Twenty Eighth Distinction

Question One. Whether ‘Unbegotten’ is Property of the Father Himself

1. About the twenty eighth distinction I ask whether ‘unbegotten’ is property of the Father himself.

That it is not:

No property is formally asserted of the essence, because then it would not distinguish [sc. the persons], just as neither does the essence distinguish, which is not said to be formally begetter or begotten, or inspiriter or inspirited; but the essence, as it seems, is unbegotten;     therefore ‘unbegotten’ is not a property of any person. - Also the Holy Spirit, as I will prove, is formally unbegotten; therefore etc     .

Proof of the assumption, because the essence is not begotten, therefore it is nonbegotten (the consequence is plain from the Philosopher De Interpretatione 10.2020-21: “On a negative proposition about a finite predicate follows an affirmative about the infinite predicate”), - and further, therefore it is unbegotten (this consequence is proved from Augustine On the Trinity V ch.7 n.8 where he says that ‘unbegotten’ is the same as not-begotten). And the like can be argued about the Holy Spirit: ‘if he is not begotten then he is non-begotten’.

2. Further, every personal property is relative, because whatever is said to itself is common to the three (from ibid. V ch.8 n.9); but unbegotten does not state a relation, as I will prove;     therefore etc     .

Proof of the minor, because if it does [sc. state a relation], then everything begotten is a related thing. This proposition is true: ‘everything begotten is a related thing’; I convert this by contraposition: ‘therefore every non-related thing is nonbegotten’. Then I argue: every non-begotten is a related thing, every non-related thing is non-begotten, therefore every non-related thing is related. The conclusion is impossible, therefore one of the premises is also impossible; not the one that follows from a true proposition by conversion through contraposition, therefore the other one.

3. Again, if not being able to be born were a property of the Father, then not being able to be inspirited would be a property of the Father and the Son, and so there would be six notions [sc. in divine reality], which is commonly denied.Tr. The five commonly accepted notions in divine reality are: being unable to be born (unbegotten), active generation (paternity), passive generation (being able to be born, filiation), active inspiriting ¹

4. Further, Ambrose On the Holy Spirit IV [On the Incarnation ch.8 nn.79-80] did not want to use the name ‘unbegotten’, as the Master says in the text [I d.13 ch.4 n.117].

5. The opposite:

Augustine to Orosius [Ps.-Augustine, Dialogue of 65 Questions q.2]: “Sure faith declares that there are not two unbegottens.”

Question Two. Whether Not Being Able to be Born is a Property Constitutive of the First Person in Divine Reality

6. Next after this I ask whether not being able to be born is a property constitutive of the first person in divine reality.

That it is:

Damascene ch.8 says that everything [sc. in divine reality] is one “besides nongeneration and generation and inspiriting.” But it is clear that he is not excluding all the personal properties (because then in the Father there would only be the property of not being able to be born), therefore he is excluding ‘everything else’ in the idea of constitutive personal property; therefore all these, and only these, must be such relations; therefore non-generation is a property constitutive of the first person.

7. Again, wisdom is goodness; therefore not able to be born is paternity.

8. Again, Praepositinus [Summa I q.14] argues thus: “By that by which the Father is Father he is this person, - by that by which he is this person he is unable to be born.”

9. Again, it is more worthy to have something not from another than to communicate it to another.

10. The opposite:

As the second person is to filiation, so is the first person to paternity; but the second person is constituted by filiation; therefore the first person too is constituted by paternity.

I. To the First Question

11. To the first question there is need to see two things, - first how unbegotten agrees with the Father alone, and second how it can be a property since it seems to involve only a negation.

A. In What Way Unbegotten Agrees with the Father Alone

12. As to the first point I say I say that every name, composed of something with many senses and a privative particle [sc. as in ‘unbegotten’], is doubly many, both from the multiplicity of the opposite affirmation, and from the multiplicity of the privation -as is plain from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.12.1019b19-23, ‘On Power’, where he distinguishes ‘impotence’ according to the multiplicity of potency, and, in addition to this, according to the multiplicity of privation, which is set down in ‘On Privation’, ibid., 22.1022b22-31; thus this name ‘unbegotten’ will be multiple, from the multiplicity of what is meant by ‘begotten’ and from the multiplicity of the privative particle.

13. As to the first point, what is begotten is properly said to be ‘produced by generation’ as the first term; but by extension, what is begotten is said to be ‘communicated by generation’, which is the formal term of generation (as Hilary On the Trinity IV ch.10 says, because the Son has nothing “save being born”); in a third way what is begotten is extended to what is produced or what pre-requires generation, although it is not per se the term of generation, whether first or formal.

14. Privation can also be multiply distinguished into privation properly said, namely when something lacks that which it is of a nature to have, and when it is so, and as etc. [sc. e.g. a blind adult dog]; and into privation more commonly said, when something lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not according to the aforesaid conditions [sc. e.g. puppies born blind which acquire sight a few days later]; and still more commonly when it lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not in itself but in its genus (as a mole is said to be blind, because vision - of which it is deprived by blindness - is not repugnant to the animal in its genus though it is repugnant to mole in itself). And in this way privation is said more generally the more the habit - of which it is the privation - is of a nature to belong to a more common thing agreeing with that privation; for example, something that would not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body would be called ‘deprived’ in a more general way than if it did not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of animal - and in a still more general way if it did not have what it would be of a nature to have according to the idea of body - and in the most general way if it did not have what it is of a nature to have according to the idea of being.a, b

a [Note of Duns Scotus] Privation (namely lack of what is of a nature to be had): according to the idea of being, according to the idea of genus, according to the idea of species, most properly (when, as, etc.). The first privation exists in any created thing, because any created thing is limited, - the second is not, because it includes every perfection eminently. - But is the second privation of relation in God or in a divine person? That it is not: the essence in any person eminently includes it. - On the contrary: the Father is unbegotten [nn.5, 19].

b [Interpolation] An example of the first: as a stone is said to be inanimate and deprived of the soul that is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body, of which ‘animated’ is a difference. Example of the second: as an angel is said to be incorporeal. Example of the third: as any creature is said to be imperfect, not because it is of a nature to have every perfection in its genus but because having every perfection is not repugnant to being.

15. Negation is also distinguished by negation outside the genus, which contradicts the affirmation, - and it is true of anything of which the affirmative is false, whether about being or non-being [e.g. non-man is true of a horse and a chimaera]; the other is ‘negation in the genus’ and it supposes the nature of the genus of which it is said, - and it can be understood in many ways, according to the multiplicity, more common and less common, of genus.

16. To the issue at hand, then, when speaking of the multiplicity involved in this particle ‘un-’: although there is dispute whether it implies negation in the genus or privation, yet it seems they are the same thing in the issue at hand, taking negation according to genus in the most general way and privation according to genus in the most general way, because negation in a something naturally fitted to have what is negated is privation (according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 4.2.1004a9-16), so that privation adds nothing to negation save that it requires something naturally fitted in which to exist. Therefore negation in a genus - however genus is taken - since it is in something naturally fitted in some way (although not fitted in itself), will be privation in some way in genus, though not properly in such a thing according to its being such.a

a [Note by Duns Scotus] Privation is nothing formally but negation, and therefore it is not in a subject otherwise than as negation is; fittingness is in a subject, but does not per se belong to privation unless privation involves two concepts, - but each concept is separable from the other, and each is indicated or connoted by the privative name.

