D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

99. To the remark - on behalf of the opinion - from 83 Questions question 63 [n.91], one can say that logos (in Greek) is better translated through what is meant by ‘word’ than by what is meant by ‘reason’, because reason does not thus signify a respect to the Father as word does, nor does it thus connote a respect to what is declared as word does. But Augustine does not mean to say that word states essentially relation to the creature under the idea of what is declarative, because he says “so that not only is respect to the Father signified, but a respect to those things too that are made through the word by operative power;” but the word is not said to be ‘operative power’ of the Father save as it is said to be the wisdom and art of the Father, which are not the word’s save by appropriation. Or if Augustine intends this name ‘word’ to signify both respects, then it does not precisely signify the property of the second person but, along with this, another appropriated respect; and then the interpretation of logos as ‘word’ and not as ‘reason’ is fitting, because ‘reason’ does not thus signify either a proper or an appropriated respect. The interpretation as ‘word’ is indeed true (for that reason it asserts more than the property of a person), nor does Augustine say the interpretation is in something that signifies a property of the second person.

100. When the addition is made that it asserts a respect to creatures, proper to the word [n92], - this seems much more false than the opposite conclusion that I maintain [nn.95, 98, 100], because not only is relation to creatures not included in the essential idea of any person, but it can also in no way pertain to any person without uniformly pertaining to the whole Trinity, because the whole Trinity is uniformly related to everything other than itself, according to any existence whatever, whether existence in reality or intelligible existence.

101. And when proof is given through the word’s being ‘declarative’ [n.92], I say that the actual intellection of the Father is declarative. Nor is ‘declarative’ the proper idea of word, but what is declarative is concomitant to expressed knowledge, because the expression is of actual knowledge; and therefore what is declarative is appropriated to word, although it is not proper to it.

102. When proof is afterwards given that ‘appropriation is not made save because of agreement with what is proper’ [n.93], the inference does not hold - from this - that appropriated is proper, but the opposite holds; and I concede that what is proper to the Son - which is ‘to be expressed’ - has an agreement with wisdom and with what is declarative, and with art, because of the fact that this expression is of something by way of intellect and by virtue of intellect; and such expression is actual knowledge, to which it belongs to declare the habitual knowledge from which it is expressed [n.64].