Thirty Second Distinction

Question One. Whether the Father and the Son Love Each Themselves by the Holy Spirit

1. About the thirty second distinction I ask whether the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit.

That they do not:

Because to love is taken either essentially or notionally; not essentially, because anything essential is present in any person not through another person; if notionally, therefore the Father and the Son inspirit by the Holy Spirit, - which is false.

2. The same thing is proved secondly, because no notional act converts to the same agent form which it is or proceeds, because of the distinction which such notional act requires between the agent and the term; therefore, if this act converts, it is not taken notionally.

3. Further, if Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, then the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit, because the Father seems to love himself and the Son by the same thing; but the conclusion seems unacceptable, because the Father loves himself in the first moment of origin, in which the Holy Spirit is not understood to have been inspirited.

4. Further, they love themselves and creatures by the same thing; but the Holy Spirit does not seem to be ‘what they love the creature by’, because then just as the Holy Spirit from the necessity of his production is love, so love of creatures would be from necessity - and so God would necessarily love the creature.

5. On the contrary:

On the Trinity VI ch.5 n.7: the Holy Spirit is “that by which the begotten is loved by the begetter and loves his begetter.”

Question Two. Whether the Father is Wise by Generated Wisdom

6. Second I ask whether the Father is wise by generated wisdom.

That he is:

‘The Father speaks by the Word’, according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.1; but according to Anselm Monologion ch.63, “to speak by supreme spirit is nothing else than to intuit as it were by thinking;” therefore the Father intuits by the Word, and so he is wise by the Word.

7. On the contrary:

Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.1: “He exists by that by which he is wise, because for him to be wise and to be are the same;” therefore if he were wise by the Word he would exist by the Word.

I. Opinion of Others to the First Question

8. The first question is held to be difficult by the Master [I d.32 ch.1 n.283] and he dismisses it unsolved.

A. First Opinion

9. Some have denied the proposition ‘the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit’, and have said it was retracted by Augustine in a similar case, Retractions I ch.26, where he retracts this proposition ‘the Father is wise by generated wisdom’, to which the former seems to be similar, - and therefore they say the former is retracted in the latter.

10. On the contrary:

Not only does Augustine separately retract matters that need to be retracted, but he even retracts the same matter - which is spoken off in diverse books (though it needs to be retracted) - several times, namely when he makes mention of those diverse books; therefore much more would he separately retract this one, if it was to be retracted.

11. Also Augustine does not retract the sayings of other saints who seem to concede this proposition, - as Jerome On the Psalms [Ps.-Jerome, 17.1]

B. Second Opinion

12. Others have said that the proposition needs to be interpreted, so that the ‘by the Holy Spirit’ is to be taken in the idea of sign, - so that the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit as by a sign of common love.

13. On the contrary:

In this way it could be said that they love themselves by a creature, because a creature is a sign of their love.

C. Third Opinion

14. Others say that they love themselves with a love appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and so they are said to love themselves by the Holy Spirit through appropriation, not properly.

15. On the contrary:

In this way they would be good by the Holy Spirit, because goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

D. Fourth Opinion

16. In another way it is said that “the ablative [sc. ‘by’] is to be construed by way of formal effect.”

17. This is made clear first by the fact that, although not every thing is a form, yet “all that by which something is denominated - as far as this goes - has the disposition of a form; so that, if I should say ‘he is clothed in clothing’, the ablative ‘in clothing’ is construed by way of disposition of a form, although it is not the form of man.”

18. “But it happens that something is denominated by that which proceeds from it, as an agent is not only by the action but also as by the term of the action, which is the effect, when the effect is included in the understanding of the action; for we say that ‘fire is a heater by heating’, although heating is not heat (which is the form of fire) but an action that proceeds from fire; and we also say that ‘the tree is flowering with flowers’, although the flowers are not the form of the tree but certain effects proceeding from it.”

19. “According to this, then, one must say that since we may take ‘to love’ in two ways in divine reality, namely essentially and notionally - as to the way it is taken essentially, the Father and the Son do not love themselves in this way by the Holy Spirit but by their essence; hence Augustine says On the Trinity XI ch.7 n.12: ‘Who dares say that neither Father nor Son nor Holy Spirit love save through the Holy Spirit?’”

20. On the contrary [n.18]:

‘To build’ distinctly includes the term which is ‘a building’, yet it is not conceded that ‘a builder builds by a building’; and in the issue at hand too, ‘to inspirit’ more distinctly includes the Holy Spirit than it includes ‘to love’, and yet it is not conceded that ‘the Father and the Son inspirit by the Holy Spirit’.