17. And if you object against this that there is no privation in divine reality, because what is deprived is imperfect, I reply that this conclusion holds of privation according to the proper idea of a deprived subject; for if the thing that ‘lacks’ were of a nature in itself to have what it lacks it would be imperfect - but if it is of a nature to have it according to the idea of genus, it is not imperfect. But that many privations are taken in this way too is plain not only from what the Philosophe says about ‘mole’ [n.14] but also by the common division of ‘common’ into habit and privation - as ‘animal’ is divided into rational and irrational; ‘irrational’ indeed states in an ox a privation, not of what is of a nature to be had in an ox in its species, but of what would be of a nature to be had in ‘what it is to be animal’; for the genus, as common to the privation and the habit, is that to which the fitness for each belongs.

18. But in the issue at hand, by extending what it is to be a genus (whether we understand it for the privation or for the negation in genus, by both of which I understand the same thing), I can take ‘quasi genus’ here for that which is common to the three persons, namely person or subsistent; and then we may say that the Father is in some way deprived in genus - or that in the Father there is some negation in genus - of something that is of a nature to belong not only to being but to supposit, which is common to Father and Son.

19. And then this name ‘unbegotten’ will be able to be taken for the issue in hand in four ways:

In one way most properly, insofar as it signifies a proper lack of what is properly signified by the name ‘begotten’, which is the first thing produced by generation, - and in this way it does not exist in divine reality, because nothing there lacks what is of a nature to be present. In the second way, insofar as it signifies a lack commonly of what is signified properly by ‘begotten’, and then it connotes a subsistent or person, and it signifies a lack ‘in genus’ of begotten properly taken; and in this way it seems to belong -by virtue of the terms - to the Father and the Holy Spirit, each of whom is a subsistent and is not begotten (it does not thus belong to the essence, because although the essence is being and non-begotten, yet it is not per se subsistent and person). In the third way - as it seems - it states a lack in genus, and this of ‘begotten’ taken in the second way, namely for what is communicated by generation; and in this way the essence is not said to be un-generable, by removal of aptitude for communication - but as the essence is in the Father it can be said to be non-communicated, and so unbegotten, if unbegotten is taken in this way. In the fourth way it signifies lack ‘in genus’ of what is begotten taken in the most common way, and then ‘unbegotten’ is the same as non-produced subsistent; and in this way it is taken by the saints, such that it is the same in divine reality as ‘unproduced’ properly taken; this is plain from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.26 n.47: “the Father alone is not from another, and therefore is alone called unbegotten,” and he means the same to Orosius [n.5].

20. I say therefore that ‘unbegotten’ in the usage of the saints, namely as it signifies the negation of begotten most commonly taken (that is of what is produced), by connoting a subsistent in divine nature, belongs thus only to the Father, as is plain from the authority of Augustine already cited [n.19].

B. How Unbegotten can be a Property of the Father

1. First Opinion

21. About the second article [n.11] some say that since unbegotten states only a privation in the genus or only a negation, and so does not of its formal nature state any dignity nor anything pertaining to dignity, and since nothing can be posited as a property of a divine person unless it is something pertaining to dignity, therefore unbegotten must connote something positive, by reason of which connotation it is a property; now this positive thing is set down by them to be a fountain of fullness that exists in the Father alone, - in whom is all fecundity, both inwardly and outwardly.

22. But against this:

First because this fountain of fullness is not understood outwardly, because such fecundity is common to the three. But inwardly there is only in the Father a double fecundity, namely for generating and for inspiriting; but this fecundity is not any one positive thing in the Father save the essence, - but it does not connote the essence, so as for this reason to be called a property of the Father. But that this fountain of fullness is not any single positive relation in the Father is plain, because then there would be three positive relations in the Father, namely active generation and active inspiriting and the relation which by circumlocution is said to be what this ‘fountain of fullness’ of fecundity is, although it lacks a name; and then there would be six notions, which is not commonly conceded, - at any rate there are not conceded to be in the Father three relative and positive properties.

23. Further, unbegotten does not seem to connote that fountain of fullness, because it does not connote the first fecundity, - because according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7, “even if he had not generated, nothing would prevent him from being unbegotten;” therefore unbegotten can precede active generation. Much more too does it not connote the second fecundity, because if per impossibile there could not be a production by way of will, yet there would still be status in generation for some unbegotten person. Therefore it seems that the fountain of fullness, which states only a double fecundity, cannot be connoted by what is meant by ‘unbegotten’.

24. Third their reason [n.21] does not seem valid, because if a property of a person were to state a dignity simply, then the person that did not have it would not have every dignity simply, - which is unacceptable.

2. Second Opinion

25. In another way it is said that this positive thing is existence from itself (and it said to be the intention of Richard of St. Victor), and that ‘existence from itself’ is a proper positive element called by circumlocution ‘unbegotten’, and it precedes relation to the Son. For because it is something from itself, therefore all being and all existence -according to Richard [On the Trinity V ch.4] - ought to come from it.

26. On the contrary: ‘from itself’, if it is something positive, is either something absolute and will be common to the three; or it is something relative, and not relative to what is prior (because there is only a negation of relation to what is prior), so it will be relative to the Son. Therefore ‘from itself’ either states filiation, if it is positive, or it states a disposition to what precedes and it will be a negation of relation, and so a negation the way ‘unbegotten’ is; therefore it is not a proper positive element of him [sc. the Father].

3. Scotus’ own Opinion

27. Therefore it seems one should say that unbegotten under its proper idea (as it signifies not having a begetter) is a personal property of the Father, and does sufficiently imply dignity, that is does not imply indignity, for this is enough for a personal property not to have indignity, in the way too that personal features in divine reality are not said to be imperfections (but not perfections simply, that is, perfections universally in anything).

28. And if there is altogether dispute that a property should altogether state dignity, not an absolute but a personal dignity, one can say that unbegotten, insofar as it denies ‘having a begetter’, states a personal dignity of the first person in divine reality, because just as it is a mark of dignity in the second person to have an originating principle, so it is a mark of dignity in the first person not to have one; and yet it is not necessary that this dignity be formally the dignity of some proper positive thing, connoted by what it means to be ‘unbegotten’. Hence negation can be said to be a mark of dignity in something insofar as it would be a mark of indignity if the affirmation were posited in him, - the way it is a mark of dignity in a king that he is not ribald.a

a [Note by Duns Scotus] Henry [of Ghent, Summa 57 q.1]: “As positive relations are founded on the essence from the nature of the thing, so this one too is negative; for from the nature of the essence comes the fact that in some person there is a reason by which he is not from another, and thus the substrate for this negation is only the divine essence, - so that the sense is: ‘unbegotten’ that is ‘having divine essence not from another’. For to have formally from himself the divine essence and not from anything as principle is to have it freely (the way a king has a kingdom), -therefore it is a mark of dignity (the notion is precisely by reason of negation; it implies dignity from the fact that it is founded on such affirmation); hence to have deity from another simply is not a mark of dignity but only by reason of the noble mode of having it, namely through generation and inspiriting.

     Ibid., ad 7: “Unbegotten strictly, namely ‘not produced by generation’, does not state dignity” (because a negation of dignity does not state dignity), “but unbegotten as it is a notion does; it does not belong to the Holy Spirit but only to the Father; thus it simply states: ‘being in no way from another’.”

     Ibid. ad 2: “Therefore non-inspirited does not state dignity, because inspirited states it” (therefore it is not a sixth notion).

     The first paragraph above is expounded ibid. ad 5: “Unbegotten is considered in one way simply and in itself, in another way as it is considered about such a nature. In the first way, the substrate is only the essence, so that if there were a hypostasis in the essence without a property it would be unbegotten. In the second way, something is a substrate of its negation in a triple way: namely either ‘as that on which it is founded’, or ‘as that by which it is founded on another’, or third ‘as that of which it is’; it indicates the idea of substance alone formally (on which it is founded), but only as it is under the property of the Father.”

     On the contrary: one would say better ad 7 that [unbegotten] implies dignity by reason of the foundation only; nor does it follow that it does not state a proper dignity, because the essence is indifferent to several personal dignities.

