Question Two. Whether Not Being Able to be Born is a Property Constitutive of the First Person in Divine Reality

6. Next after this I ask whether not being able to be born is a property constitutive of the first person in divine reality.

That it is:

Damascene ch.8 says that everything [sc. in divine reality] is one “besides nongeneration and generation and inspiriting.” But it is clear that he is not excluding all the personal properties (because then in the Father there would only be the property of not being able to be born), therefore he is excluding ‘everything else’ in the idea of constitutive personal property; therefore all these, and only these, must be such relations; therefore non-generation is a property constitutive of the first person.

7. Again, wisdom is goodness; therefore not able to be born is paternity.

8. Again, Praepositinus [Summa I q.14] argues thus: “By that by which the Father is Father he is this person, - by that by which he is this person he is unable to be born.”

9. Again, it is more worthy to have something not from another than to communicate it to another.

10. The opposite:

As the second person is to filiation, so is the first person to paternity; but the second person is constituted by filiation; therefore the first person too is constituted by paternity.

I. To the First Question

11. To the first question there is need to see two things, - first how unbegotten agrees with the Father alone, and second how it can be a property since it seems to involve only a negation.

A. In What Way Unbegotten Agrees with the Father Alone

12. As to the first point I say I say that every name, composed of something with many senses and a privative particle [sc. as in ‘unbegotten’], is doubly many, both from the multiplicity of the opposite affirmation, and from the multiplicity of the privation -as is plain from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.12.1019b19-23, ‘On Power’, where he distinguishes ‘impotence’ according to the multiplicity of potency, and, in addition to this, according to the multiplicity of privation, which is set down in ‘On Privation’, ibid., 22.1022b22-31; thus this name ‘unbegotten’ will be multiple, from the multiplicity of what is meant by ‘begotten’ and from the multiplicity of the privative particle.

13. As to the first point, what is begotten is properly said to be ‘produced by generation’ as the first term; but by extension, what is begotten is said to be ‘communicated by generation’, which is the formal term of generation (as Hilary On the Trinity IV ch.10 says, because the Son has nothing “save being born”); in a third way what is begotten is extended to what is produced or what pre-requires generation, although it is not per se the term of generation, whether first or formal.

14. Privation can also be multiply distinguished into privation properly said, namely when something lacks that which it is of a nature to have, and when it is so, and as etc. [sc. e.g. a blind adult dog]; and into privation more commonly said, when something lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not according to the aforesaid conditions [sc. e.g. puppies born blind which acquire sight a few days later]; and still more commonly when it lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not in itself but in its genus (as a mole is said to be blind, because vision - of which it is deprived by blindness - is not repugnant to the animal in its genus though it is repugnant to mole in itself). And in this way privation is said more generally the more the habit - of which it is the privation - is of a nature to belong to a more common thing agreeing with that privation; for example, something that would not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body would be called ‘deprived’ in a more general way than if it did not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of animal - and in a still more general way if it did not have what it would be of a nature to have according to the idea of body - and in the most general way if it did not have what it is of a nature to have according to the idea of being.a, b

a [Note of Duns Scotus] Privation (namely lack of what is of a nature to be had): according to the idea of being, according to the idea of genus, according to the idea of species, most properly (when, as, etc.). The first privation exists in any created thing, because any created thing is limited, - the second is not, because it includes every perfection eminently. - But is the second privation of relation in God or in a divine person? That it is not: the essence in any person eminently includes it. - On the contrary: the Father is unbegotten [nn.5, 19].

b [Interpolation] An example of the first: as a stone is said to be inanimate and deprived of the soul that is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body, of which ‘animated’ is a difference. Example of the second: as an angel is said to be incorporeal. Example of the third: as any creature is said to be imperfect, not because it is of a nature to have every perfection in its genus but because having every perfection is not repugnant to being.

15. Negation is also distinguished by negation outside the genus, which contradicts the affirmation, - and it is true of anything of which the affirmative is false, whether about being or non-being [e.g. non-man is true of a horse and a chimaera]; the other is ‘negation in the genus’ and it supposes the nature of the genus of which it is said, - and it can be understood in many ways, according to the multiplicity, more common and less common, of genus.

