a. Which of the Things Found in the Intelligence is the Word

48. Now in the intelligence there seems only to be [1] actual intellection, [2] or the object that is the term of that intellection, or, according to others, [3] the species generated in the intelligence from the species in the memory, which ‘species in the intelligence’ precedes the act of understanding, or, according to others, [4] it is something formed by an act of understanding, or fifth, according to others, [5] intellection itself as a passion, as if caused by itself as action; and according to these five there can be five opinions about the word.

49. Now the species in the intelligence is not prior to the act of understanding [contra the third opinion], because positing such a species is superfluous. For it does not more perfectly represent the object than the species in the memory, and it is enough to have one thing perfectly representing the object before the act of understanding.

50. But that it is not ‘more perfect’ is plain from Augustine ibid. XV ch.14 n.23: “There is nothing more in the offspring than in the parent.”

51. Also in that case two species of the same idea would be in the same power, because these two species are of the same power; and the intellect itself as memory and intelligence is one power, because it is pure act, and that by which the possessor operates and that by which it has first act is in second act.

52. In that case too the habit would not be the immediate principle of the act, nor would what has the habit be in accidental power to acting according to the habit, because a prior form would be required for the operation, different from the habit.

53. Nor can the ‘species in the intelligence’ be posited as being born naturally, supposing it could never exist without actual intellection, because actual intellection is subject to the command of the will; nor even can it be said that it is born freely or that its generation is subject to the command of the will - as it seems - if it is posited as a species prior to act, because it seems that the first thing pertaining to the intellect that is in our power is actual intellection.

54. Nor can the object itself be posited as the word, as another opinion says [the second, n.48], because the object in itself is not anything produced by virtue of memory (or of anything in the mind), such as the word is, - nor is the object ‘as it is in the memory’ produced by virtue of the memory, as is plain; but the object ‘as it is in the intelligence’ is only generated because something is first generated in which the object has being, because, as was said in distinction 3 nn.375, 382, 386, these intentional actions and passions do not belong to the object save because of some real action or passion that belongs to that in which the object has intentional being.

55. Nor too is it some term produced by intellection [sc. the fourth opinion, n.48], because intellection is not the productive action of any term; for then it would be incompossible to understand it to exist and not to be of the term, just as it is incompossible to understand that there is heating and no heat toward which the heating exists. But it is not impossible to understand intellection in itself without understanding that it is of some term as produced by it.

56. There is a confirmation too, that such operations ought to be ultimate acts, from Ethics 1.1.1094a3-5 and Metaphysics 9.8.1050a-b1. - This matter was spoken about above in distinction 3 nn.600-604, as to how it is a certain action of the genus of action, and another action that is quality, of which sort intellection is.

57. This way - and the following one about intellection-passion - are also refuted [sc. the fourth and fifth opinions, n.48] through the same middle term, that then the intelligence and not the memory would generate the word, which is contrary to Augustine [n.44]; for intelligence would produce the term of the action of understanding, if there were any - and intelligence would produce intellection-passion, if there were any.

58. Also this way ‘about intellection-action and passion’ [the fifth] does not seem reasonable, because intellection is one form, which although it can be compared to the agent from which it is and to the subject in which it is received, yet it does not have from it such distinction that it could be as it were the cause of itself or the term of action in accord with this [sc. the subject] and not in accord with that [sc. the agent]; because if it is the term of action, this is in accord with itself, and not in accord with this respect or that, but those respects are concomitants of it.

59. It follows,     therefore , by way of division that the word is actual intellection [the first opinion, n.48].

60. And there is confirmation from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.16 n.23: “Our thinking, reaching to that which we know, and formed from it, is our word.” The same is held by him in ibid. ch.10 n.19: “Formed thinking, indeed,” etc     . “is the word,” as was said above [n.44].

61. There is confirmation of this through a likeness about the vocal and imaginable word: for the vocal word is formed to signify and make clear what is understood, but that a vocal sound is not at once formed by someone who understands insofar as he understands but through some other middle power (namely a motive one), this belongs to imperfection; if therefore it were generated or formed at once as expressive of that which is latent in the intellect, and this by virtue of the understanding intellect, it would no less be the word. Now the object lies habitually latent in the memory; if therefore by virtue of it is at once caused some actual intellection, which once generated expresses and makes clear the object latent there, - truly it is the word, because expressive of what is latent and generated by virtue of it to express it.