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Annotation Guide:

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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 26 to 48.
Book One. Distinctions 26 - 48
Twenty Seventh Distinction
Question Two. Whether the Word in Divine Reality States something Proper to the Generated Person

Question Two. Whether the Word in Divine Reality States something Proper to the Generated Person

5. Second I ask about the Divine Word, whether word in divine reality states something proper to the generated person.

That it does not:

Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.10 n.15: “the Word is knowledge along with love;” all these things [sc. knowledge and love], placed in the definition of word, are essentials; therefore the word is an essential too.a

a [Interpolation] Again, the word is the intellectual term of operation; ‘to understand’ , whereby the Son is produced, is not only a personal property but also a common essential one; therefore through it is produced an essential word.

6. Further, On the Trinity XV ch.7 n.12 ‘On Great Things’ and chs.15 and 16 ‘On Small Things’: “Just as the Father understands for himself and wills for himself and remembers for himself, so also do the Son and Holy Spirit;” but the proper act of intelligence as it is intelligence is the word; therefore just as in the Father there formally exists intelligence as intelligence, so there exists in him word as word.

The assumption is proved by this, that the trinity which Augustine assigns in On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18 (‘mind, knowledge, and love’, which knowledge is the word, according to him in the same place), and the trinity assigned according to him in On the Trinity X ch.10 n.13 (‘memory, intelligence, and will’) correspond to each other in turn, -the first part to the first part, and the second to the second, and the third to the third; therefore, just there is no perfect will without love formally, nor perfect mind without memory formally, so there is no perfect intelligence - as it seems - without the word formally.

7. Again there are not two things proper to one person, because there is one formal constitutive property for one thing constituted in being; filiation is the property constitutive of the generated person (according to Augustine On the Faith to Peter [really Fulgentius] ch.2 n.7), therefore the word is not; for these do not seem to state the same property, because not every son is word nor is every word son.

8. The opposite:

Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3: “He is word by that by which he is Son,” and each of these is said relatively.