16. To the issue at hand, then, when speaking of the multiplicity involved in this particle ‘un-’: although there is dispute whether it implies negation in the genus or privation, yet it seems they are the same thing in the issue at hand, taking negation according to genus in the most general way and privation according to genus in the most general way, because negation in a something naturally fitted to have what is negated is privation (according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 4.2.1004a9-16), so that privation adds nothing to negation save that it requires something naturally fitted in which to exist. Therefore negation in a genus - however genus is taken - since it is in something naturally fitted in some way (although not fitted in itself), will be privation in some way in genus, though not properly in such a thing according to its being such.a

a [Note by Duns Scotus] Privation is nothing formally but negation, and therefore it is not in a subject otherwise than as negation is; fittingness is in a subject, but does not per se belong to privation unless privation involves two concepts, - but each concept is separable from the other, and each is indicated or connoted by the privative name.

17. And if you object against this that there is no privation in divine reality, because what is deprived is imperfect, I reply that this conclusion holds of privation according to the proper idea of a deprived subject; for if the thing that ‘lacks’ were of a nature in itself to have what it lacks it would be imperfect - but if it is of a nature to have it according to the idea of genus, it is not imperfect. But that many privations are taken in this way too is plain not only from what the Philosophe says about ‘mole’ [n.14] but also by the common division of ‘common’ into habit and privation - as ‘animal’ is divided into rational and irrational; ‘irrational’ indeed states in an ox a privation, not of what is of a nature to be had in an ox in its species, but of what would be of a nature to be had in ‘what it is to be animal’; for the genus, as common to the privation and the habit, is that to which the fitness for each belongs.

18. But in the issue at hand, by extending what it is to be a genus (whether we understand it for the privation or for the negation in genus, by both of which I understand the same thing), I can take ‘quasi genus’ here for that which is common to the three persons, namely person or subsistent; and then we may say that the Father is in some way deprived in genus - or that in the Father there is some negation in genus - of something that is of a nature to belong not only to being but to supposit, which is common to Father and Son.

19. And then this name ‘unbegotten’ will be able to be taken for the issue in hand in four ways:

In one way most properly, insofar as it signifies a proper lack of what is properly signified by the name ‘begotten’, which is the first thing produced by generation, - and in this way it does not exist in divine reality, because nothing there lacks what is of a nature to be present. In the second way, insofar as it signifies a lack commonly of what is signified properly by ‘begotten’, and then it connotes a subsistent or person, and it signifies a lack ‘in genus’ of begotten properly taken; and in this way it seems to belong -by virtue of the terms - to the Father and the Holy Spirit, each of whom is a subsistent and is not begotten (it does not thus belong to the essence, because although the essence is being and non-begotten, yet it is not per se subsistent and person). In the third way - as it seems - it states a lack in genus, and this of ‘begotten’ taken in the second way, namely for what is communicated by generation; and in this way the essence is not said to be un-generable, by removal of aptitude for communication - but as the essence is in the Father it can be said to be non-communicated, and so unbegotten, if unbegotten is taken in this way. In the fourth way it signifies lack ‘in genus’ of what is begotten taken in the most common way, and then ‘unbegotten’ is the same as non-produced subsistent; and in this way it is taken by the saints, such that it is the same in divine reality as ‘unproduced’ properly taken; this is plain from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.26 n.47: “the Father alone is not from another, and therefore is alone called unbegotten,” and he means the same to Orosius [n.5].

20. I say therefore that ‘unbegotten’ in the usage of the saints, namely as it signifies the negation of begotten most commonly taken (that is of what is produced), by connoting a subsistent in divine nature, belongs thus only to the Father, as is plain from the authority of Augustine already cited [n.19].

B. How Unbegotten can be a Property of the Father

1. First Opinion

21. About the second article [n.11] some say that since unbegotten states only a privation in the genus or only a negation, and so does not of its formal nature state any dignity nor anything pertaining to dignity, and since nothing can be posited as a property of a divine person unless it is something pertaining to dignity, therefore unbegotten must connote something positive, by reason of which connotation it is a property; now this positive thing is set down by them to be a fountain of fullness that exists in the Father alone, - in whom is all fecundity, both inwardly and outwardly.

22. But against this:

First because this fountain of fullness is not understood outwardly, because such fecundity is common to the three. But inwardly there is only in the Father a double fecundity, namely for generating and for inspiriting; but this fecundity is not any one positive thing in the Father save the essence, - but it does not connote the essence, so as for this reason to be called a property of the Father. But that this fountain of fullness is not any single positive relation in the Father is plain, because then there would be three positive relations in the Father, namely active generation and active inspiriting and the relation which by circumlocution is said to be what this ‘fountain of fullness’ of fecundity is, although it lacks a name; and then there would be six notions, which is not commonly conceded, - at any rate there are not conceded to be in the Father three relative and positive properties.