     The first argument that he posits [in 57 q.3] is confirmed by the fact that where there is a positive disposition to what is prior, it is to the prior before it is to the posterior; therefore so is the negative too, - and this is what is said, that the idea of first precedes the idea of principle; and universally, in what is not constituted by an order to what follows, the negation of order to the prior precedes the order to the posterior, and never elsewhere. The absolute is prior to the relative, - ‘unbegotten’ in itself could belong to an absolute supposit, if there was one.

     Gofrey [of Fontaines Quodlibet V q.3]: A notion indicates, the persons are distinguished by relations of origin; therefore what pertain to the origin are notions. The first person is indicated doubly by origin: because he is ‘from none’ and ‘another is from him’ (therefore there is another notion); by reason of negation it implies dignity (therefore it is a ‘negation in genus’), and it states dignity from the fact it is founded on an affirmation. This is the essence, which lies beneath all the divine notions, so that the sense is: ‘unbegotten’, that is ‘having divine essence not from antoher’ (this is mark of great dignity). Third, how dignity is proper to the Father: because it is considered in a double way, in itself and by reason of form, or by reason of matter (as being about such matter); in the first way only the essence lies beneath, whatever the supposit be, absolute or relative; in the second way, it is triply founded: ‘disposition to the foundation’, ‘as that in which’, ‘as that of which’ (in this way the supposit with its property lies beneath).

C. To the Principal Arguments

29. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-4].

To the first [n.1] I deny the minor. When it is proved from the Philosopher in De Interpretatione, I say that the consequence of the Philosopher holds on the basis of the truth of the first principle, namely this principle ‘what one contradictory is removed from, of that the other is asserted’; but as such, one cannot conclude that an affirmative about an infinite predicate follows from a negative about a finite predicate save as the infinite predicate signifies a negation outside the genus, contradictory to the affirmation (because ‘a negation in the genus’ does not contradict the affirmation), then the inference ‘it is not begotten, therefore it is non-begotten’ does not follow save about a negation outside the genus; and in this way non-begotten does not convert with begotten, although it would convert if one takes non-begotten in the sense of stating a negation in the genus, which is the way Augustine [n.1] understands it.

30. To the second [n.2] I concede that no property of a person - according to the common way [d.26 n.15] - states something that exists to itself. Yet one should not say that every property states a relation positively, but it is enough that it state a relation positively or negatively; for if the relation is personal and proper to some person, the negation of the relation will also be a personal feature proper to another person, and thus not existing to itself nor common to the three; and in this way - namely negatively -unbegotten states a relation, as is plain from Augustine On the Trinity V ch.7 n.8. And then this proposition is false, ‘every non-begotten is a related thing’ [n.2], - and yet the inference does not follow, ‘therefore non-begotten states something existing to itself’, but what follows is that it either states something existing to itself or it states the negation of a proper relation or ‘a relation negatively’.

31. To the third [n.3] one response is that what is inspirit-able does not state any dignity, as unbegotten does, and so it is not a notion. - But this seems false in itself, because it is a mark of equal dignity in the Father and the Son not to be inspirited as it is in the Father not to be begotten; and also it does not seem valid as to the issue at hand, because it does not seem necessary for a property (or for a notion) to state a proper dignity [n.27].

32. One can say in another way that unbegotten states non-produced (as was expounded in the first article of this solution [nn.19-20]), and in this way non-inspirit-able - because it is contained in it - is not a different notion from it; for the inference ‘non-produced therefore non-inspirited’ follows, and not conversely; therefore it is not another notion.

33. On the contrary: unbegotten is only in the Father, non-inspirited is in the Father and Son, therefore this notion is not that one.

34. If this inference [n.33] is to be conceded, there will be six notions, unless another reason be assigned why non-inspirit-able is not a notion. Although it may seem absurd to posit six notions (because commonly there are not so many posited), one could say that an argument place from authority does not hold negatively: ‘this is not said, therefore this is not the case’. For in the time of Ambrose it does not seem that three notions in the Father were in use, because he did not wish to use this name ‘unbegotten’ [nn.4, 35]; in the time of Anselm also two positive notions in the Father do not seem to have been in use, because he himself does not use ‘inspiriting force’, but takes ‘deity’ in its place, common to Father and Son. Although from the beginning only three properties were noted, namely paternity, filiation, and inspiriting (and this from the word of the Savior in the Gospel, Matthew 28.19 and of John in his canonical letter, I John 5.7 [nn.26, 67]), yet afterwards other notions and properties became known by investigation, which were prior in the thing though not known first; and so, just as later thinkers conceded more notions than earlier ones did (although the earlier ones did not deny them, even if they did not state them), so this does not seem unacceptable about thinkers later than those doctors, while however they could conclude the point from what those said.

35. To the final argument [n.4] - from Ambrose - the answer is plain from the Master, that the word ‘unbegotten’ was not so known in his time, nor even was it so necessary for the expression of the faith that every Catholic ought to use it; and to express the first person with that property was also an occasion of error for the simple, because it seems to state something that exists to itself, because it does not as manifestly involve relation as ‘begotten’ does; and therefore caution was taken for the simple faithful not to use that word, because of malignant heretics, although the word in itself properly and first belongs to the Father.

II. To the Second Question

A. Opinion of Others

36. To the second question [n.6] it seems one can answer yes, - understanding it in this way, that the divine essence, before it is understood to have been communicated through production, seems to be understood to be non-communicated in act in something, as in the first person; not indeed to be incommunicable (because it is not incommunicable), but not actually communicated, because it does not seem possible for something to be communicated quasi-passively unless it is already possessed in something as not communicated to it quasi-passively. And in this first moment, in which only essence and this negation ‘non-communicated in act’ are understood, an understanding of something incommunicable seems to be had; for if essence ‘as noncommunicated in act’ were not incommunicable then ‘as non-communicated’ it could exist in several things, - and then there could be several unbegottens, in which the essence would exist equally primarily, and there woud not be a stand in someone first; but if someone incommunicable is had, subsisting in the divine nature, then a person is had; therefore before any understanding of a positive property [sc. paternity], by understanding only essence and unbegotten (that is, non-communicated through production), some incommunicable subsistent in the divine nature is had, who is properly unbegotten, taking ‘unbegotten’ the way it can be taken in divine reality.

37. Again, essence, as prior to relation, is non-communicated and gives ‘per se existence’, - therefore it gives it to an unbegotten hypostasis. The proof of the antecedent: ‘as prior’ it is not communicated, therefore it is non-communicated; as such it gives ‘per se existence’ (On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11). Proof of the consequence: ‘as noncommunicated’ it is not common to several supposits; therefore it is one only, and only in the unbegotten, because it is communicated in the case of the begotten.

38. To this returns the fact that the essence ‘per se being’ or ‘this God’ generates, insofar as it has the formal principle and per se existence; and nothing is pre-understood to generation save that it has the principle ‘by which’ not from another, and is as it were waiting for the consequent relation [sc. paternity], which rises up with the term [sc. Son] once it is posited.

39. On the contrary: then by generation there is a positive property in the Father as in the Son. - One can concede that it is in neither ‘as per se term’ (neither first nor formal), but is concomitant to the first term who is the Son, because mutual relations are concomitant to the same ‘per se term’, which is one extreme.

40. And this opinion is confirmed from Augustine ibid. V ch.6 n.7 when he means that “if the Father had not generated, nothing would prevent him from being unbegotten,” - therefore some ‘unbegotten’ can be understood before understanding that he has generated; but when unbegotten is understood, an incommunicable subsistent supposit is understood; therefore it seems that the person is there first constituted by ‘unbegotten’ before by any positive property.

