I. To the Question

4. I reply:

Every perfect operative power can be the power of operating about any object that is of a nature to have a respect to such power, - just as a perfect intellect can be the principle of understanding anything intelligible and perfect sight of seeing anything visible; therefore since in God there is will formally (from distinction 2 nn.75-88), and even will supremely perfect ‘because infinite’ (from the same distinction nn.94, 101, 117-

118, 234-235, 300-303), the result is that it can be the principle of willing anything will-able.

5. But it cannot be a principle of willing anything from time, because this could not be without the change of something; and not of the willed object, because the willed object only has being because it is willed and because it is in the divine will; therefore this change would be in the will itself, as was deduced in distinction 30 n.41 about the idea of the will itself. Therefore the divine will can in its own eternity be the principle of willing anything will-able.

6. But it is not the idea of willing both opposites at the same time, because opposites cannot be at the same time with respect to anything; nor is the idea of willing neither of them, because then nothing in creatures would be willed by God, - and consequently he would cause nothing in creatures, because contingency can only be in God on the part of the will, as was deduced in distinction 39 [in the interpolation for that question]. Therefore there is in eternity the idea of willing any other object in anything other than himself.