21. Again, even if such predication were conceded, yet it is not referable back to the agent - because something that would be a term for the fire by something it produces is not conceded to be said of fire.

22. Further, in a transitive construction never is the effect ‘as effect’ construed in the ablative; but to love is a transitive verb. Hence the example - on which they rely [who adopt this opinion] - is not to the purpose; for ‘to flower’ is a neutral verb and does not formally state the production of anything.

Every neutral verb indeed signifies the same as an adjectival name (if a name were imposed), save that this name signifies by way of having and rest, but the verb signifies it in becoming, - as ‘to be hot’ signifies the same thing in rest as ‘to heat’ signifies it as it were in becoming. And just as such a denominative name could be said of something with the ablative, indicating that by which the subject is denominated with such denominative, so a neutral verb could be construed with the ablative in the same disposition of denominating form; for as fire ‘heats by heat’ so it is ‘hot by heat’, and both are in the idea of the form from which the denomination comes, by way of rest in the one case and by way of becoming in the other. But the form is sometimes inherent, as a quality, - and sometimes it is disposed by way of a form from without of the denominating thing, as in the case of the category of having [sc. being clad] or by way of it (in both ways the denomination can be made); and just as something is denominated not only by the form but by something extrinsic, sometimes, so what denominates can be said of it with the extrinsic thing taken in the ablative, and this whether what denominates signifies nominally or verbally; for just as one can say ‘he is adorned with a garment’ (insofar as ‘adorned’ signifies something in the category of having), so one can say ‘he is glowing with a garment’ (or by some other neutral verb that would signify the same as the denominative ‘is adorned’), - and so it is in the issue at hand, because ‘the tree is flowering’ does not formally signify that the tree is producing a flower. For if an active verb is posited, which would signify in this way, namely ‘to florificate’ (if it were in use), this proposition would be false ‘the tree is florificating with flowers’; but this proposition is true ‘the tree is flowering with flowers’, because by this neutral verb is signified that it denominates the subject as it were by way of having, because although having [sc. being clad] does not properly exist in inanimate things, yet they can be denominated by something next to them, which - insofar as it is in some way an ornament or covering for them - can be reduced to the category of having; and then, just as one would say ‘the tree is flowery with flowers’ and the ablative would be construed in idea of that by which the subject is denominated according to such a denomination, in this way too is the ‘with flowers’ construed with this verb ‘to flower’. The example, then, is to the opposite, when we are speaking of an active verb, and is nothing to the purpose - the way it is true -when we are speaking of a neutral verb.

II. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question

23. To solve this question [n.1] (because things in the intellect are more manifest [sc. than those in the will]), one must first reply to the second question [n.6].

And first let us look at our own intellect:

For there memory generates actual knowledge, which has a double relation to memory; namely ‘of generated to generating’ and this relation belongs to the second mode of relatives and is mutual - and the other ‘of declaring to declared’, and this belongs to the third mode of relatives and is not mutual [d.30 n.31]. But just as generated knowledge declares formally the object that lies in the memory, so that which produces actual knowledge and gives it this power of declaring can be said ‘to declare by this knowledge’ as if by way of efficient cause; for if someone produces a mirror and images appearing in it, although the mirror formally declares those appearing images, yet the ‘one producing the mirror’ declares them by efficient causality. And this is more evident if acts of the soul, which are not truly makings, were signified by neutral, non active verbs (but now they are signified by active verbs, because of the disposition they have to the object into which they pass as into their term, although they cause nothing in the object); for then, if they were neutral verbs, they would signify formally that the reality is in the subject from which they are imposed, and then active verbs of this sort could be imposed by the same forms, which would signify the production of them; and then ‘generated knowledge’ would be formally declarative of the object, but ‘the one producing’ would be said to be efficient cause of the form (just as was said elsewhere that likeness can be in that on which the relation of active and passive is founded, so that ‘making like’ is a giving of likeness [I d.19 n.28]), and then ‘declaring’ - taken actively -would be efficient cause of the formal declaration in the act of the soul or in the subject of that act.