41. Further, in every essential order the negation of order to a prior seems more immediately to follow the first thing than does its order to the second thing, because that negation seems to follow it immediately insofar as it is such; therefore likewise in the order of persons, the negation of order to a prior will more belong to the first person than his order to the second person; therefore he is first understood to be unbegotten before generating, and in that prior moment he is understood to be incommunicable in divine nature.

42. Further, if according to the imagination of the philosophers there were in divine reality only one absolute supposit, it would be constituted by the essence, without any positive property, - and if any property were to be concurrent, it would only be this negative one, which is ‘not being from another’; therefore it seems that - since origin when posited in divine reality takes nothing from the essence itself, neither does it take anything from this negative property ‘not being from another’ - it will now be possible for some person to be constituted by these two things [sc. ‘not being from another’ and essence].

43. And if it be objected ‘how will mere negation be able to constitute a divine person?’ - the response is that person includes essence, which is communicable, and along with this something by which it is incommunicable; by the fact, then, that it has the nature in itself, it has every positive perfection that can exist in it; but by the counderstood negation it can have the idea of being incommunicable, and especially so if incommunicability only states some negation in genus.

B. Rejection of the Opinion

44. Against this way the argument is as follows:

No negation is of itself incommunicable, because just as it is not of itself one or individisible by any division, so it is not of itself a this and incommunicable, but only by an affirmation to which being divided is first repugnant, - and it is by this that not being divided belongs to negation; and so too does it seem about being incommunicable, that to be communicated is not repugnant to negation of itself but only by some affirmation to which incommunicability first belongs; therefore negation will not be the first idea of incommicability.a

a [Note by Duns Scotus] Response: negation of being from a principle in being is altogether incommunicable, because everything else from a unique being is from a principle.

     Hence is ‘this negation’ incommunicable in being? - I say from the nature of being that this negation in its being communicated is repugnant to it.

     On the contrary: therefore the positive thing is incommunicable first. This does not follow; rather, if there were not merely one principle, there would not be merely one thing without a principle.

     An instance: non-animation, positing that the form of a mixed thing remains the same as before. - It is no instance, because although non-animation might be present in a thing so mixed, yet it is not proper to it, because animation was present in it.

45. Further, no negation is proper to any subject save by some affirmation proper to it on which such negation follows; therefore this negation ‘not being from another’ is not proper to the first person save because some prior affirmation is proper to him on which this negation follows; the ‘prior affirmation’ cannot be the essence, - therefore some positive property.

46. Further, if the first person is incommunicable formally by negation, and the second is incommunicable by positive relation (namely by filiation) and the third likewise (namely by passive inspiriting), - then these persons are not uniformly disposed in idea of personality; nor are they equally positive, nor equally perfect (insofar as they are persons), because negation and some positive property are not equally perfect personality.

47. These reasons, although perhaps they may not convince an adversary that they cannot be solved, yet because it does not seem probable that the first person is formally a person by negation alone, therefore can the conclusion of these reasons be conceded.

C. To the Principal Argument

48. To the argument for the opposite [n.6] I say - as was said in distinction 26 [n.77] - that this exclusive word ‘besides’ does not exclude any personal features but does exclude essential features, and it includes in the included property all the personal being of the person; hence in ‘unbegotten-ness’ is included both paternity and active inspiriting as it exists in the Father. The point is also proved by him [sc. Damascene] elsewhere when he names paternity and filiation and procession. - Therefore he was not intending in the first place that those three properties alone were personal ones (nor was he intending that those three were personal constitutive properties), but he was intending by them all the others, and that all the essential features - which are excluded by the ‘besides’ - are one in the three persons.

D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

49. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.40-42].

When argument is made from Augustine about the priority of unbegotten to paternity [n.40], I reply: sometimes privation does not connote affirmation, and yet a privation is never present unless such a positive is formally present in the deprived thing; an example: being blind only connotes the eye (which is the common subject of blindness and sight), and yet it is never present in the eye by reason of the eye alone but through some positive entity which the privation follows, - to wit some mixture in the eye along with which there cannot be sight. So can it be said here that although unbegotten connotes some subsistent person in the divine essence, yet this affirmation is not the whole reason for the inherence of this negation ‘unbegotten’, but there must be in the thing some positive property that in some way precedes unbegotten by which it is present, although it not be connoted by ‘unbegotten’ as some proper subject. And in this respect, the statement of Augustine must be understood that insofar as it is about the per se idea of unbegotten it does not connote the Father; however it cannot be in the thing unless this affirmation (or some other, absolute or relative) is as it were the reason for its inherence.

50. To the second [n.41] one statement is that the proposition is true of the thing first in order, that it exists to itself, of which namely the ‘being’ is not ‘to be to another’.a It is not so in an order of persons having the same nature in such a disposition or in the issue at hand, because here ‘to be the first person’ is an order to the second person; and therefore the order to the second person precedes as it were the negation of being from a principle, just as the formal constitutive feature of some positive entity precedes in it the negation of some entity repugnant to it.

a [Note of Duns Scotus] Or thus: [the proposition is true] where the nature of the first thing is not the same as the nature of the second; therefore negation of being from a principle at once follows the nature of the first before order to the second thing is understood. But where there is the same nature of the first thing and of the second, the negation of being from a principle does not follow the nature, but something proper; that can only be here - according to the common opinion - a relation [n.30].

51. To the third [n.42]. If things were there as they are according to the imagination of the gentile philosophers, then the divine essence would be determined of itself to this subsistence, and it would constitute ‘this’ not through some negation but through itself (according to them), because it would be in every way determined to this, as in the case of creatures ‘this nature’ is altogether limited to this supposit; but now by positing that there is origin there, the essence need not be in every way determined to one person, and therefore it need not by itself constitute some person. And when the argument says ‘to posit origin takes nothing from the essence, nor from that by which it is constituted’, - it is true that it takes nothing away; but it posits the opposite of the hypothesis by which the essence of itself would constitute a person, namely indetermination of the essence to a single subsistence, because the hypothesis would take away perfection from the essence (because it would seem to posit a limitation), but the opposite of the hypothesis - positing an origin - does not take away perfection; but it does take away the impossible mode ‘constitutive of a person’ that would be true on the hypothesis.a

a [Note of Duns Scotus] For the first opinion ‘an incommunicable property constitutes this sort of unbegotten’:

     On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7: “Even if he had not generated, nothing would prevent him being said to be ‘unbegotten’ - even if someone generates a son, not by that fact is he unbegotten, because men who are begotten beget others;” later ch.7 n.8: “Nor for this reason is someone a father because he is unbegotten, nor unbegotten because he is a father;” later: “There is one notion by which he is understood to be begetter, and another by which he is understood to be unbegotten;” later: “When the Father is called ‘unbegotten’, what is shown is not what he is but what he is not;” later; “ When he is called ‘unbegotten’, he is not called so in relation to himself, but it is shown that he is not from a begetter.”

     Again, about the respect to a prior.

     Again, the absolute is prior; therefore the more it has of the idea of an absolute, the more it is prior.

     Again, ‘not to have through production’ precedes being produced, because it pertains to the idea of the proximate power, or it is the removal of an impediment. - Response: the proximate power does not in any way precede generation in the thing, but only according to concepts absolute in idea (as was said in distinction 27 [of the Reportatio])

     Mode: an essence is non-communicated in something before it is communicated (add if you will: ‘the essence in itself is not communicated’).

     On the contrary:

     Negation does not constitute the first person, because it does not constitute the second; ‘unbegotten’ is a negation. Proof of the minor, because the notion is different; and as such it does not state the essence only, nor a positive thing different from the two. - An instance: the conclusion is that it is not a notion. Response: Henry [of Ghent] (on the contrary: insofar as it is a notion it states a dignity; response: ‘personal dignity’, everything other than itself - above [note to n.28].

