I. To the First Question

11. To the first question there is need to see two things, - first how unbegotten agrees with the Father alone, and second how it can be a property since it seems to involve only a negation.

A. In What Way Unbegotten Agrees with the Father Alone

12. As to the first point I say I say that every name, composed of something with many senses and a privative particle [sc. as in ‘unbegotten’], is doubly many, both from the multiplicity of the opposite affirmation, and from the multiplicity of the privation -as is plain from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.12.1019b19-23, ‘On Power’, where he distinguishes ‘impotence’ according to the multiplicity of potency, and, in addition to this, according to the multiplicity of privation, which is set down in ‘On Privation’, ibid., 22.1022b22-31; thus this name ‘unbegotten’ will be multiple, from the multiplicity of what is meant by ‘begotten’ and from the multiplicity of the privative particle.

13. As to the first point, what is begotten is properly said to be ‘produced by generation’ as the first term; but by extension, what is begotten is said to be ‘communicated by generation’, which is the formal term of generation (as Hilary On the Trinity IV ch.10 says, because the Son has nothing “save being born”); in a third way what is begotten is extended to what is produced or what pre-requires generation, although it is not per se the term of generation, whether first or formal.

14. Privation can also be multiply distinguished into privation properly said, namely when something lacks that which it is of a nature to have, and when it is so, and as etc. [sc. e.g. a blind adult dog]; and into privation more commonly said, when something lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not according to the aforesaid conditions [sc. e.g. puppies born blind which acquire sight a few days later]; and still more commonly when it lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not in itself but in its genus (as a mole is said to be blind, because vision - of which it is deprived by blindness - is not repugnant to the animal in its genus though it is repugnant to mole in itself). And in this way privation is said more generally the more the habit - of which it is the privation - is of a nature to belong to a more common thing agreeing with that privation; for example, something that would not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body would be called ‘deprived’ in a more general way than if it did not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of animal - and in a still more general way if it did not have what it would be of a nature to have according to the idea of body - and in the most general way if it did not have what it is of a nature to have according to the idea of being.a, b

a [Note of Duns Scotus] Privation (namely lack of what is of a nature to be had): according to the idea of being, according to the idea of genus, according to the idea of species, most properly (when, as, etc.). The first privation exists in any created thing, because any created thing is limited, - the second is not, because it includes every perfection eminently. - But is the second privation of relation in God or in a divine person? That it is not: the essence in any person eminently includes it. - On the contrary: the Father is unbegotten [nn.5, 19].

b [Interpolation] An example of the first: as a stone is said to be inanimate and deprived of the soul that is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body, of which ‘animated’ is a difference. Example of the second: as an angel is said to be incorporeal. Example of the third: as any creature is said to be imperfect, not because it is of a nature to have every perfection in its genus but because having every perfection is not repugnant to being.

15. Negation is also distinguished by negation outside the genus, which contradicts the affirmation, - and it is true of anything of which the affirmative is false, whether about being or non-being [e.g. non-man is true of a horse and a chimaera]; the other is ‘negation in the genus’ and it supposes the nature of the genus of which it is said, - and it can be understood in many ways, according to the multiplicity, more common and less common, of genus.

16. To the issue at hand, then, when speaking of the multiplicity involved in this particle ‘un-’: although there is dispute whether it implies negation in the genus or privation, yet it seems they are the same thing in the issue at hand, taking negation according to genus in the most general way and privation according to genus in the most general way, because negation in a something naturally fitted to have what is negated is privation (according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 4.2.1004a9-16), so that privation adds nothing to negation save that it requires something naturally fitted in which to exist. Therefore negation in a genus - however genus is taken - since it is in something naturally fitted in some way (although not fitted in itself), will be privation in some way in genus, though not properly in such a thing according to its being such.a

a [Note by Duns Scotus] Privation is nothing formally but negation, and therefore it is not in a subject otherwise than as negation is; fittingness is in a subject, but does not per se belong to privation unless privation involves two concepts, - but each concept is separable from the other, and each is indicated or connoted by the privative name.