24. To the issue at hand:

The divine Word is expressed by the Father, and this expression is a relation of origin; but to this expressed word is communicated by force of its production infinite knowledge, which - from this fact - is declarative of everything declarable. It has therefore a real relation to what expresses it, from which it is born, but the other relation - namely of the declarer - it has not only to itself but, because it is infinite, it has this respect of ‘declarative’ to itself and to it and to everything else; and this is only a relation of reason, because it is not only to creatures but also to itself; and if there is no real relation to creatures (from distinction 30 nn.49-51]), much more then is there not a real relation of the same thing to itself.a But this ‘to declare’ belongs formally to the Word, but it belongs by way of principal to the producer (just as in us it belonged to the memory as efficient cause), - and then the Word formally declares everything declarable; but the Father declares by the Word not formally but by way of principal, insofar as he communicates to him infinite actual knowledge, by which the Word actually declares.

a [Interpolation, from Appendix A] The word declares the object, ‘saying’ it clarifies the object by the word, by which is indicated that the word has the idea of the sub-authentic principle with respect to that which agrees with itself formally and with another by way of being principle; just as the Father creates by the Word by which the Word is indicated to have sub-authority with respect to action, because the action belongs to each as agent.

25. Applying this reality then to this verb which is ‘to say’, I say that ‘to say’a can signify the relation of origin which is ‘of generating to generated’ and in this way only the Father says, - not indeed by the Word but he says the Word; and in this way Richard [of St. Victor] says On the Trinity VI ch.12 that “only the Father says,” and as Augustine said “the Word, by which he has disposed all things.” In another way, ‘to say’ can signify the disposition of reason which is ‘to declare’, and this insofar as ‘to declare’ belongs to something formally, - and in this way the Word says all declarable things and by himself formally; and about this Augustine speaks ibid., VII ch.3 n.4: “For if this word is our temporal word etc.”b In the third way it can signify the same disposition of the declarer, insofar is it belongs to it not formally but by way of principal, and in this way it is said of the Father that ‘he says by the Word’, - and in this third way Augustine says ibid. that ‘the Father says by the Word’; in this way too he says ibid. XV ch.14 n.23 that “the Father saying himself generated the Son equal to himself,” where the takes ‘to say’ for ‘to declare by way of principal’, although he does not add there the principle by which the Father says.c, d

a [Interpolation, from Appendix A] in one way it is taken essentially, as is plain from Anselm Monologion ch.63 (and Augustine does not speak thus, On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.1); because according to Anselm the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one sayer, and any person says formally and with no other person in the ablative. In another way it is taken personally, and thus.

b [Interpolation, from Appendix A] And thus it is an essential and is appropriated to one person; for any person declares his own intelligibles that are in him, - yet it is appropriated to the Son, as is plain from the following doubt.

c [Interpolation] and thus the principal signified thing is an essential feature of it, but it connotes a notional feature, as was said above about gift [Reportatio IA d.32 n.35] - With what disposition is it construed? I say that if it were the same as ‘to create’ it would denote that it has the idea of authentic formal principle, and it is construed with the disposition of such principle.

d [Note by Duns Scotus] To say is purely an essential (Monologion 64 [nn.6, 30]). Purely a personal (‘to verbalize’): thus does the Father say the Son, not ‘by the Word’ unless it is dative (‘for the Word’) and by taking ‘to say’ as ‘to communicate by expressing’. In the third way, to declare formally: thus it is an essential (as in the first way), and thus does any of them here say by his own actual knowledge, as in the first way any of them says by his own intelligence; but in the third way it is appropriated to the Word, and first of the Father. In the fourth way, to declare by way of principle; which connotes a personal by the ‘by way of principle’, and it signifies an essential by ‘to declare’.

26. But then there is a doubt, whether to declare formally everything declarable is proper to the Word.

27. Some say that it is, because this belongs to him by force of his production.

28. But this was discussed above, in distinction 27 question 1 nn.100-101; and generally, since this verb ‘to declare’ states a relation of reason, and no such relation is proper to any person nor is included in what is proper to any person, it will not be the ‘to declare’ that is proper to the Word, but it is only appropriated to him by the fact that the Word, by force of his production, has actual knowledge communicated to him; but the Father, although he has it, yet, by the force by which he produces, he is memory, and he does not produce insofar as he is actual knowledge; but to actual knowledge - whereby it is actual - it belongs to declare, and therefore ‘to declare’ more belongs with a property of the Son than with a property of the other persons, and so it is more appropriated to him. But it truly is in every other person, because any person has actual declaration insofar as it is actual knowledge, and has it as equally declarative really as the actual knowledge is which is ‘word’. Therefore the Father formally declares everything by himself, just as the Son and the Holy Spirit formally declare everything each by himself. Therefore the Father and Son declare by the Holy Spirit by way of principle, although these ways of taking ‘to declare’ - formally and by way of principle - are not as much in use as those by which the Word is said to declare formally and the Father to do so by the Son by way of principle; and the reason for the greater use of these words is the appropriation of actual knowledge to the Word.