     Confirmation from a similarity about the inspirit-able. - It is not similar, because it is in something not constituted by order to a posterior, the former is negation of order to a prior.

     Again, negation is incommunicable and proper (because neither is it one, just as not a being either) only because of position.

     Again, the first person is not without the second.

     Again, Augustine [Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter ch.2 n.7: “Not because he is not begotten, but because he has begotten a single Son.”

     Again, paternity is prior, - therefore it is a property of a person; otherwise it is a property of nature. - Proof of the antecedent: in the case of the same thing affirmation is the reason for the being of negation; not conversely, because although the negation infers it, yet it presupposes it. I concede the conclusion.

     Mode: essence of itself determines for itself first its first production, such that essence is a principle of generating, not as with some property nor as under some property nor as in some person, (so that it retains something prior, in some way, in the thing), but it is only thus as it is of itself a principle (whereby it is principle), by which - that is - as it founds it actually; it founds it actually, because (distinction 28, last question) generation is altogether the first determination of essence, and it follows that what produces it is altogether unproduced (for he is truly father who does not have a father, - hence Damascene, ch.8).

     To the arguments ‘for the opinion’:

     Augustine makes a comparison three times: he asserts the third; he understands the second perhaps ‘because it is per se in the first mode’; the first is posited under an ‘if’, as the statement of heretics (Alexander in another way: “Augustine did not have regard to the nature of being but of understanding;” Praepositinus: “If you note the property of the word, the locution is false;” Henry: “If the person were absolute;” otherwise: nothing prevents ‘unbegotten’, - it follows by reason of the form).

Question Three. Whether the First Divine Person is Constituted in Personal Being by some Positive Relation to the Second Person

52. Lastly I aska whether the first divine person is constituted in personal being by some positive relation to the second person.

That he is not:

Because the first person is pre-understood in personal being before he begets; for to act belongs to a supposit; therefore he is understood to be a supposit before he acts. But if he were constituted by a relation to the second person, the existence of the second person would be co-understood - along with his own existence - and consequently the second person would be pre-understood before the first person begets him, and so the second person would not be the term of generation.

a [Note of Duns Scotus] Whether the divine essence of itself determines first for itself active generation.

     That it does not: then it would in anything; then it would not stand with its opposite; again, relations would be equally first in the essence.

     On the contrary: if through something, the first person would not be constituted by it.

     Solution: distinction about indeterminate and determinate, and to determine against contingency, against limitation. The essence determines, because it is first and aptitudinal, -therefore actually by something; not by relation, because it does not exist before it is founded, -not by something else, because of regress ad infinitum; therefore from itself first. Doubly: adequately, immediately. In the first way: according to intension yes (reason, example, corollary ‘Against Godfrey’), according to extension no. Immediately: whatever is related to several things having an order with respect to it, one has the ‘first’ thus and another thus (example ‘sun’, example ‘soul’); the essence then is immediately to the first, and through this to the second.

     Doubt: in which respect of principle? - Henry: of matter. On the contrary: of the producer (by division); again, form is ‘per se entity’. The mode here, and congruence about threefold principle; on the contrary in three ways. Here the mode is other.

     Afterwards to the arguments.

53. A confirmation of the reason is that as to all things that are simultaneous in nature, by whatever it is that one is prior the other is too; relatives are simultaneous in nature; therefore if the first person is formally constituted in personal existence through a relation to the second, by whatever the first is prior in personal being by that the second is too. But by generation, which is an act of the first person, the first person seems to be prior in personal being, therefore the second is too; and as before [n.52], he will not then be the formal term of generation.

54. Further, in every order the first seems to be the most absolute, as is clear from running through the point in the case of any order whatever; therefore so will it be in the order of persons, that the first will be the most absolute, and so it would not be constituted by a relation to the second.

55. On the contrary:

The first person is not constituted in personal being by deity, because deity is not incommunicable, - nor by active inspiriting, because this is common to him and the Son, - nor by being unable to be born, from the preceding question [n.47]; therefore, by way of division, by some relation to the second person.

I. To the Question

A. Opinions of those who Hold that the Persons are Constituted by Relations

56. Here the affirmative part of the question is commonly conceded, but because of the difficulty of the first argument [nn.52, 67], a distinction is made about the relation that constitutes the first person.

1. First Opinion

57. In one way [from Aquinas], that ‘it can be considered as a property or as a relation; as a property it precedes generation, - as a relation it follows’; and then, according to what it constitutes, the second person need not be simultaneous with the first, although according to its being a relation - consequent, as it were, to generation - the second should be simultaneous with it.

58. Against this:

A property ‘as property’ is some entity, otherwise it would not constitute any being. Either therefore it is a being to itself or to another or neither; that some entity is singular, that is neither an entity to itself nor to another, does not seem intelligible; therefore this entity should be formally to itself, and then it will constitute an absolute person - or to another, and that ‘as a property’ it will be a relation; and then the difficulty is not avoided, even though there is one way of considering it as a property and another as a relation.

And the reason can be confirmed by an example, because although whiteness can be considered as whiteness or as a quality (and if it be considered as whiteness, that is according to its proper specific reason, - but if as quality, this is according to the idea of an ‘imperfect’ instance in its genus), yet whatever is constituted by whiteness is not constituted by any entity that is not a quality, because whiteness even ‘as whiteness’ essentially includes quality and is essentially quality, so that whiteness cannot constitute anything save in qualitative being. So does it seem in the issue at hand, about a relative property considered in this way and in that [n.57].

60. Further, he [Aquinas, Roger Marston] says elsewhere that ‘in divine reality there cannot be order’ (because neither in the case of the essence to the relations, nor in the case of the relations among themselves), ‘because relatives are simultaneous in nature’. - But if a property can be considered in the way in which it would not be a relation (and in this way it need not have a correlative simultaneous in nature), their argument would not be valid.

2. Second Opinion

61. A distinction is drawn in another way about relation, as it is relation and as it is origin; and the position is that it constitutes as origin (but not as relation), because the idea of origin in some way precedes and the relation is as it were founded in it; but the first person is constituted by the first relation there, by which it is distinguished [Roger Marston].

62. Against this it is objected that origin ‘as origin’ is not form; and not of the person to which it is, but as it were the way to it, - and then it is not of the first person as form but as it were presupposes it; but nothing constitutes anything in anything save insofar as it is its form.

63. But if this opinion is understood of distinguishing as it were by way of principle (corresponding to efficient cause in creatures, as was expounded in distinction 26 [n.58]), and not by way of formal principle, then this position could have truth, and this argument would not be against it.

3. Third Opinion

64. In another way it is said that just as the same action can be diversely understood - insofar as it is aptitudinal or insofar as it is potential, insofar as it is future, insofar as it is in act, insofar as it is past - so relations ‘founded on action’ can be diversely taken; so that relation is founded on generation as in some way past as it were, in other way as present as it were, in another way founded on it as future as it were, in another way founded on it as potential as it were, and further as aptitudinal.

65. But it is said that relation under the first idea constitutes a person; but the first idea is ‘aptitudinal idea’, because that follows on the other and not conversely; therefore generation in this sort of way constitutes the Father, and in this way it is signified by what is meant by ‘generativity’.

66. Against this:

The first person is not constituted by a property having something positive less perfectly than what is constitutive of the second person has it, because then they would not seem to be equally perfect in personal being; but the second person is constituted -according to them - by filiation as it is filiation; therefore the first person is not constituted by potential relation, which has a less perfect being from the nature of relation than the property of the second person has it. But the relation of the generative to the generable - which they posit to be first and constitutive - is a potential relation; therefore it does not constitute as perfect an actual person as the second does.

Proof of the assumption: no actual being requires a potential being, because a potential being is less perfect than an actual one, provided they are of the same idea; but the relation of the generative requires the generable, because it states a potential relation on the part of the Son; therefore the relation of generative in the Father is not an actual relation.