23. Further, unbegotten does not seem to connote that fountain of fullness, because it does not connote the first fecundity, - because according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7, “even if he had not generated, nothing would prevent him from being unbegotten;” therefore unbegotten can precede active generation. Much more too does it not connote the second fecundity, because if per impossibile there could not be a production by way of will, yet there would still be status in generation for some unbegotten person. Therefore it seems that the fountain of fullness, which states only a double fecundity, cannot be connoted by what is meant by ‘unbegotten’.

24. Third their reason [n.21] does not seem valid, because if a property of a person were to state a dignity simply, then the person that did not have it would not have every dignity simply, - which is unacceptable.

2. Second Opinion

25. In another way it is said that this positive thing is existence from itself (and it said to be the intention of Richard of St. Victor), and that ‘existence from itself’ is a proper positive element called by circumlocution ‘unbegotten’, and it precedes relation to the Son. For because it is something from itself, therefore all being and all existence -according to Richard [On the Trinity V ch.4] - ought to come from it.

26. On the contrary: ‘from itself’, if it is something positive, is either something absolute and will be common to the three; or it is something relative, and not relative to what is prior (because there is only a negation of relation to what is prior), so it will be relative to the Son. Therefore ‘from itself’ either states filiation, if it is positive, or it states a disposition to what precedes and it will be a negation of relation, and so a negation the way ‘unbegotten’ is; therefore it is not a proper positive element of him [sc. the Father].

3. Scotus’ own Opinion

27. Therefore it seems one should say that unbegotten under its proper idea (as it signifies not having a begetter) is a personal property of the Father, and does sufficiently imply dignity, that is does not imply indignity, for this is enough for a personal property not to have indignity, in the way too that personal features in divine reality are not said to be imperfections (but not perfections simply, that is, perfections universally in anything).

28. And if there is altogether dispute that a property should altogether state dignity, not an absolute but a personal dignity, one can say that unbegotten, insofar as it denies ‘having a begetter’, states a personal dignity of the first person in divine reality, because just as it is a mark of dignity in the second person to have an originating principle, so it is a mark of dignity in the first person not to have one; and yet it is not necessary that this dignity be formally the dignity of some proper positive thing, connoted by what it means to be ‘unbegotten’. Hence negation can be said to be a mark of dignity in something insofar as it would be a mark of indignity if the affirmation were posited in him, - the way it is a mark of dignity in a king that he is not ribald.a

a [Note by Duns Scotus] Henry [of Ghent, Summa 57 q.1]: “As positive relations are founded on the essence from the nature of the thing, so this one too is negative; for from the nature of the essence comes the fact that in some person there is a reason by which he is not from another, and thus the substrate for this negation is only the divine essence, - so that the sense is: ‘unbegotten’ that is ‘having divine essence not from another’. For to have formally from himself the divine essence and not from anything as principle is to have it freely (the way a king has a kingdom), -therefore it is a mark of dignity (the notion is precisely by reason of negation; it implies dignity from the fact that it is founded on such affirmation); hence to have deity from another simply is not a mark of dignity but only by reason of the noble mode of having it, namely through generation and inspiriting.

     Ibid., ad 7: “Unbegotten strictly, namely ‘not produced by generation’, does not state dignity” (because a negation of dignity does not state dignity), “but unbegotten as it is a notion does; it does not belong to the Holy Spirit but only to the Father; thus it simply states: ‘being in no way from another’.”

     Ibid. ad 2: “Therefore non-inspirited does not state dignity, because inspirited states it” (therefore it is not a sixth notion).

     The first paragraph above is expounded ibid. ad 5: “Unbegotten is considered in one way simply and in itself, in another way as it is considered about such a nature. In the first way, the substrate is only the essence, so that if there were a hypostasis in the essence without a property it would be unbegotten. In the second way, something is a substrate of its negation in a triple way: namely either ‘as that on which it is founded’, or ‘as that by which it is founded on another’, or third ‘as that of which it is’; it indicates the idea of substance alone formally (on which it is founded), but only as it is under the property of the Father.”