29. To the second question, then, I concede the negative part of the question, because of the reason of Augustine ibid. [n.2].a

a [Interpolation] The declaration of this is as follows: an essential act cannot belong to any supposit by mediation of any principle as a ‘by which’, unless it is to such person the formal principle of existence (as the Father is wise by ungenerated wisdom), or the originating principle for it of existence (in which way the Master concedes [I d.32 ch.2 n.287] that the Son is wise by ungenerated wisdom, from which he has the fact that he is wise), or the sub-authentic principle with respect to such act (in which way it is conceded that the Father creates by the Word); but the Son - or generated wisdom - is not for the F ather the formal principle of existence, nor the originating principle, nor the sub-authentic active principle, with respect to his essential act, -because he does not produce that act in himself (but it is communicated to him and to [from?] the Son), and the sub-authentic active principle has the idea of producer with respect to the act with respect to which it is called such a principle. But to be wise is an essential act, therefore the Father is not wise with generated wisdom. - But this he [sc. Scotus] said at first [Reportatio IA d.32 n.27], and then, so that the solution of the question may be better seen, one must first see it as it is contained above [nn.23.25] etc.

III. To the Principal Argument of the Second Question

30. To the argument for the opposite [n.6] I say that Anselm takes ‘to say’ there purely essentially for ‘actually to understand’, as he expressly intends in that chapter, where he says that they are ‘one sayer as they are one understander, and although each says and says each, yet they are one in idea of saying and of said just as they one understanding and one intellect’. This way extends considerably what it is ‘to say’, because it neither signifies the relation of origin nor connotes it, just as neither do ‘to understand’ and ‘to be wise’; and Augustine does not in this way say that the Father says by the Word [nn.6, 25].

31. But how is it conceded that the Holy Spirit says the Word? - I reply: in the same way as he understands the Word [sc. purely essentially]. But it is not conceded for ‘to express’; nor for ‘to declare’, unless it is taken formally, because the Holy Spirit declares formally everything declarable; but not for ‘to declare by way of principle’, save perhaps in respect of creatures, because when we speak of the manifestation of creatures, the whole Trinity effects that. And because the Holy Spirit does not have any idea of principle absolutely over the formal manifestation of the Word - not when comparing it to creatures - (because he does not give to the Word that by which he is formally manifestive), therefore this seems in no way to be conceded. Nor does Anselm say that ‘the Holy Spirit says by the Word’, although he sees everything in the Word; so too any of the blessed sees everything in the Word, and any person sees in any person (according to Augustine ibid. XV ch.14 n.23), but ‘to say by the Word’ seems to involve some authority of ‘saying by the Word’ with respect to the Word insofar as the Word is declarative formally.

IV. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question

32. As to the first question, about the Holy Spirit [n.1], one must proceed in the same way as was done in the preceding question [nn.23-25].

And first about our will:

Here I say that will in us, as it is produced, has a relation of the second mode to the will as producer, and the relation is perhaps mutual. It also has another relation, to the object, pertaining to the third mode of relatives, - and it is not mutual, because just as science is referred to the knowable and conversely [d.30 n.38], so love is referred to the lovable and not conversely; and just as love has formally some disposition to the object, so that which produces love can be denominated from that disposition, if a word were imposed signifying it actively.

33. So I say in divine reality that the Holy Spirit, by the force of his production -not indeed properly but by appropriation - is love of everything necessarily loved, and therefore he has some relation of reason formally to what is thus loved; but the producer of him can be denominated from the same disposition, as if by way of principle, and this disposition, as denominating by way of principle, is introduced by this word ‘to love’, when the Father and the Son are said ‘to love themselves by the Holy Spirit’; this indeed is for ‘the Father and the Son to produce the Love’ which is of the Father and the Son, just as for ‘the Father to say himself by the Word’ is to produce the Word, which is what declares the Father himself.