67. Further, against this opinion (and against the two preceding:

Relation, if it constitutes a person there, is only according to what exists in reality, - otherwise it would not constitute a real person; but there exists in reality only a single relation of the first person to the second, and it is only there under the most actual idea, however diversely it can be taken; therefore under the most actual idea it will constitute that person, and under that idea a relation in the second person will correspond to it (there is not anything in the second person save what is most actual). In vain therefore is a quasi potential or aptitudinal distinction from the idea of what is active sought for, because this distinction in conceivable modes does nothing for what is constitutive of the first person without the first person always requiring the second person along with it at the same time; and yet because of this difficulty, lest the first person be posited as having the second along with it at the same time, this distinction of actual and aptitudinal and potential relations is sought for, lest the Son be posited as preceding the generation of the Father. -In the same way one could argue against the first and second opinion, because the relation - however it is conceived - is there only a single one.

4. Against the Three Opinions together

68. Further, against all three opinions [nn.57, 61, 65]:

Because if the Father generates the Son by the fact that by the action of the Father the relation of the Son is in the divine essence, and if by his action - according to these opinions - paternity ‘as paternity’ is in the divine essence (because according to them paternity ‘as paternity’ then first exists when filiation exists as filiation, even if something first precede as origin, whether generativity or the property) then the Father will generate himself as Father by generation in just the way filiation is in the Son, which seems absurd.

69. Further, there is against all the opinions another difficulty; in what way will the essence be determined to the first person? For if from itself, then it does not seem common to the other persons, because whenever something is determined to something other than itself, whenever it does so, it has it, - and then the essence, whenever it exists, would have the personality of the first person; if it does so from another, this seems to be against the idea of the first person, because then he would seem to be originated, or seem in some way able to be posited in such subsistence by something.

70. Further, third: if it is determined of itself, I ask of what principle the essence has the reason when it determines itself to the first property? Not of matter (distinction 5 [nn.64-85]); not of form, because that which is the principle of form pre-requires that which is principle of the producer as from the formal and efficient cause; therefore the essence quasi productively determines itself, and so the first person will in some way be produced. Nor can it be said that the property is determined of itself, because it is impossible - in any way at all - for there to be two things altogether first, but every multitude comes to a stand at one thing; this here is only the essence as it is a sea; therefore there will be attributed to it the idea of some principle with respect to anything that is second.

71. If someone wants to say that the essence ‘as a this’ exists per se and thus acts per se (according to the first argument made in distinction 7 against Thomas [n.11]), he could say that ‘this essence’ communicates itself - quasi productively - to the first person, and in the first person communicates itself to the second, and in the first and second to the third, and thus there are three productions according to a triple principle, namely: essence as essence, as intellect, as will.

72. On the contrary:

Nothing produces itself - therefore there is a distinction between the essence and the first person. The reason is confirmed by the authority of the Master who - in distinction 5 [ch.1 n.58] - denies, because of this, that the essence generates or is generated; by parity of reason it seems one should deny that it produces ‘from itself’.

73. Again, this production is not generation, because ‘the Father is unbegotten’; nor is it inspiriting, as is plain, - and there are no others in divine reality.

74. Again, action is of a supposit; therefore the essence is a fourth supposit.

75. One could say that something belonging to the produced can well produce the whole, when that ‘something’ is first a per se being and in virtue possesses the rest of what concurs with it in the composite. There is no example, in the case of creatures, in substantial production (because there only matter pre-exists, which does not virtually have form), but there is very well an example in accidental production; wherever a subject has an accident actively, it produces the composite, - just as water, first made hot and afterwards left to itself, produces cold water. So one might say here that the essence, a ‘per se being’ in the altogether first moment - when relation is burgeoning - produces itself in a relative person, or more properly: communicates itself to it.

76. To the form of the reasoning [n.72]: the antecedent is conceded, insofar as ‘itself’ refers precisely to the same thing [sc. nothing produces itself], - and so the consequent is conceded, because ‘there is a distinction’ (that is, not a complete identity of essence with the related person, because it includes something in addition to the essence).

77. To the second [n.73]: this production can be called ‘generation’, and the production of the Word ‘saying’, - just as if fire were intelligent, it would generate by firey-ness and would say by intellect.

78. To the third [n.74]: form as ‘per se being’, that is not inhering as an accident (whether substantial form or quiddity) in a supposit, can be an agent; however it is not a supposit, because it is not incommunicable.

Thus the three reasons seem to escape [nn.72-74].

79. But there remain two authorities unsolved: the first, confirming the first reason, namely the authority of the Master [n.72] - the other in the second reason, that Augustine says the Father is unbegotten [n.73].

80. Because of the first authority one can say that in altogether the first moment there is not only ‘deity, a per se being’, but ‘this God’, and he produces himself as Father; and then this - the logic - is avoided ‘the essence produces’, although it produce in something in which there is nothing but essence. Thus the first way [nn.70-71] is corrected as to its sum.

81. Because of the second authority from Augustine one could say that the saints who suppose there is a first property in the essence, from wherever it burgeons (because they were not then investigating that), had a first supposit and were not speaking save of production of supposit by supposit; therefore they said that that person is unproduced ‘which is not produced by a supposit’ [n.19]. Likewise they said that the opposed relations of origin ‘could only be in distinct supposits’, - which is true if each relation belongs to a supposit but not if one belongs to another singular ‘per se being’ and not to a supposit, namely ‘to this God’. And the reason is that ‘a singular non-supposit’ can communicate itself, and so is not distinguished from the product; for because it is ‘a singular per se being’, therefore it can act, - because it is not a supposit, therefore it can be communicated; but a supposit never communicates itself, and therefore if it produces a supposit, it produces a distinct one, nothing of which it is.

82. How is this phantasy to be refuted, so dissonant to the sayings of the saints [Augustine, Anselm, nn.79-81]?

Although in divine reality all priority in nature is denied and only a priority of origin is commonly conceded (or a priority according to natural intelligence), yet there must in every way be some priority given to essence in respect of relation; both because it is the foundation (according to everyone), and because it is formally infinite but relation is not, - and because however they are distinguished they are not equally altogether first, nor is relation prior. Rightly then is the question raised [n.69] of whence essence determines the first property for itself - and since no other determining factor is found (because there is always the same question of whence the essence has it, unless one proceeds ad infinitum), one must stand at the fact the essence of itself precisely determines the first relation in itself as in a foundation. False then is this root claim that ‘nothing undetermined of itself to certain things determines itself of itself to any of them’, as is well maintained here, about the double indeterminate and the double primacy, of adequation and immediacy [nn.100-107].

83. But a doubt remains: what circumstance of the principle is indicated by ‘from’ or ‘of’ when it is said that ‘the essence of itself determines the first property for itself’? And if you would escape, because it does not state there the idea of any principle but excludes a principle that is a joint participant, that is no obstacle; for I ask how the essence determines, or by reason of what principle is it in respect of the property?

And the way here [nn.70-71] says that it is by reason of the principle of the producer, because without it there is no idea of formal or material principle, and because active form as ‘per se being’ per se acts (about which proposition see distinction 7 n.74), and because of the congruence of the triple productive principle [n.71] (from which congruence an instance was made in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Two Productions’ [n.304]); but the correction is made that ‘this God’ produces the Father, but not the essence properly speaking [n.80].

84. But against this way three reasons and three authorities were here before brought forward. All seem to escape in some way [n.78]. But because it does not sound right that the first person is produced, one can say that the essence determines the first property for itself by reason of formal principle, not indeed as in-forming but as quiddity is said to be the form of the supposit, and that a non necessarily causable quiddity formally determines some supposit for itself (the way the pagans would posit it about an absolute supposit, but we about the first relative); and the reason is that such a quiddity itself stops itself and is itself the quiddity of something.

