II. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question

30. I respond therefore to the first question [n1] that the relations of creatures to God are new and from time, nor is there need, because of them, insofar as they are related to God ‘as to their term’, to posit any relations in God from time to be their term.

I prove it thus:

First, because according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.15.1021a26-30 ‘About relation’, relatives in the third mode are called those that are said ‘to something’ because other things belong to them, - so that this is the per se difference of the two first modes from the third, that in the first two the relation is mutual, but in the third it is not mutual, but one of the relatives is referred precisely to the other and the other is not referred but is only something of it; but all relations of creatures to God pertain to the third mode of relatives; therefore of whatever sort those are which are in one extreme, there is no need for the other extreme - according to some relation in it - to be the term of those relations, but it can be the term precisely under the idea of an absolute.a

a [Note of Duns Scotus] Henry [of Ghent, Summa a.55 q.5 ad 4]: “Praepositinus responds saying that ‘not every relation has a correlation, for there is a relation of the creature with respect to the creator, yet there is not one in the creator with respect to the creature, - which is true as to the reality; yet it is present according to a consideration of the intellect.”

32. And this is also proved from the intention of the Philosopher Metaphysics 9.8.1049b12-17, where he proves that ‘act is prior to power in definition, because power is defined by act’; but if act were referred to power, then - conversely - act would also be defined by power, as Porphyry says Book of Predicables ch.3 ‘About species’, because in mutual relatives “the ideas of both must be posited in the ideas of both.”

33. Then the argument goes: act defines power as it is the term of the relation; either then it is term of the relation as an absolute, and the intended conclusion is gained, - or as a correlative, and thus power will define act; therefore as act is ‘prior’ in definition it is ‘posterior’ in definition!

34. Therefore act so defines power that it is not conversely defined by it, and consequently act is not referred to power but is a pure absolute, and this under the idea under which it defines power; but it defines power insofar as power is to it as a relation to a term; therefore act, according as it is a pure absolute ‘something’, is the term of this relation, whatever the relation be, whether simply so or in a certain respect.

35. This is also more generally proved by all relatives, because no relative is referred first to the correlative as to a term in the case of creatures.

Proof: a relative, insofar as it is relative, is first defined by the term to which it is referred, - therefore the term ‘as term’ is prior in definition to the relative as relative. The inference is plain from Metaphysics 7.4.1030b4-7, where the Philosopher compares accident to substance - and from him Metaphysics 9.8.1049b12-17, where he compares potency to act.

36. If then the term, insofar as it is term, is referred to the related thing insofar as it was related, then ‘insofar as it is term’ it will have regard to the related thing for definition, and consequently for what is prior according to definition; therefore father would be prior to son in definition and conversely. But it is impossible for there to be a circle in any essential priority whatever, therefore it is impossible for father to be referred first to son insofar as son is referred to father. Therefore it is referred first to the absolute that is the proximate foundation of the relation (namely of filiation), and the absolute is prior to the father as father; and conversely, son ‘as son’ is referred to the absolute which is the proximate foundation of paternity, and the absolute is prior to filiation and to son insofar as it is son.

37. Nor is there because of this any circle, as that to the father ‘insofar as he is father’ a should be prior (which is an ‘absolute’ and the proximate foundation of filiation), and that to filiation ‘insofar as it is filiation’ b should be prior (which is the proximate foundation of the relation of paternity). For from this there only follows that these two absolutes are prior to two relations, and this is true; nay both absolutes are prior to each relation, because any relation pre-requires not only the foundation but also the term as it is term. Thus therefore is how things are when the relations are mutual; but it happens there to the term, as it is term, that it is conversely referred. It is possible therefore for something to be referred to an absolute, - and so it seems reasonable to posit this in God, who most of all has the idea of an absolute as creatures are related to him.

38. Further, although the intellect could busy itself about the term of some relation of the third mode [n.31] and cause a relation of reason in that term, yet that is not a reason for being the term; for although some intellect confer the squaring of the circle on science, causing in that absolute the relation of reason which is knowability, yet that is not a reason for terminating the relation of reason to it; for this relation of reason is not in this absolute save as actually considered by the intellect, but science is really referred to it, not merely as it is considered by the intellect; therefore the relation of reason in the knowable was not the reason for terminating the relation of the science.

