2. Scotus’ own Opinion

11. I say, therefore, that there is here a foundation or equality that is real and from the nature of the thing, not only a remote one, which is the essence, - but a proximate one, which is magnitude or specifically ‘infinity’. And this is proved by all the reasons that are given to show that the essence of the first thing is infinite; they do all indeed conclude that from the nature of the thing it is infinite; for all things that depend on it - whether on it as it is first in idea of effective principle, or in idea of final principle, or in idea of being eminent and measuring and participated (which ways were touched on in distinction 2 nn.111-144) - all these things, I say, depend on it according to what it is from the nature of the thing, after removing every act of intellect, because no dependence of a finite effect rests on something under the formal idea of a being of reason, as can be proved by the reasons given in distinction 13 against the sixth opinion [nn.31-42]). There is also here from the nature of the thing what is posited as the proximate foundation of equality, or the idea of founding it, namely unity, because according to Damascene ch.8: “In him” (namely in God) “common and one are considered to be in the thing;” it is not so in the case of creatures, but the common there is ‘one’ by intellect only.