85. Then to the arguments for the other way [n.83]:

To the first I say that every in-forming form is preceded by an efficient cause (and so the first efficient cause does not thus have the form), but not every quidditative form ‘giving being to a supposit’ is preceded by an efficient or producing cause, because here there is not a cause and a cause intrinsic to the composite that need to be united by the agent but there is perfect entity, which itself belongs in itself to being.

86. But if you object that ‘either the essence in-forms the property or conversely’, - a response was given in distinction 5 n.137: “Neither is the case, but there is perfect identity,” which identity does not have an efficient principle, but it has the quiddity, in idea of formal principle, of that with which it is itself first identical.

87. As to the second [n.83], seek the response in distinction 7 n.75.

88. As to the third: this way [n.84] well preserves congruence, because the essence as essence and as prior to every idea of power exists to give being formally, and thus it determines itself; but as it is such and such a power, to be principle belongs to it. Therefore there are two productive principles - a single one non-productive from itself alone, but giving of being formally to the first supposit.

B. Opinion of those who Wish to Hold that the Persons are Constituted by Absolutes

89. Another position is set down by holding a conclusion opposite to these three opinions [nn.57, 61, 65], - because the first person is not constituted by any relation to the second person (and this when speaking of what is first constitutive of that person in personal being), but by some absolute non-quidditative reality, as was touched on in the third opinion in distinction 26 nn.56-59.

90. For this opinion argument is given in particular about the first person, because unbegotten is pre-understood to paternity, and to unbegotten seems to be pre-understood some reality proper to the first person; therefore since it cannot be a relative reality, it will be some absolute one, proper to that person.

Proof of the assumption: both from Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7: “if he had not generated, nothing would have prevented him from being unbegotten;” and because fecundity for some production in divine reality is not understood as ‘quasi proximate power’ save as it is in something that does not have that fecundity through an act of that fecundity, just as the will is not understood to be fecund for inspiriting ‘as it is in some person’ save in a person in whom it exists as non-communicated by fecundity of the will. And therefore it seems to be commonly conceded that it is pre-understood to the force of the inspiriting power in the Father and the Son that the will is not had through inspiriting; therefore by similarity here, being unable to be born seems to be preunderstood to the fecundity of generating ‘as it is a quasi proximate power’, and this being unable to be born indicates that it is not had by act of fecundity of the intellect, that is by act of generation. - Proof of the second assumption, from the rejection of the preceding opinion in the preceding question [nn.44-46].

91. Further, no relatives are first referred to each other, such that a related thing ‘as related’ is the first term of the relation (the thing is plain in creatures), because the related thing ‘as related’ requires that to which it is referred for its being and for its definition; therefore that to which it is referred is in some way prior to the related thing as related. Likewise conversely, it would be referred as being the term; therefore by parity of reasoning it would require that to which it is referred for its being and its definition. Therefore there would be a circle in joint requirement, from the fact that each would require the other as essentially prior to itself, as defining it; but a circle in essential priority is impossible; therefore it is impossible for a relative ‘as relative’ - by the fact it depends on its correlative as term - to be the term of dependence of the other correlative. And by similarity so does it seem in the issue at hand, that a relative is not first referred to the relative as to the term; therefore the second person, if he is referred to the first, should posit some absolute thing as the term of this relation; but that absolute thing is not the essence, because as the essence is not referred, so it is not the term of a relation, because it is not distinguished; therefore there is some personal absolute thing which can be distinguished from the second person.

92. Against this opinion [n.89] an argument is given that it is quasi heretical, but the arguments were touched on and responses given in distinction 26 [nn.60-64, 73-83], -now I pass them over.

C. Scotus’ own Response

93. To this question [n.52] - for someone who does not like the last opinion about absolute persons [n.89] - one can say, by holding the common way (namely by supposing that the persons are relative), that the first person is constituted by a positive relation to the second, because by nothing else, as was argued for the opposite by way of division [n.55]. Nor is it necessary to distinguish how this relation may be considered as it is constitutive; for however it is may vary in consideration, it is the same in reality, - and according to what it is in reality, it constitutes a real person [n.67].

94. Nor is there any difficulty save how it requires the second person to be simultaneous with it, although however it precedes him [n.52].

In brief I say that the simultaneity of correlatives - whereby they are said to be ‘together by nature’ [n.53] - is this simultaneity, namely not to be able to be ‘without each other’ without contradiction, if they are mutual relatives; for one relation cannot be without its term, because if it could be without it, it would be a being to itself; by parity of reason neither can the other relation corresponding to it be without the former term, because then it would exist to itself; therefore these two relations, when they are mutual, cannot be ‘without each other’ without contradiction. But everything ‘prior in nature’ can exist without a posterior without contradiction, such that if the former be posited without the latter there would be no contradiction; the thing is plain from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.11.1019a1-4, the chapter ‘On the Prior’.

95. In this way I concede that the first person and the second person cannot be ‘without each other’ without contradiction (and the contradiction is not from something extrinsic but from the formal idea of these persons), and yet there stands along with this a priority of origin, because one is from the other.

Which point is made clear first by the fact that if Socrates is father of Plato, Socrates is not understood as subject of paternity but as under paternity, and Plato is understood as under filiation; these exist together in nature, because they are thus understood as correlatives, - and yet as such Socrates is prior in origin to Plato, because he is understood thus under paternity, which is formally a priority of origin. Therefore it seems in the same way that what is prior in origin in creatures is also simultaneous in nature with the same thing, in the way that simultaneity of nature is required for correlatives.

96. The point is also made persuasive - secondly - by the fact that priority of nature is in one way priority according to perfection, such that prior things are said to be more perfect in nature, Metaphysics 9.8.1050a7-9. But now along with simultaneity of correlatives in nature it seems there can stand priority in perfection in one of them with respect to the other, - because if the genus of relation is divided through proper opposed differences as other genera are, one of the dividing differences will be more worthy and the other more unworthy (because two species are not equal, Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32-44a11), and consequently a species constituted by a less noble difference will be less noble; and since two species constituted from two opposed differences can be referred to each other (because every relation of inequality is referred to something of a different species), therefore in the case of relations corresponding to each other one can be prior -that is more perfect - than the other, and yet simultaneous in nature, as far as what is meant by ‘not able to be without each other’. Therefore much more does it also seem that priority of origin - namely by which one extreme in nature does not exceed the other extreme but is ‘from which another is’ - can stand along with simultaneity of correlatives.

97. There is a confirmation from the remark of Augustine On the Quantity of the Soul ch.9 n.15: “you rightly put equality before inequality,” - and he is speaking not by reason of foundation, because from the nobility of equality he concludes that the foundation to which it belongs is more noble than the foundation to which it does not belong (the thing is plain there about circle and other figures); therefore a relation has a proper nobility in its genus. Thus one relation is nobler than another, and yet they are two correlative species, whenever there is a relation of inequality.

98. For this is also adduced Avicenna Metaphysics VI ch.2 (91vb-92ra), where he seems to intend the cause ‘insofar as it is cause’ to be prior to the caused insofar as it is caused, and yet a cause ‘insofar as it is cause’ is simultaneous with the caused, with the simultaneity required for correlatives. But this priority of nature, which is of the cause to the caused, seems more repugnant to the simultaneity in nature of correlatives than is the priority of origin alone!

99. Then briefly: the first person is constituted in personal being by a positive relation to the second, and conversely, and it is impossible for them to be without each other; and yet the first person himself, constituted in such being, is prior in origin to the second person (such that the first person, constituted in such being, is ‘from whom the second is originated’), and so priority of origin is not repugnant to simultaneity of relatives.