39. This can also be made clear in the issue at hand about God, because although the divine essence can be compared to creatures, and this through an act both of the created intellect and of the uncreated intellect, and so this act can cause in the essence a relation of reason, yet it will not be the reason for terminating the relation of creatures to it. Certainly not the one that is caused by act of the created intellect; proof, because then, when no created intellect was considering, by comparing God to a stone (if God were to produce a stone) there would not be in the stone a real relation to him, because neither is there a relation of reason in God which would be the reason for terminating the real relation of the stone to him; the consequent is false. Therefore also not that one either that the divine intellect causes in its own essence; proof, because if per impossibile God were not an intellectual nature (as some have said, positing that the sun is the first principle [Wisdom 13.1-2]) and he were to produce a stone, the stone would be really referred to God and yet then there would be no relation of reason in God to it.

40. Absolutely then I say that, because of the termination of relations in creatures from time to God, there is no need to posit any relation in God, neither new nor old, which might be the reason for terminating the relation of the creature.

41. Yet there can be posited in God some relation of reason, new indeed, as that which is caused in him by act of our intellect when considering him, but not any new one by act of his own intellect.

Which I prove because never is there passage from contradictory to contradictory without change; for if there were no change in anything, there would be no reason why one of the contradictories could now be true rather than the other, nor why one should be false rather than the other, and so both are false at the same time and true at the same time; but if in God there could be a new relation by act of his own intellect, one extreme of some contradiction would now be true about something which before was not true;a therefore there is some change in something. Not in the divine essence as known, - nor in the object considered, because it does not yet exist. Nor in anything to which it is compared by his own intellect, unless change is posited in the intellect itself when comparing; because, as the object compared and that to which it is compared - insofar as they are such - do not have another being save in being understood, so they cannot have another being or exist in another way unless something else is understood of them or understood in another way; but if something different being understood of them or being differently understood is impossible without some change of the divine intellect, then no relation can be new in God by act of his own intellect comparing his essence to something temporal. But this is not for this reason, that an actual and a potential relation are one (as the first rejected opinion said [nn.11, 15-19]), but for this reason, that the divine intellect - whatever it compares its essence to - compares in eternity, although not for eternity; hence just as in eternity he compares his will ‘as creative’ to the soul of Antichrist as possible for a certain time, so he compares in eternity his will ‘as creating’ to the soul of Antichrist as actually existing for the now for which he wishes to create that soul; and these indeed are two relations of reason, as they are two extremes, - but each is eternal, although not for eternity.

a [Interpolation] because now it is being considered under some idea under which it was not being before considered by the divine intellect.

42. From this is apparent the response to this objection: ‘If there can be no new relation in God by act of his own intellect, then if no created intellect were possible and God could create a stone, he could not understand himself creating a stone as a created intellect can understand him now creating a stone, when he does create it; the consequent appears unacceptable, because whatever is knowable by us is much more knowable also by him’. - I reply: God could know himself creating a stone at time a; but he could not newly know himself creating a stone, but in eternity he would know himself creating a stone at time a just as in eternity he knows himself to be at some time creative of a stone. This is to say, in eternity he knows the actual relation of it to that at time a, just as he also knows the quasi potential relation of himself to it - a relation of reason, however - at some time.

43. In brief I say that it is plain there is no new relation in God, per se terminating a new relation of a creature; there is however some new relation by act of a created intellect, but none by act of his own intellect.

44. But then the first member [n.43] seems doubtful, as to how God is to be posited as lord, - according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.16 n.17 [above, n.4].

I reply: by the sole new relation that is in the creature to him is he denominated ‘lord’; not indeed that in creatures there are two opposite relations [sc. of lord and servant] (by one of which God is denominated [n.24]), but there is one relation only [sc. of servant], which is to God as he is absolute. And for this reason, because ‘as absolute’ he is the term of that relation, he is denominated as if there were in him a new relation, namely the corresponding one [sc. lord], - in the way that a work made by a man is called ‘human’, not because of something of humanity that is formally in the work, but because of the humanity that is formally in man, to whom the work has a disposition.

45. And this seems to be the intention of the Master expressly in the text [d.30 ch.1 n.264], when he concludes this from the words of Augustine. For he speaks thus: “The appellation by which a creature is said relatively to the creator is relative, and it indicates the relation that is in the creature itself; but the appellation by which the creator is said relatively to the creator is relative indeed, but it indicates no relation that is in the creator;” and this same thing is what Augustine seems to say On the Trinity V [nn.4, 11, 24, 44], as the Master adduces him: “That God begins in time to be called what he was not called before is manifestly relatively said, not however according to an accident of God (because something has happened to him), but plainly according to an accident of that to which God begins relatively to be said.”