17. And if you object against this that there is no privation in divine reality, because what is deprived is imperfect, I reply that this conclusion holds of privation according to the proper idea of a deprived subject; for if the thing that ‘lacks’ were of a nature in itself to have what it lacks it would be imperfect - but if it is of a nature to have it according to the idea of genus, it is not imperfect. But that many privations are taken in this way too is plain not only from what the Philosophe says about ‘mole’ [n.14] but also by the common division of ‘common’ into habit and privation - as ‘animal’ is divided into rational and irrational; ‘irrational’ indeed states in an ox a privation, not of what is of a nature to be had in an ox in its species, but of what would be of a nature to be had in ‘what it is to be animal’; for the genus, as common to the privation and the habit, is that to which the fitness for each belongs.

18. But in the issue at hand, by extending what it is to be a genus (whether we understand it for the privation or for the negation in genus, by both of which I understand the same thing), I can take ‘quasi genus’ here for that which is common to the three persons, namely person or subsistent; and then we may say that the Father is in some way deprived in genus - or that in the Father there is some negation in genus - of something that is of a nature to belong not only to being but to supposit, which is common to Father and Son.

19. And then this name ‘unbegotten’ will be able to be taken for the issue in hand in four ways:

In one way most properly, insofar as it signifies a proper lack of what is properly signified by the name ‘begotten’, which is the first thing produced by generation, - and in this way it does not exist in divine reality, because nothing there lacks what is of a nature to be present. In the second way, insofar as it signifies a lack commonly of what is signified properly by ‘begotten’, and then it connotes a subsistent or person, and it signifies a lack ‘in genus’ of begotten properly taken; and in this way it seems to belong -by virtue of the terms - to the Father and the Holy Spirit, each of whom is a subsistent and is not begotten (it does not thus belong to the essence, because although the essence is being and non-begotten, yet it is not per se subsistent and person). In the third way - as it seems - it states a lack in genus, and this of ‘begotten’ taken in the second way, namely for what is communicated by generation; and in this way the essence is not said to be un-generable, by removal of aptitude for communication - but as the essence is in the Father it can be said to be non-communicated, and so unbegotten, if unbegotten is taken in this way. In the fourth way it signifies lack ‘in genus’ of what is begotten taken in the most common way, and then ‘unbegotten’ is the same as non-produced subsistent; and in this way it is taken by the saints, such that it is the same in divine reality as ‘unproduced’ properly taken; this is plain from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.26 n.47: “the Father alone is not from another, and therefore is alone called unbegotten,” and he means the same to Orosius [n.5].

20. I say therefore that ‘unbegotten’ in the usage of the saints, namely as it signifies the negation of begotten most commonly taken (that is of what is produced), by connoting a subsistent in divine nature, belongs thus only to the Father, as is plain from the authority of Augustine already cited [n.19].

B. How Unbegotten can be a Property of the Father

1. First Opinion

21. About the second article [n.11] some say that since unbegotten states only a privation in the genus or only a negation, and so does not of its formal nature state any dignity nor anything pertaining to dignity, and since nothing can be posited as a property of a divine person unless it is something pertaining to dignity, therefore unbegotten must connote something positive, by reason of which connotation it is a property; now this positive thing is set down by them to be a fountain of fullness that exists in the Father alone, - in whom is all fecundity, both inwardly and outwardly.

22. But against this:

First because this fountain of fullness is not understood outwardly, because such fecundity is common to the three. But inwardly there is only in the Father a double fecundity, namely for generating and for inspiriting; but this fecundity is not any one positive thing in the Father save the essence, - but it does not connote the essence, so as for this reason to be called a property of the Father. But that this fountain of fullness is not any single positive relation in the Father is plain, because then there would be three positive relations in the Father, namely active generation and active inspiriting and the relation which by circumlocution is said to be what this ‘fountain of fullness’ of fecundity is, although it lacks a name; and then there would be six notions, which is not commonly conceded, - at any rate there are not conceded to be in the Father three relative and positive properties.

23. Further, unbegotten does not seem to connote that fountain of fullness, because it does not connote the first fecundity, - because according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7, “even if he had not generated, nothing would prevent him from being unbegotten;” therefore unbegotten can precede active generation. Much more too does it not connote the second fecundity, because if per impossibile there could not be a production by way of will, yet there would still be status in generation for some unbegotten person. Therefore it seems that the fountain of fullness, which states only a double fecundity, cannot be connoted by what is meant by ‘unbegotten’.

24. Third their reason [n.21] does not seem valid, because if a property of a person were to state a dignity simply, then the person that did not have it would not have every dignity simply, - which is unacceptable.