V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

34. To the first argument [n.1] I say that it is held neither purely essentially nor purely notionally, but it connotes the notion (namely the production of the Holy Spirit), and it signifies the disposition that follows the Holy Spirit to that loved thing (not indeed formally but by way of being principle); and by reason of this following disposition it is an ‘essential’ as to the term of the disposition, because the term is not only the Holy Spirit but everything necessarily lovable, - and to this extent there is conversion, but not as to the connoted notional feature (the answer to the second argument [n.2] is plain from this). And this can be made clear in the example of ‘to say’, that, in the way in which it is conceded that the Father says by the Word, ‘to say’ is neither merely essential nor merely notional, but connotes the notional (namely generation), and it introduces the disposition of what is declarative, which disposition is to everything declarable; something similar to this (although not so perfectly) can be found in what it is ‘to be sent’, which connotes process in divine reality, although it signifies principally a temporal effect; and as to what it signifies, the whole Trinity works the effect, - as to the notion, it does not respect the whole Trinity in the idea of principle (for the Son can be sent, though he is not from the Holy Spirit).

35. To the third [n.5]. Although some force can be give to this proposition [sc. the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit], because the ‘themselves’ can be understood reflexively or reciprocally (discussion of this double construal is found in Peter Elias On Priscian on Construal - and it is plain in the sophism ‘they are fighting so that they may themselves conquer’ [sc. either: conquer over themselves, or: be themselves conquerors]), and according to some the proposition would seem more needing to be conceded to the extent the ‘themselves’ is construed reflexively than reciprocally, because the Holy Spirit according to them is inspirited by the Father and the Son by concordant will (insofar namely as the Father bestows love on the Son and the Son bestows it back, according to Richard On the Trinity [I d.12 n.10]), yet when speaking in accordance with what was said in distinction 12 n.36 on this matter, that the Father and Son inspirit formally by will insofar as it is one (but the relation of concord of Father with Son and conversely is not the formal reason for inspiriting, because it does not seem that the Father and Son, insofar as they have a respect of origin to the Holy

Spirit, have a mutual relation to each other; for then they would not have only a mutual relation of origin of paternity and filiation; and this, I repeat, when saying that although by having one will they agree in it formally yet the concord is not per se the reason but the one will is - and that the fecundity is complete in one just as it is in two; therefore, however, two inspirit, because the fecundity is pre-understood to be one in the two before they have the term), it can be conceded that the truth is the same when taking the ‘themselves’ in this way or in that way; and then I concede the consequent [n.3], that ‘the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit’. And when you say ‘he loves himself in the first moment of origin’ [n.3], it is true, - but then he loves himself by the will as it is in him formally; but by inspiriting the Holy Spirit, who is necessarily love of him, he loves himself by the Holy Spirit as it were by way of being principle - in which way too the Son loves himself by the Holy Spirit.

36. To the final argument [n.4] I say that one should not concede that the Father and Son love the creature by the Holy Spirit in the way they love themselves by the Holy Spirit, because this way of loving - as taken by way of being principle - seems to belong first to that term of love to which love itself belongs formally, from the fact that it is from a principle; for thus to love the object is to be principle of love, which - as from a principle - is formally of that object; but the Holy Spirit, by the force of his being from a principle, is neither first nor concomitantly love of the creature, because the creature is only contingently loved by God. But although from the force of his production he is first love of essence, yet concomitantly he can be called love of the Son, because those persons are ‘in nature first loved’ from necessity of the nature; and therefore it can be conceded that the Father does not love the creature by the Holy Spirit in the way that he loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, because he does not produce a love which by the force of its production is love of the creature, nay with a complete necessary production of the love there is still contingency in the love as it is of the creature - and this is in the power not only of producing this love but of the love produced, because the Holy Spirit as contingently loves the creature as the Father and Son do.a a. [Note by Duns Scotus] The will in love formally takes or values the object; but if it were not informed with love but only inspirited it (as now, insofar as it inspirits it), it accepts or values it by way of being principle, that is, it renders the object accepted or valued by its love, as that which from it is what formally accepts. Thus can it be expounded of the formal effect, that is of the product, which has from the production that it is the formal ‘by which’ with respect to another.

But to whom is it accepted? - Response: just as to whom it is declared, because ‘to everyone who sees the word’; so here, to everyone loving love.

But does it then hold that every will loving the essence as it is the object of love (which is the Holy Spirit) loves it by the Holy Spirit, - and seeing the essence in the Word as it is the object of knowledge in the Word knows it by the Word? But if so, not for this reason does it say the Word, and consequently neither does it love by the Holy Spirit - as it corresponds by way of being principle in this case in that case, because it is not the principle of the Word or the Holy Spirit.