Frontmatter

Titlepage

The Ordinatio of Blessed John Duns Scotus

Book 2. Distinctions 1 - 3

Translated by Peter L.P. Simpson

Translator's Preface

This translation of Book 2 Distinctions 1 to 3 of the Ordinatio (aka Opus Oxoniense) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume seven of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi.

Scotus’ Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Peter L.P. Simpson September, 2014

Contents

Book Two

First Distinction

                                            

Question 1: Whether Primary Causality with Respect to all Causables is of Necessity in the Three Persons	Num. 1
I. Opinion of Henry of Ghent	Num. 5
II. Scotus’ own Solution	Num. 15
A. The First and Perfect Causality is Necessarily in the Three Persons	Num. 16
B. On Causality in regard to all Causables as to their Being in a certain Respect	Num. 23
C. Whether in an Absolute Person, if posited, there could be Perfect Causality with Respect to all Causables	Num. 41
D. Conclusion	Num. 44
III. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 45
Question 2: Whether God could create Something	Num. 50
I. To the Question	Num. 58
A. About Creation from Nothing as ‘From’ denotes Order of Nature	Num. 59
B. About Creation from Nothing as ‘From’ denotes Order of Duration	Num. 69
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 85
Question 3: Whether it was Possible for God to produce Something without a Beginning other than Himself	Num. 95
I. First Opinion	Num. 102
II. Second Opinion	Num. 117
III. To the Reasons for the First Opinion when holding the Second Opinion	Num. 130
IV. To the Principal Arguments of Each Part	Num. 173
Question 4: Whether the Creation of an Angel is the Same as the Angel	Num. 179
Question 5: Whether the Relation of the Creature to God is the Same as its Foundation	Num. 188
I. To the Fifth Question
A. On the Identity of Relation with its Foundation in General
1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent	Num. 192
2. Objections	Num. 223
3. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num. 230
4. To the Arguments for Henry’s Opinion	Num. 231
B. On the Identity of the Special Relation of ‘Creature to God’ with its Foundation
1. First Opinion	Num. 241
2. Second Opinion	Num. 253
3. Scotus’ own Solution	Num. 260
a. The Relation of Creature to God is the same really as its Foundation	Num. 261
b. The Relation of Creature to God is not the same formally as the Foundation nor is it precisely the same	Num. 272
C. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 276
II. To the Fourth Question
A. Solution	Num. 281
B. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 286
Question 6: Whether Angel and Soul Differ in Species	Num. 296
I. To the Question
A. About the Conclusion in Itself	Num. 301
B. On the First Reason for this Distinction	Num. 302
1. First Opinion	Num. 303
2. Second Opinion	Num. 306
3. Scotus’ own Solution	Num. 315
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 323

Second Distinction

First Part

On the Measure of the Duration of the Existence of Angels

                                           

Question 1: Whether in the Actual Existence of an Angel there is any Succession Formally	Num. 1
I. First Opinion as Reported and Held by Bonaventure	Num. 11
A. Arguments for the Opinion	Num. 12
B. Arguments against the Opinion	Num. 33
II. Second Opinion	Num. 39
A. Thomas Aquinas’ Way of Positing it	Num. 40
B. Henry of Ghent’s Way of Positing it	Num. 42
III. In what Ways the First Opinion can be Sustained
A. The First Way, which is according to the Intention of Bonaventure
1. As to the Opinion itself	Num. 48
2. To the Arguments brought against the First Opinion	Num. 52
B. The Second Way, which is tangential to the Intention of Bonaventure	Num. 57
IV. Against the Conclusion of the First Opinion in itself	Num. 58
V. Scotus’ own Response to the Question	Num. 62
VI. To the Arguments for the First Opinion	Num. 63
VII. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 80
Question 2: Whether in an Angel actually Existing there is Need to posit Something Measuring his Existence that is Other than that very Existence	Num. 84
I. To the Affirmative Side of the Question
A. The Opinion of Others	Num. 88
B. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 91
C. Instance against the Rejection of this Opinion	Num. 95
D. Response to the Instance	Num. 97
II. To the Negative Side of the Question	Num. 116
III. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 124
Question 3: Whether there is one Aeviternity for all Aeviternals	Num. 126
I. To the Question
A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent	Num. 129
B. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 130
C. Instance	Num. 136
D. Response to the Instance	Num. 138
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 141
Question 4: Whether the Operation of an Angel is Measured by Aeviternity	Num. 143
I. To the Question
A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent
1. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 147
2. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 153
B. Scotus’ own Solution	Num. 167
C. Instances against Scotus’ own Solution
D. Responses to the Instances	Num. 168
1. To the First Instance	Num. 171
2. To the Second Instance	Num. 181
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 185
III. To the Authority of Augustine adduced for the Opinion of Henry	Num. 188

Second Part

On the Place of Angels

                                              

