II. To the Principal Argument

19. To the first argument [n.1]: the Master’s reason holds, on the supposition that the universe is capable of a greater perfection, because, if that capacity were given to it, it would be made to be better than it is made to be without that capacity, - as if it were capable of many additional things; but absolutely the Master’s reason does not hold if that supposition is denied, namely the supposition that it could become better, - just as neither does it follow that ‘what remains as fire’ could become better if it were made capable of intellect or will, because it is not capable of those things. I say then to the form of the argument, that God cannot give capacity to what is not receptive of being made; but the first reason for this is not this fact but rather that such a thing cannot have such a capacity - and this reason is reduced to the formal repugnance of the parts, and beyond this to the divine intellect.