2. Second Opinion

25. In another way it is said that this positive thing is existence from itself (and it said to be the intention of Richard of St. Victor), and that ‘existence from itself’ is a proper positive element called by circumlocution ‘unbegotten’, and it precedes relation to the Son. For because it is something from itself, therefore all being and all existence -according to Richard [On the Trinity V ch.4] - ought to come from it.

26. On the contrary: ‘from itself’, if it is something positive, is either something absolute and will be common to the three; or it is something relative, and not relative to what is prior (because there is only a negation of relation to what is prior), so it will be relative to the Son. Therefore ‘from itself’ either states filiation, if it is positive, or it states a disposition to what precedes and it will be a negation of relation, and so a negation the way ‘unbegotten’ is; therefore it is not a proper positive element of him [sc. the Father].

3. Scotus’ own Opinion

27. Therefore it seems one should say that unbegotten under its proper idea (as it signifies not having a begetter) is a personal property of the Father, and does sufficiently imply dignity, that is does not imply indignity, for this is enough for a personal property not to have indignity, in the way too that personal features in divine reality are not said to be imperfections (but not perfections simply, that is, perfections universally in anything).

28. And if there is altogether dispute that a property should altogether state dignity, not an absolute but a personal dignity, one can say that unbegotten, insofar as it denies ‘having a begetter’, states a personal dignity of the first person in divine reality, because just as it is a mark of dignity in the second person to have an originating principle, so it is a mark of dignity in the first person not to have one; and yet it is not necessary that this dignity be formally the dignity of some proper positive thing, connoted by what it means to be ‘unbegotten’. Hence negation can be said to be a mark of dignity in something insofar as it would be a mark of indignity if the affirmation were posited in him, - the way it is a mark of dignity in a king that he is not ribald.a

a [Note by Duns Scotus] Henry [of Ghent, Summa 57 q.1]: “As positive relations are founded on the essence from the nature of the thing, so this one too is negative; for from the nature of the essence comes the fact that in some person there is a reason by which he is not from another, and thus the substrate for this negation is only the divine essence, - so that the sense is: ‘unbegotten’ that is ‘having divine essence not from another’. For to have formally from himself the divine essence and not from anything as principle is to have it freely (the way a king has a kingdom), -therefore it is a mark of dignity (the notion is precisely by reason of negation; it implies dignity from the fact that it is founded on such affirmation); hence to have deity from another simply is not a mark of dignity but only by reason of the noble mode of having it, namely through generation and inspiriting.

     Ibid., ad 7: “Unbegotten strictly, namely ‘not produced by generation’, does not state dignity” (because a negation of dignity does not state dignity), “but unbegotten as it is a notion does; it does not belong to the Holy Spirit but only to the Father; thus it simply states: ‘being in no way from another’.”

     Ibid. ad 2: “Therefore non-inspirited does not state dignity, because inspirited states it” (therefore it is not a sixth notion).

     The first paragraph above is expounded ibid. ad 5: “Unbegotten is considered in one way simply and in itself, in another way as it is considered about such a nature. In the first way, the substrate is only the essence, so that if there were a hypostasis in the essence without a property it would be unbegotten. In the second way, something is a substrate of its negation in a triple way: namely either ‘as that on which it is founded’, or ‘as that by which it is founded on another’, or third ‘as that of which it is’; it indicates the idea of substance alone formally (on which it is founded), but only as it is under the property of the Father.”

     On the contrary: one would say better ad 7 that [unbegotten] implies dignity by reason of the foundation only; nor does it follow that it does not state a proper dignity, because the essence is indifferent to several personal dignities.

     The first argument that he posits [in 57 q.3] is confirmed by the fact that where there is a positive disposition to what is prior, it is to the prior before it is to the posterior; therefore so is the negative too, - and this is what is said, that the idea of first precedes the idea of principle; and universally, in what is not constituted by an order to what follows, the negation of order to the prior precedes the order to the posterior, and never elsewhere. The absolute is prior to the relative, - ‘unbegotten’ in itself could belong to an absolute supposit, if there was one.