Question 1: Whether an Angel is in Place	Num. 189
Question 2: Whether an Angel requires a Determinate Place	Num. 197
I. To the First Question
A. The Opinion of Others	Num. 198
B. Against the Conclusion of the Opinion	Num. 204
C. Scotus’ own Solution
1. How Body is in a Place	Num. 216
a. On the First Article	Num. 219
b. On the Other Articles	Num. 232
2. How an Angel is in Place	Num. 236
D. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 250
II. To the Second Question	Num. 253
Question 3: Whether an Angel can be in Two Places at Once	Num. 254
I. To the Question	Num. 262
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 265
Question 4: Whether two Angels can be in the Same Place at Once	Num. 273
I. To the Question	Num. 276
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 280
Question 5: Whether an Angel can be moved from Place to Place by Continuous Motion	Num. 284
I. To the Question	Num. 310
II. To the Principal Arguments
A. To the First Argument	Num. 314
B. To the Second Argument	Num. 315
1. Rejection of the First Antecedent	Num. 316
2. Rejection of the Second Antecedent	Num. 332
3. To the Proofs of the First Antecedent
a. To the First Proof	Num. 354
b. To the Second Proof	Num. 376
4. To the Proofs of the Second Antecedent	Num. 389
C. To the Third Argument	Num. 412
D. To the Fourth Argument	Num. 428
Question 6: Whether an Angel can move himself	Num. 439
I. To the Question
A. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num. 444
B. Instance	Num. 445
C. Rejection of the Instance	Num. 446
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 472
Question 7: Whether an Angel can be Moved in an Instant	Num. 486
I. To the Question
A. The Opinions of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent	Num. 489
B. Rejection of the Opinions	Num. 491
C. Scotus’ own Response	Num. 501
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 505
Question 8: Whether an Angel could be Moved from Extreme to Extreme without Passing through the Middle	Num. 507
I. To the Question	Num. 511
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 517

Third Distinction

First Part

On the Principle of Individuation

                                               

Question 1: Whether Material Substance is Individual or Singular of Itself or from its Nature	Num. 1
I. To the Question
A. The Opinion of Others	Num. 5
B. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num. 29
II. To the Principal Argument	Num. 41
III. To the Confirmation of the Opinion	Num. 42
Question 2: Whether Material Substance is of Itself Individual through Some Positive Intrinsic thing	Num. 43
I. To the Question
A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent	Num. 47
B. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num. 57
II. To the Principal Argument	Num. 58
Question 3: Whether Material Substance is Individual, or the Reason for Individuating Another, through Actual Existence	Num. 59
I. The Opinion of Others	Num. 60
II. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 61
III. To the Argument for the Opinion	Num. 65
Question 4: Whether Material Substance is Individual or Singular through Quantity	Num. 66
I. To the Question
A. The Opinion of Others
1. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 71
2. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 75
a. The First Way: from the Identity of Individuation or Singularity	Num. 76
b. The Second Way: from the Order of Substance to Accidents	Num. 82
c. The Third Way: from the Idea of Ordering within a Category	Num. 89
d. The Fourth Way: on the Part of Quantity	Num. 99
e. Against the Reasons for the Opinion	Num.105
B. Scotus’ own Conclusion	Num. 111
II. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others	Num. 112
III. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 122
Question 5: Whether Material Substance is a This and Individual through Matter	Num. 129
I. The Opinion of Others	Num. 132
[Continued after Question 6]
Question 6: Whether Material Substance is Individual through Some Entity per se Determining Nature to Singularity	Num. 142
A. To the Question
1. The Opinion of Others
a. Exposition of the Opinion	Num. 148
b. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 155
2. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num. 168
B. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 189
C. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others	Num. 194
[Continuation of Question 5]
II. Scotus’ own Solution to the Fifth Question	Num. 200
III. To the Authorities from Aristotle to the Opposite	Num. 201
Question 7: Whether it is Possible for Several Angels to Exist in the Same Species	Num. 212
I. To the Question
A. The Opinion of Others	Num. 225
B. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num. 227
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 238

Second Part

On the Knowledge of Angels

                                            

Question 1: Whether an Angel can Know Himself through his own Essence	Num.
I. To the Question	Num.
A. The Opinion of Others	Num.
B. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num.
C. Instances against Scotus’ own Opinion	Num.
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num.
Question 2: Whether an Angel has a Distinct Natural Knowledge of the Divine Essence	Num.
I. The Response of Others to the Question	Num.
A. First Opinion	Num.
B. Second Opinion	Num.
C. Rejection of the Opinions	Num.
II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question	Num.
A. On Distinction of Intellections	Num.
B. Solution	Num.
III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion	Num.
IV. To the Argument for the Second Opinion	Num.
V. To the Principal Arguments	Num.
Question 3: Whether an Angel is Required to have Distinct Reasons for Knowing Created Quiddities in Order to Know them Distinctly	Num. 349
I. To the Question
A. The Opinion of Others	Num. 263
B. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num. 269
C. Instances against Scotus’ own Opinion	Num. 272
II. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 286
Question 2: Whether an Angel has a Distinct Natural Knowledge of the Divine Essence	Num. 302
I. The Response of Others to the Question	Num. 306
A. First Opinion	Num. 307
B. Second Opinion	Num. 312
C. Rejection of the Opinions	Num. 313
II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question
A. On Distinction of Intellections	Num. 318
B. Solution	Num. 324
III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion	Num. 332
IV. To the Argument for the Second Opinion	Num. 346
V. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 347
Question 3: Whether an Angel is Required to have Distinct Reasons for Knowing Created Quiddities in Order to Know them Distinctly	Num. 349
I. The Opinion of Others
A. First Opinion, which is that of Henry of Ghent	Num. 355
B. Second Opinion, which is that of Thomas Aquinas	Num. 364
C. Rejection of Both Opinions in General	Num. 366
D. Rejection of the First Opinion in Particular	Num. 378
II. Scotus’ own Opinion	Num. 388
III. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 395
IV. To the Arguments for the First Opinion	Num. 400
V. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion	Num. 408