     On the contrary: one would say better ad 7 that [unbegotten] implies dignity by reason of the foundation only; nor does it follow that it does not state a proper dignity, because the essence is indifferent to several personal dignities.

     The first argument that he posits [in 57 q.3] is confirmed by the fact that where there is a positive disposition to what is prior, it is to the prior before it is to the posterior; therefore so is the negative too, - and this is what is said, that the idea of first precedes the idea of principle; and universally, in what is not constituted by an order to what follows, the negation of order to the prior precedes the order to the posterior, and never elsewhere. The absolute is prior to the relative, - ‘unbegotten’ in itself could belong to an absolute supposit, if there was one.

     Gofrey [of Fontaines Quodlibet V q.3]: A notion indicates, the persons are distinguished by relations of origin; therefore what pertain to the origin are notions. The first person is indicated doubly by origin: because he is ‘from none’ and ‘another is from him’ (therefore there is another notion); by reason of negation it implies dignity (therefore it is a ‘negation in genus’), and it states dignity from the fact it is founded on an affirmation. This is the essence, which lies beneath all the divine notions, so that the sense is: ‘unbegotten’, that is ‘having divine essence not from antoher’ (this is mark of great dignity). Third, how dignity is proper to the Father: because it is considered in a double way, in itself and by reason of form, or by reason of matter (as being about such matter); in the first way only the essence lies beneath, whatever the supposit be, absolute or relative; in the second way, it is triply founded: ‘disposition to the foundation’, ‘as that in which’, ‘as that of which’ (in this way the supposit with its property lies beneath).

C. To the Principal Arguments

29. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-4].

To the first [n.1] I deny the minor. When it is proved from the Philosopher in De Interpretatione, I say that the consequence of the Philosopher holds on the basis of the truth of the first principle, namely this principle ‘what one contradictory is removed from, of that the other is asserted’; but as such, one cannot conclude that an affirmative about an infinite predicate follows from a negative about a finite predicate save as the infinite predicate signifies a negation outside the genus, contradictory to the affirmation (because ‘a negation in the genus’ does not contradict the affirmation), then the inference ‘it is not begotten, therefore it is non-begotten’ does not follow save about a negation outside the genus; and in this way non-begotten does not convert with begotten, although it would convert if one takes non-begotten in the sense of stating a negation in the genus, which is the way Augustine [n.1] understands it.

30. To the second [n.2] I concede that no property of a person - according to the common way [d.26 n.15] - states something that exists to itself. Yet one should not say that every property states a relation positively, but it is enough that it state a relation positively or negatively; for if the relation is personal and proper to some person, the negation of the relation will also be a personal feature proper to another person, and thus not existing to itself nor common to the three; and in this way - namely negatively -unbegotten states a relation, as is plain from Augustine On the Trinity V ch.7 n.8. And then this proposition is false, ‘every non-begotten is a related thing’ [n.2], - and yet the inference does not follow, ‘therefore non-begotten states something existing to itself’, but what follows is that it either states something existing to itself or it states the negation of a proper relation or ‘a relation negatively’.

31. To the third [n.3] one response is that what is inspirit-able does not state any dignity, as unbegotten does, and so it is not a notion. - But this seems false in itself, because it is a mark of equal dignity in the Father and the Son not to be inspirited as it is in the Father not to be begotten; and also it does not seem valid as to the issue at hand, because it does not seem necessary for a property (or for a notion) to state a proper dignity [n.27].

32. One can say in another way that unbegotten states non-produced (as was expounded in the first article of this solution [nn.19-20]), and in this way non-inspirit-able - because it is contained in it - is not a different notion from it; for the inference ‘non-produced therefore non-inspirited’ follows, and not conversely; therefore it is not another notion.

33. On the contrary: unbegotten is only in the Father, non-inspirited is in the Father and Son, therefore this notion is not that one.

