VI. To the Arguments of the First Opinion

99. To the arguments for the opinion of Praepositinus [nn.7-8] I reply:

To the first [n.7] I say that it is true that ‘person is simple like the essence’; however person includes certain things one of which is not formally the other, the essence not so, and therefore the essence is itself totally distinct although person, because of the essence, which is common, is not itself totally distinct; for such a non formal identity is sufficient in something for the fact that the Son is distinguished by one and not by the other.

To the second [n.8] I say that a concrete - whether it signifies or connotes - at any rate gives to understand a subsistent in form or nature, but an abstract precisely gives to understand form;a but in the matter at issue a subsistent, possessing paternity, has also along with this the divine essence, which essence is not formally paternity, nor conversely (as is said in On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3), and therefore to say ‘the Father is distinguished by paternity’, taking Father not adjectivally but substantively for a hypostasis (as the Master takes it in distinction 27 ch.2 n.238b), is not to say ‘the Father is himself wholly distinct’ first, but by something that is in him, yet giving to understand the whole.c

a [Interpolation] but if this be doubtful to anyone about a concrete adjective, it seems sufficiently certain about a concrete substantive, which either signifies or necessarily connotes a subsistent in the nature that is implied by its abstract.

b A blank space was left here by Scotus

c [Interpolation] for Father (as taken substantively) does not per se include deity in all the same way that paternity does.