he subjoins afterwards about alteration that “there is no need, for this reason, that the whole alteration be infinite, for frequently it is swift” [n.297], where the translation of the Commentator has “sudden” for the “swift” in our translation; now the Commentator expounds ‘sudden’ thus, “that is, in an instant,” and infers “not in time.” But this exposition is contrary to Aristotle’s text, as is plain from our translation ‘frequently it is swift’, and from his own translation which has ‘suddenly’ - because in Physics 4.13.222b14-15, where our translation has “at once,” his translation has “suddenly,” and he has a note there, “that is said to happen suddenly which happens in an imperceptible time” - and thus does he himself there expound it. So to expound ‘swiftly’ or ‘suddenly’ as an instant is to expound time as an instant.

400. However, the intention of the Philosopher [sc. in Physics 8, nn.297, 399] is as follows: there is no need that, as the alterable is divisible ad infinitum, so a time ad infinitum should correspond to the alteration of the alterable - or that always, while the alterable exists, part after part of it should alter continuously, the way alteration could be a succession by reason of the parts of the alterable; but ‘frequently alteration is swift or sudden’, that is, when the alterable is at rest, and then the parts are not simultaneous (either according to the first change or according to the first part of motion) but in succession.

401. And this is what is immediately added by the reason that the Philosopher appends for the same conclusion, namely that when someone is healed the healing is in time “and not at the limit of time;” and yet the movable is not always in motion with this motion, because this motion is finite between two contraries. How then would Aristotle, for the purpose of proving that ‘not everything is in motion’, be taking in the preceding reason [n.400] that ‘alteration happens in an instant’ [sc. as Averroes interprets Aristotle, n.399], and in this second reason he is taking the opposite, namely that ‘healing is not at the limit of time but in time’, and still healing is, on this account, ‘not always’ because it is between contraries, and so, when the contrary is acquired, the motion ceases?

402. Therefore the Philosopher subjoins that “to say ‘everything is continually in motion’ is extravagant quibbling” (where ‘continually’ is taken for ‘always’, because he rejects, for all these reasons [nn.397, 399, 401, 402], the second member of the five membered divisionAristotle gives in the passage at Physics 8 five arguments against the thesis that everything is always in motion: from increase and decrease, from the wearing away of a stone, from the freezing of water, from health, and from stones remaining hard. ³⁶). And yet too a further exposition is there posited, because ‘stones remain hard’; so they do not undergo alteration.

403. Aristotle does not then deny his whole opinion in Physics 6 because of anything he says here, in Physics 8 [nn.297, 392]; and granted that here there were some term that seems expressly to carry this meaning (although there is not but only one taken from a false interpretation), yet it would seem to need being expounded according to what is said in Physics 6 rather than to retract somewhere else [sc. Physics 8] the whole of what is chief in Physics 6 because of certain things that somewhere else are not said as chiefly or of as express intention as in Physics 6.

404. To the passage from On Sense and Sensibles [n.299] response will be made in the last argument of this distinction [nn.519-520].

405. To the argument about contradictories [n.300] a response is made that statements are contradictories that are taken to hold for the same time (and according to the other required conditions), and statements are not contradictories that are not taken to hold for the same time - as is proved by the definition of contradiction set down in Sophistical Refutations 1.5.167a23-27 [‘A refutation is a contradiction of a same and single thing in the same respect and in relation to the same thing and in like manner and at the same time’]; and so the non-being of heat as it went before in the last instant of change, and the being of heat taken up in the completed time, are not contradictories with respect to heat.

406. On the contrary: the being and non-being of color, taken absolutely (not as they understood to be in the same instant), are incompossible simply, so that because they are incompossible simply they cannot be in the same instant - not conversely; and the reason for this incompossibility ‘for the same instant’ is not other than that they are formally opposed with no other opposition formally than contradictory opposition.

407. This is confirmed by a likeness in other things, that a contrary succeeding to a contrary is truly contrary to it, although the two are not together in the same instant; likewise, a form as the term ‘to which’ of privation is truly opposed to it privatively - and this motion is formally between opposites. Hence the Philosopher in Physics 1.5.188a30-b26, 5.5.229a7-b22 maintains that every motion is between opposites that are contrary or privative or some intermediate of the two, and yet they are, as terms of change, never simultaneous.

408. It could also be argued that the terms of creation were not contraries, because the non-being that preceded the being of the created thing cannot be a contrary or a privative or an intermediate between them because it is not in any susceptive subject -and thus it would not be contradictory to being. Creation therefore would not be between contradictories or contraries, which seems absurd.

409. But as to what is adduced about the definition of a contradiction [n.405], there is an equivocation because contradiction exists in one way in propositions and in another way in terms. Propositions are not contradictory unless they are taken to be for the same instant, and for this instant both must assert the predicate of the subject; but terms absolutely taken, without determination to any being, are contradictories. About the first contradiction the Philosopher speaks in On Interpretation 6.17b16-26, and about the second in Categories 10.13b27-35.

410. I reply in another way to the argument [n.300], because ‘immediate’ can be taken in two ways: in one way that there is no middle between what is a whole in itself and something else, and in another way that what is a whole in itself is at once with something else or after something else. In the first way the continuous is immediate with its term, because nothing falls in the middle between the indivisible point that terminates and the divisible continuum that is terminated. In the second way there is nothing immediate to the indivisible point terminating a continuum; for nothing that is a whole in itself immediately follows the indivisible but a part of the whole does; and what is an immediate whole in the first way follows an indivisible according to a part before a part ad infinitum.

411. To the issue at hand therefore I say that as the measures are disposed to each other so are the things measured, namely that when one contradictory is measured by an indivisible the other is measured by an indivisible as well. And then the minor is false [sc. in n.300, ‘if there is no first between the being of the form that is to be introduced through motion and the non-being of it, the ‘first’ would be indivisible’]; for there is no middle between a contradictory ‘as it is in its whole measure’ and the other contradictory, just as neither between its whole measure and the measure of the other; a contradictory, however, that is measured by an indivisible is not immediate to anything, such that according to some of its being (namely as it is in its measure) it immediately follow the other contradictory. So I say as to the issue at hand that the non-being was in an indivisible, but the being of the form introduced by motion is in the whole completed time - and so nothing is intermediate between them; and yet what follows in time is not immediate - in the second way [n.410] - to what pre-exists in an instant.