B. Rejection of the Opinion

44. Against this way the argument is as follows:

No negation is of itself incommunicable, because just as it is not of itself one or individisible by any division, so it is not of itself a this and incommunicable, but only by an affirmation to which being divided is first repugnant, - and it is by this that not being divided belongs to negation; and so too does it seem about being incommunicable, that to be communicated is not repugnant to negation of itself but only by some affirmation to which incommunicability first belongs; therefore negation will not be the first idea of incommicability.a

a [Note by Duns Scotus] Response: negation of being from a principle in being is altogether incommunicable, because everything else from a unique being is from a principle.

     Hence is ‘this negation’ incommunicable in being? - I say from the nature of being that this negation in its being communicated is repugnant to it.

     On the contrary: therefore the positive thing is incommunicable first. This does not follow; rather, if there were not merely one principle, there would not be merely one thing without a principle.

     An instance: non-animation, positing that the form of a mixed thing remains the same as before. - It is no instance, because although non-animation might be present in a thing so mixed, yet it is not proper to it, because animation was present in it.

45. Further, no negation is proper to any subject save by some affirmation proper to it on which such negation follows; therefore this negation ‘not being from another’ is not proper to the first person save because some prior affirmation is proper to him on which this negation follows; the ‘prior affirmation’ cannot be the essence, - therefore some positive property.

46. Further, if the first person is incommunicable formally by negation, and the second is incommunicable by positive relation (namely by filiation) and the third likewise (namely by passive inspiriting), - then these persons are not uniformly disposed in idea of personality; nor are they equally positive, nor equally perfect (insofar as they are persons), because negation and some positive property are not equally perfect personality.

47. These reasons, although perhaps they may not convince an adversary that they cannot be solved, yet because it does not seem probable that the first person is formally a person by negation alone, therefore can the conclusion of these reasons be conceded.