34. If this inference [n.33] is to be conceded, there will be six notions, unless another reason be assigned why non-inspirit-able is not a notion. Although it may seem absurd to posit six notions (because commonly there are not so many posited), one could say that an argument place from authority does not hold negatively: ‘this is not said, therefore this is not the case’. For in the time of Ambrose it does not seem that three notions in the Father were in use, because he did not wish to use this name ‘unbegotten’ [nn.4, 35]; in the time of Anselm also two positive notions in the Father do not seem to have been in use, because he himself does not use ‘inspiriting force’, but takes ‘deity’ in its place, common to Father and Son. Although from the beginning only three properties were noted, namely paternity, filiation, and inspiriting (and this from the word of the Savior in the Gospel, Matthew 28.19 and of John in his canonical letter, I John 5.7 [nn.26, 67]), yet afterwards other notions and properties became known by investigation, which were prior in the thing though not known first; and so, just as later thinkers conceded more notions than earlier ones did (although the earlier ones did not deny them, even if they did not state them), so this does not seem unacceptable about thinkers later than those doctors, while however they could conclude the point from what those said.

35. To the final argument [n.4] - from Ambrose - the answer is plain from the Master, that the word ‘unbegotten’ was not so known in his time, nor even was it so necessary for the expression of the faith that every Catholic ought to use it; and to express the first person with that property was also an occasion of error for the simple, because it seems to state something that exists to itself, because it does not as manifestly involve relation as ‘begotten’ does; and therefore caution was taken for the simple faithful not to use that word, because of malignant heretics, although the word in itself properly and first belongs to the Father.

II. To the Second Question

A. Opinion of Others

36. To the second question [n.6] it seems one can answer yes, - understanding it in this way, that the divine essence, before it is understood to have been communicated through production, seems to be understood to be non-communicated in act in something, as in the first person; not indeed to be incommunicable (because it is not incommunicable), but not actually communicated, because it does not seem possible for something to be communicated quasi-passively unless it is already possessed in something as not communicated to it quasi-passively. And in this first moment, in which only essence and this negation ‘non-communicated in act’ are understood, an understanding of something incommunicable seems to be had; for if essence ‘as noncommunicated in act’ were not incommunicable then ‘as non-communicated’ it could exist in several things, - and then there could be several unbegottens, in which the essence would exist equally primarily, and there woud not be a stand in someone first; but if someone incommunicable is had, subsisting in the divine nature, then a person is had; therefore before any understanding of a positive property [sc. paternity], by understanding only essence and unbegotten (that is, non-communicated through production), some incommunicable subsistent in the divine nature is had, who is properly unbegotten, taking ‘unbegotten’ the way it can be taken in divine reality.

37. Again, essence, as prior to relation, is non-communicated and gives ‘per se existence’, - therefore it gives it to an unbegotten hypostasis. The proof of the antecedent: ‘as prior’ it is not communicated, therefore it is non-communicated; as such it gives ‘per se existence’ (On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11). Proof of the consequence: ‘as noncommunicated’ it is not common to several supposits; therefore it is one only, and only in the unbegotten, because it is communicated in the case of the begotten.

38. To this returns the fact that the essence ‘per se being’ or ‘this God’ generates, insofar as it has the formal principle and per se existence; and nothing is pre-understood to generation save that it has the principle ‘by which’ not from another, and is as it were waiting for the consequent relation [sc. paternity], which rises up with the term [sc. Son] once it is posited.

39. On the contrary: then by generation there is a positive property in the Father as in the Son. - One can concede that it is in neither ‘as per se term’ (neither first nor formal), but is concomitant to the first term who is the Son, because mutual relations are concomitant to the same ‘per se term’, which is one extreme.

40. And this opinion is confirmed from Augustine ibid. V ch.6 n.7 when he means that “if the Father had not generated, nothing would prevent him from being unbegotten,” - therefore some ‘unbegotten’ can be understood before understanding that he has generated; but when unbegotten is understood, an incommunicable subsistent supposit is understood; therefore it seems that the person is there first constituted by ‘unbegotten’ before by any positive property.

41. Further, in every essential order the negation of order to a prior seems more immediately to follow the first thing than does its order to the second thing, because that negation seems to follow it immediately insofar as it is such; therefore likewise in the order of persons, the negation of order to a prior will more belong to the first person than his order to the second person; therefore he is first understood to be unbegotten before generating, and in that prior moment he is understood to be incommunicable in divine nature.

42. Further, if according to the imagination of the philosophers there were in divine reality only one absolute supposit, it would be constituted by the essence, without any positive property, - and if any property were to be concurrent, it would only be this negative one, which is ‘not being from another’; therefore it seems that - since origin when posited in divine reality takes nothing from the essence itself, neither does it take anything from this negative property ‘not being from another’ - it will now be possible for some person to be constituted by these two things [sc. ‘not being from another’ and essence].

