Book One. Distinctions 26 - 48

Twenty Sixth Distinction

Single Question. Whether the Persons are Constituted in their Personal Being through Relations of Origin

1. About the twenty sixth distinction I ask whether the persons are constituted in their personal being through relations of origin.

That they are not:

Relations of origin are of different ideas, just as are relations differing by species in creatures; the point is clear, for paternity and filiation differ more, or paternity differs more from filiation, than filiation differs from filiation or paternity from paternity; therefore things constituted formally by these relations differ in species. The persons therefore differ in species, and so generation is equivocal in divine reality - all which was disproved in distinction 7 [nn.51-64, 47-50].

2. Again, the idea by which the relations of origin constitute persons is the same idea by which common relations constitute them, and so the same person would be constituted by a double formal constitutive feature, - which is unacceptable. The inference is proved by the fact that common relations require equal distinctness in the extremes, and they in the same way stand along with unity of essence; therefore they distinguish equally [sc. as the relations of origin do].

3. Further, opposite relations of the second kind of relatives [sc. relations of active and passive, Metaphysics 5.15.1020b26-32] can be based on the same thing, the way the will moves itself; but the relation of mover and moved pertains to the second mode of relatives; therefore by parity of reasoning the relations of producer and produced, which pertain to the same mode, can exist in the same thing, - and so they will not distinguish opposites.

4. The reason is confirmed by Boethius, who at the end of his book On the Trinity ch.6 says that this relation is as it were ‘of the same thing toward itself’. Therefore these relations are not distinct.a

a [Interpolation, from Appendix A] Note. Relations are distinguished either by species or by number.

     If they are distinct by species, this distinction is received because of a distinction in the foundation, and that in two ways: either because there are two foundations in the some related thing, - and then it is plain that the two relations founded on them are distinct in species (as Socrates by his generative power, through the medium of a previous act, is related to Plato by the relation that is ‘paternity’, - and by another relation, founded on whiteness, that is called ‘likeness’ he is related to a white thing; and these relations are different in species); in another way there can be a distinction of foundations, not in the related thing itself in which the relations are, but in the terms to which those relations are relations (for example, by the same whiteness Socrates is fundamentally related by the relation that is ‘likeness’ to a white thing and by the relation that is ‘unlikeness’ to a black thing; and these two relations are distinguished by species through a distinction of foundations in the extremes to which the related thing, in which the two relations are, is related).

     If one asks about numerical distinction, I say that sufficient for this is either of the two aforesaid distinctions and their foundations (the proof is that whatever suffices for the distinction of certain things in species, suffices for a distinction of them in number); and I speak of the distinction of essence, not of a distinction of supposit or subject. A distinction also of related things suffices for a numerical relation between them (the proof is that the same relation in number never exists in two related things, as neither does any other accident). A distinction of terms in number also suffices for a distinction of the relations in number (the proof is that one of them can remain when the other does not remain). A numerical distinction of foundations also, along with unity of subject and term, suffices for a numerical distinction of relations; hence, when the unity of the related thing and the term remain, but a variation is made in the foundation of the relation, then there is not in each of them (namely the related thing and the term) the same relation in number, because by the action of a natural agent no return is made to the same thing in number. An example of this last point: white Socrates is related to Plato in the relation that is called ‘likeness’; but if afterwards he become black, then he is not related to Plato by any such likeness; but if again become white, then he is related to him by ‘likeness’, but not by the same likeness in number as before.

     Hence note that a specific distinction of relations is founded on a distinction of the foundations existing in the related thing in which the two relations are, or in the extremes to which the related thing is by the aforesaid relations related. But sufficient for a numerical distinction of the relations is either of the distinctions of the aforesaid foundations (whether of the subject or of the term) toward which the relation is.

     The reason for all the aforesaid points is that, whenever many things are required for something, a distinction of any of them suffices for a distinction of it; and for the unity of it there is required a unity of all the other things required. Hence for the unity of something more things are required than for its distinction.