     Gofrey [of Fontaines Quodlibet V q.3]: A notion indicates, the persons are distinguished by relations of origin; therefore what pertain to the origin are notions. The first person is indicated doubly by origin: because he is ‘from none’ and ‘another is from him’ (therefore there is another notion); by reason of negation it implies dignity (therefore it is a ‘negation in genus’), and it states dignity from the fact it is founded on an affirmation. This is the essence, which lies beneath all the divine notions, so that the sense is: ‘unbegotten’, that is ‘having divine essence not from antoher’ (this is mark of great dignity). Third, how dignity is proper to the Father: because it is considered in a double way, in itself and by reason of form, or by reason of matter (as being about such matter); in the first way only the essence lies beneath, whatever the supposit be, absolute or relative; in the second way, it is triply founded: ‘disposition to the foundation’, ‘as that in which’, ‘as that of which’ (in this way the supposit with its property lies beneath).

C. To the Principal Arguments

29. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-4].

To the first [n.1] I deny the minor. When it is proved from the Philosopher in De Interpretatione, I say that the consequence of the Philosopher holds on the basis of the truth of the first principle, namely this principle ‘what one contradictory is removed from, of that the other is asserted’; but as such, one cannot conclude that an affirmative about an infinite predicate follows from a negative about a finite predicate save as the infinite predicate signifies a negation outside the genus, contradictory to the affirmation (because ‘a negation in the genus’ does not contradict the affirmation), then the inference ‘it is not begotten, therefore it is non-begotten’ does not follow save about a negation outside the genus; and in this way non-begotten does not convert with begotten, although it would convert if one takes non-begotten in the sense of stating a negation in the genus, which is the way Augustine [n.1] understands it.

30. To the second [n.2] I concede that no property of a person - according to the common way [d.26 n.15] - states something that exists to itself. Yet one should not say that every property states a relation positively, but it is enough that it state a relation positively or negatively; for if the relation is personal and proper to some person, the negation of the relation will also be a personal feature proper to another person, and thus not existing to itself nor common to the three; and in this way - namely negatively -unbegotten states a relation, as is plain from Augustine On the Trinity V ch.7 n.8. And then this proposition is false, ‘every non-begotten is a related thing’ [n.2], - and yet the inference does not follow, ‘therefore non-begotten states something existing to itself’, but what follows is that it either states something existing to itself or it states the negation of a proper relation or ‘a relation negatively’.

31. To the third [n.3] one response is that what is inspirit-able does not state any dignity, as unbegotten does, and so it is not a notion. - But this seems false in itself, because it is a mark of equal dignity in the Father and the Son not to be inspirited as it is in the Father not to be begotten; and also it does not seem valid as to the issue at hand, because it does not seem necessary for a property (or for a notion) to state a proper dignity [n.27].

32. One can say in another way that unbegotten states non-produced (as was expounded in the first article of this solution [nn.19-20]), and in this way non-inspirit-able - because it is contained in it - is not a different notion from it; for the inference ‘non-produced therefore non-inspirited’ follows, and not conversely; therefore it is not another notion.

33. On the contrary: unbegotten is only in the Father, non-inspirited is in the Father and Son, therefore this notion is not that one.

34. If this inference [n.33] is to be conceded, there will be six notions, unless another reason be assigned why non-inspirit-able is not a notion. Although it may seem absurd to posit six notions (because commonly there are not so many posited), one could say that an argument place from authority does not hold negatively: ‘this is not said, therefore this is not the case’. For in the time of Ambrose it does not seem that three notions in the Father were in use, because he did not wish to use this name ‘unbegotten’ [nn.4, 35]; in the time of Anselm also two positive notions in the Father do not seem to have been in use, because he himself does not use ‘inspiriting force’, but takes ‘deity’ in its place, common to Father and Son. Although from the beginning only three properties were noted, namely paternity, filiation, and inspiriting (and this from the word of the Savior in the Gospel, Matthew 28.19 and of John in his canonical letter, I John 5.7 [nn.26, 67]), yet afterwards other notions and properties became known by investigation, which were prior in the thing though not known first; and so, just as later thinkers conceded more notions than earlier ones did (although the earlier ones did not deny them, even if they did not state them), so this does not seem unacceptable about thinkers later than those doctors, while however they could conclude the point from what those said.

35. To the final argument [n.4] - from Ambrose - the answer is plain from the Master, that the word ‘unbegotten’ was not so known in his time, nor even was it so necessary for the expression of the faith that every Catholic ought to use it; and to express the first person with that property was also an occasion of error for the simple, because it seems to state something that exists to itself, because it does not as manifestly involve relation as ‘begotten’ does; and therefore caution was taken for the simple faithful not to use that word, because of malignant heretics, although the word in itself properly and first belongs to the Father.