43. And if it be objected ‘how will mere negation be able to constitute a divine person?’ - the response is that person includes essence, which is communicable, and along with this something by which it is incommunicable; by the fact, then, that it has the nature in itself, it has every positive perfection that can exist in it; but by the counderstood negation it can have the idea of being incommunicable, and especially so if incommunicability only states some negation in genus.

B. Rejection of the Opinion

44. Against this way the argument is as follows:

No negation is of itself incommunicable, because just as it is not of itself one or individisible by any division, so it is not of itself a this and incommunicable, but only by an affirmation to which being divided is first repugnant, - and it is by this that not being divided belongs to negation; and so too does it seem about being incommunicable, that to be communicated is not repugnant to negation of itself but only by some affirmation to which incommunicability first belongs; therefore negation will not be the first idea of incommicability.a

a [Note by Duns Scotus] Response: negation of being from a principle in being is altogether incommunicable, because everything else from a unique being is from a principle.

     Hence is ‘this negation’ incommunicable in being? - I say from the nature of being that this negation in its being communicated is repugnant to it.

     On the contrary: therefore the positive thing is incommunicable first. This does not follow; rather, if there were not merely one principle, there would not be merely one thing without a principle.

     An instance: non-animation, positing that the form of a mixed thing remains the same as before. - It is no instance, because although non-animation might be present in a thing so mixed, yet it is not proper to it, because animation was present in it.

45. Further, no negation is proper to any subject save by some affirmation proper to it on which such negation follows; therefore this negation ‘not being from another’ is not proper to the first person save because some prior affirmation is proper to him on which this negation follows; the ‘prior affirmation’ cannot be the essence, - therefore some positive property.

46. Further, if the first person is incommunicable formally by negation, and the second is incommunicable by positive relation (namely by filiation) and the third likewise (namely by passive inspiriting), - then these persons are not uniformly disposed in idea of personality; nor are they equally positive, nor equally perfect (insofar as they are persons), because negation and some positive property are not equally perfect personality.

47. These reasons, although perhaps they may not convince an adversary that they cannot be solved, yet because it does not seem probable that the first person is formally a person by negation alone, therefore can the conclusion of these reasons be conceded.

C. To the Principal Argument

48. To the argument for the opposite [n.6] I say - as was said in distinction 26 [n.77] - that this exclusive word ‘besides’ does not exclude any personal features but does exclude essential features, and it includes in the included property all the personal being of the person; hence in ‘unbegotten-ness’ is included both paternity and active inspiriting as it exists in the Father. The point is also proved by him [sc. Damascene] elsewhere when he names paternity and filiation and procession. - Therefore he was not intending in the first place that those three properties alone were personal ones (nor was he intending that those three were personal constitutive properties), but he was intending by them all the others, and that all the essential features - which are excluded by the ‘besides’ - are one in the three persons.

D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

49. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.40-42].

When argument is made from Augustine about the priority of unbegotten to paternity [n.40], I reply: sometimes privation does not connote affirmation, and yet a privation is never present unless such a positive is formally present in the deprived thing; an example: being blind only connotes the eye (which is the common subject of blindness and sight), and yet it is never present in the eye by reason of the eye alone but through some positive entity which the privation follows, - to wit some mixture in the eye along with which there cannot be sight. So can it be said here that although unbegotten connotes some subsistent person in the divine essence, yet this affirmation is not the whole reason for the inherence of this negation ‘unbegotten’, but there must be in the thing some positive property that in some way precedes unbegotten by which it is present, although it not be connoted by ‘unbegotten’ as some proper subject. And in this respect, the statement of Augustine must be understood that insofar as it is about the per se idea of unbegotten it does not connote the Father; however it cannot be in the thing unless this affirmation (or some other, absolute or relative) is as it were the reason for its inherence.

50. To the second [n.41] one statement is that the proposition is true of the thing first in order, that it exists to itself, of which namely the ‘being’ is not ‘to be to another’.a It is not so in an order of persons having the same nature in such a disposition or in the issue at hand, because here ‘to be the first person’ is an order to the second person; and therefore the order to the second person precedes as it were the negation of being from a principle, just as the formal constitutive feature of some positive entity precedes in it the negation of some entity repugnant to it.

a [Note of Duns Scotus] Or thus: [the proposition is true] where the nature of the first thing is not the same as the nature of the second; therefore negation of being from a principle at once follows the nature of the first before order to the second thing is understood. But where there is the same nature of the first thing and of the second, the negation of being from a principle does not follow the nature, but something proper; that can only be here - according to the common opinion - a relation [n.30].