     [Additional note:] Note that a white man is like blackness in whiteness [sc. because white and black are both qualities qualifying a subject?] and unlike the same in color, and these relations are yet distinct in species although they have the same terms. So correct these additions in this way.

5. On the contrary:

Boethius, ibid.: “The essence contains the unity, the relation multiplies the trinity.”

I. Opinions of Others

A. First Opinion

6. The response of some - as of Praepositinus - is that the persons are distinct by themselves, and so there is no need to ask by what they are formally distinguished or by what they are constituted, because they do not have a constitutive element.

7. A confirmation of this reason is that a divine person is as equally simple as the essence; but the essence, because of its simplicity, is distinct by itself from anything else; therefore the person is too.

8. Again, abstract and concrete signify the same thing, - therefore paternity is the Father. Therefore to say the Father is distinct by paternity is to say that he is distinct by himself.

9. Argument against this as follows:

Things that are not primarily diverse are distinct by some part of themselves, because things that are wholly distinct are primarily distinct (for if they are not primarily diverse but are beings in some way the same, then they are not distinct by that by which they are the same but by something of themselves by which they are not the same); but the divine persons are not primarily diverse, because they belong to the same essence; therefore one must still ask by what they are made distinct.

10. Again, there are many properties in the same person, as not being begotten and action-generation in the Father; but they are distinct, according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7, where he means that if the Father were not unborn yet he could be Father, and conversely; therefore although - per impossibile - one property would not distinguish the Father from anything, the other property could distinguish him, and conversely. Therefore one must ask by what the Father is distinct from the Son.

11. Again, in the Father there is active generation and active inspiriting; active inspiriting does not distinguish him from the Son, because it exists in the Son; therefore the Father is not equally primarily distinguished by his whole total self but by something that is in him.

12. Again, in the Preface about the Trinity, “a property in the persons” is spoken of; but a person is not in itself in the way that a property is understood to be in a person; therefore a person can be said to be distinguished formally by a property in a way that a person is not distinguished first in itself.

13. There is also argument against this opinion [n.6] that if the Father is distinct in his totality from the Son then also by parity of reason he is distinct in his totality from the Holy Spirit, - and the converse inference holds; and if he is distinct from both by the same thing, then he has the same relation to both; therefore conversely too, each of them has the same relation to him, and a relation of the same idea (just as if Paul is like Peter and Linus, then Peter and Linus have the same likeness and a relation of the same idea to Paul), and then the Son would seem to be distinguished from the Father by a relation of the same idea as that by which the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Father.

14. But perhaps this argument is not conclusive, because whatever be way the Father is constituted in personal being, he would be distinguished personally from the Son and the Holy Spirit; yet it does not follow conversely that the Son and Holy Spirit would be distinguished from the Father by something of the same idea.

B. Second Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

15. There is another opinion, the common one, which says that the persons are constituted by relations.

16. For this opinion the authority of Christ is alleged in the Gospel (Matthew, last chapter), as will be touched on below against the third opinion.

17. For this opinion is adduced Boethius [n.5], where he seems to touch on many things about it.

18. And Augustine likewise, On the Trinity V ch.8 n.9: “Whatever that most outstanding sublimity is said to be in relation to itself, it is said to be substantially;” and a little later: “Whatever is said about the individual persons in relation to themselves, is not taken multiply in a sum but singly.” And ibid.: “Whatever is said about the individual persons in relation to themselves is said all at once.” And in ch.11 n.12: “But as to the individual things that are properly spoken of in the same Trinity, these are not in any way said in relation to themselves but to each other - or to the creature; and therefore it is manifest that for that reason they are said relatively not substantially.” - In these words the view seems to be most expressly held that everything said ‘in relation to itself’ belongs to the three persons and is common to them, and everything not common to the three is a relative; but what is constitutive and distinctive of the person is not common to the three; therefore it is a relative.

19. Again, Augustine City of God XI ch.10 n.1: “God is whatever he has, save that one person is said in relation to another and is not the other.”