100. But there is another doubt (which was touched on against the three opinions [n.69]), namely: by what is essence determined to the first subsistence?

To this I say that whenever something is unlimited in some idea of cause, such that there correspond to it several things in the other extreme (or some one thing that contains many things), if there is some order among those several things, whether absolutely or in itself, having some respect to that unlimited thing, then what is ‘first’ with respect to such unlimited thing - and this when speaking of the primacy of adequacy - is not the same as what is ‘first’ with the primacy of immediacy.

101. An example of this - first in the efficient cause, where it is more manifest:

If the sun ‘as cause’ illumines the whole medium, and yet is a quasi unlimited agent to which many parts of the illumined medium correspond, and there is some order between these parts, because the first illumined part is closer than a more remote one, -the first thing corresponding to the sun as it illumines is the whole medium as it includes all the parts; first, I say, as adequate; however it is not first as immediate, but a part nearer the sun is more immediately illumined than a more remote part.

102. So in the case of form:

By taking the intellective soul (which is in some way an unlimited form), the organic body corresponds to it as the first perfectible thing, including in itself many perfectible parts; so the first perfectible thing, that is adequate thing, for the intellective soul is the whole organic body. But because in the parts of this whole there is an order of origin, either in itself or in having the soul (because the heart is first, then the other parts, Generation of Animals 24740a1-30, 5-6.741b15-31), therefore this form does not first -that is equally immediately - perfect the whole, but it thus first perfects the heart and through its mediation the other parts. If then the soul were the whole essence of heart and hand by identity, and yet it were to give them a distinct being of the sort it now gives (although within the whole), and if along with this the heart and hand were not parts of the same whole (because this would be a mark of imperfection) but they were distinct supposits, - still the soul would, because of its unlimitedness, have the organic body for adequate perfectible (or would then have all those as supposits, which are now parts of the body, for its one adequate object), and yet it would have one of them - namely the one that is first in origin - for first object, namely for immediately perfectible.

103. So can it be said universally in the case of every unlimited thing, to which there correspond several things between which there is some order, because of which order one of those things is more immediately regarded by that unlimited thing than another is.

104. So in the issue at hand: the divine essence does not have some one first subsistent, that is one that is adequate to itself (because then it could not be in another one), but three subsistents are in this way adequate to that nature; yet in those three there is an order in having the nature, and so the essence by one primacy - namely the primacy of immediacy - respects the first of those ordered things, such that just as the essence of itself would be first in the three if it were in them without order (and this both with the primacy of adequacy and with the primacy of immediacy), so now it is of itself in the three by primacy of adequacy - but not by primacy of immediacy, but thus it is in the first of them and by virtue of it in the others, to which it is communicated by that first one.

105. When therefore you ask ‘by what is the essence in the first person?’ [n.100], I say that it is so from itself. And if you still wish to say no, but that it is so through a determining property, there is the same question: ‘by what is it determined to the determining property?’, or ‘by what does that property first burgeon in the divine essence?’ And then either one must proceed ad infinitum or one must make a stand at the fact that the essence is of itself first (that is adequately) in the three, and that it is of itself immediately in the first of the three as they possess order.

106. And if you ask ‘by what is the essence determined to the first person, - and if it is determined of itself, then it cannot be in another’, I reply:

Determination is double, opposed to a double indetermination. One is indetermination ‘to contradictory opposites’ (as matter is indeterminate to form and privation), the other is indetermination ‘to diverse positives’, which however stand together with determination to one part of each contradiction (an example of the second: if the sun is indeterminate to producing a worm and a plant as to diverse positives, although however it is of itself determined to one part of the contradiction - both of the former and of the latter - just as if it were a particular agent only of a nature to produce one of them). Then I say in the case of the issue at hand that the essence is of itself determined to the first person by a determination opposed to the first indetermination, which is to contradictories; not however by a determination opposed to the second indetermination, because that does not stand along with unlimitedness to several things.

107. And hereby is plain the answer to the argument ‘if it is determined of itself then it cannot be in another person’ [n.106]. The consequence holds when speaking of the second determination, which is opposed to unlimitedness to several things, - and in this way the essence is not determined to one subsistent but to three, because this determination is to an adequate ‘first’; but the consequence does not hold when speaking of determination in the first way, because that is to an immediate ‘first’ (not an adequate one),a and it stands along with unlimitedness of such undetermined thing to several things.b

a [Interpolation] But this alone follows, ‘therefore it has no power for them’! By this determination too it is determined to three, because both the determination that is to the adequate ‘first’ and that which is to the immediate ‘first’ are necessary; when the addition is made ‘because it is to the immediate first (not the adequate one)’, this is false, understanding it precisely.

b [Note of Duns Scotus] Godfrey [of Fontaines] Quodlibet VII qq.3: “The perfection of the divine nature requires that it be had by several in several ways, for these three (to have it thus and thus and thus, without order of duration, nature, dignity) concur to the constitution of the divine perfection (as far as it consists in the most perfect acts in intellect and will), just as three angles equally constitute the perfection of a triangle;” q.4: “The order ought to be in perfect acts, namely of saying and inspiriting, by which are produced declarative knowledge and incentive love, in which are as it were perfected the divine beatific operations.”

II. To the Principal Arguments

108. To the first principal argument [n.52] the answer is plain from what has been said [nn.94-99], that the first supposit precedes the second in origin, and yet they are simultaneous in nature as is required for relatives.

109. And you argue that the first supposit precedes generation, therefore the second does too [n.52], - I reply that in the antecedent both active and passive generation can be understood. If active generation, I deny the antecedent, nay the first supposit is subsistent active generation; because, however this relation is understood, there is no difference in reality when saying ‘the Father subsists’ or ‘generation subsists’ or ‘generativity subsists’. But if in the antecedent the understanding is about passive generation, I concede that the first person, as he precedes the Son in origin, so he precedes passive generation in origin.

110. And when you argue ‘therefore the Son precedes the same passive generation because he is simultaneous with the Father’ [n.53], - this inference is not valid, because he is not simultaneous with the Father in the way in which the Father is prior to passive generation; for the Son is simultaneous in nature with the Father (as pertains to correlatives), but the Father precedes passive generation not in this way but in origin. But now this proposition ‘when certain things are simultaneous, in whatever way one of them is prior the other is too’ [n.53] is false, unless it be understood of simultaneity of the same idea as the priority and posteriority; just as this proposition is false ‘if certain things are simultaneous in time, whatever is prior in nature to one is prior in nature also to the other’; but this proposition is true ‘they are simultaneous in time, - therefore what is prior in time to one is prior in time also to the other’.

111. To the second argument [n.54] I say that the major is true in the order of essences, because there it is understood in quidditative perfections, and a stand is made at infinite quidditative perfection, which is absolute. But in persons that have the same nature, and are distinct only in origin (as one must understand in the issue at hand, according to the common opinion), the major proposition is false, because there ‘first’ is precisely that which is formally precise in relation to the second.a

a [Note by Duns Scotus] Whether there are only five notions. - That there are not: ‘from another’ is not, because it needs a correlative, - one, because it belongs to several; no ‘able to inspirit’ [sc. filiation and paternity are not notions because they need another; inspiriting, active and passive, is not because it needs others (the Father and Son); able to inspirit, whether of Father or Son, is not; therefore only unable to be born is a notion]. - On the contrary: On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7 [“one notion is whereby begetter is understood, another whereby begotten is”]. - Solution: notion is fundamentally, formally, accidentally; ‘because of which’ is a notional person or also the idea of personality. In the first way all essential properties (or properties according to essence) are notions; we are speaking in the second way here (formally); third, because quiddity becomes a notion. In the second way, because the notions are ‘because of which’ the essence is. - A doubt about able to inspirit. A power for the second production.