51. To the third [n.42]. If things were there as they are according to the imagination of the gentile philosophers, then the divine essence would be determined of itself to this subsistence, and it would constitute ‘this’ not through some negation but through itself (according to them), because it would be in every way determined to this, as in the case of creatures ‘this nature’ is altogether limited to this supposit; but now by positing that there is origin there, the essence need not be in every way determined to one person, and therefore it need not by itself constitute some person. And when the argument says ‘to posit origin takes nothing from the essence, nor from that by which it is constituted’, - it is true that it takes nothing away; but it posits the opposite of the hypothesis by which the essence of itself would constitute a person, namely indetermination of the essence to a single subsistence, because the hypothesis would take away perfection from the essence (because it would seem to posit a limitation), but the opposite of the hypothesis - positing an origin - does not take away perfection; but it does take away the impossible mode ‘constitutive of a person’ that would be true on the hypothesis.a

a [Note of Duns Scotus] For the first opinion ‘an incommunicable property constitutes this sort of unbegotten’:

     On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7: “Even if he had not generated, nothing would prevent him being said to be ‘unbegotten’ - even if someone generates a son, not by that fact is he unbegotten, because men who are begotten beget others;” later ch.7 n.8: “Nor for this reason is someone a father because he is unbegotten, nor unbegotten because he is a father;” later: “There is one notion by which he is understood to be begetter, and another by which he is understood to be unbegotten;” later: “When the Father is called ‘unbegotten’, what is shown is not what he is but what he is not;” later; “ When he is called ‘unbegotten’, he is not called so in relation to himself, but it is shown that he is not from a begetter.”

     Again, about the respect to a prior.

     Again, the absolute is prior; therefore the more it has of the idea of an absolute, the more it is prior.

     Again, ‘not to have through production’ precedes being produced, because it pertains to the idea of the proximate power, or it is the removal of an impediment. - Response: the proximate power does not in any way precede generation in the thing, but only according to concepts absolute in idea (as was said in distinction 27 [of the Reportatio])

     Mode: an essence is non-communicated in something before it is communicated (add if you will: ‘the essence in itself is not communicated’).

     On the contrary:

     Negation does not constitute the first person, because it does not constitute the second; ‘unbegotten’ is a negation. Proof of the minor, because the notion is different; and as such it does not state the essence only, nor a positive thing different from the two. - An instance: the conclusion is that it is not a notion. Response: Henry [of Ghent] (on the contrary: insofar as it is a notion it states a dignity; response: ‘personal dignity’, everything other than itself - above [note to n.28].

     Confirmation from a similarity about the inspirit-able. - It is not similar, because it is in something not constituted by order to a posterior, the former is negation of order to a prior.

     Again, negation is incommunicable and proper (because neither is it one, just as not a being either) only because of position.

     Again, the first person is not without the second.

     Again, Augustine [Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter ch.2 n.7: “Not because he is not begotten, but because he has begotten a single Son.”

     Again, paternity is prior, - therefore it is a property of a person; otherwise it is a property of nature. - Proof of the antecedent: in the case of the same thing affirmation is the reason for the being of negation; not conversely, because although the negation infers it, yet it presupposes it. I concede the conclusion.

     Mode: essence of itself determines for itself first its first production, such that essence is a principle of generating, not as with some property nor as under some property nor as in some person, (so that it retains something prior, in some way, in the thing), but it is only thus as it is of itself a principle (whereby it is principle), by which - that is - as it founds it actually; it founds it actually, because (distinction 28, last question) generation is altogether the first determination of essence, and it follows that what produces it is altogether unproduced (for he is truly father who does not have a father, - hence Damascene, ch.8).

     To the arguments ‘for the opinion’:

     Augustine makes a comparison three times: he asserts the third; he understands the second perhaps ‘because it is per se in the first mode’; the first is posited under an ‘if’, as the statement of heretics (Alexander in another way: “Augustine did not have regard to the nature of being but of understanding;” Praepositinus: “If you note the property of the word, the locution is false;” Henry: “If the person were absolute;” otherwise: nothing prevents ‘unbegotten’, - it follows by reason of the form).