C. Third Opinion

12. [Exposition of the opinion] - In another way “it is said that whatever God does with respect to creatures, he does only by the good pleasure of his will, and for this no reason or cause needs to be sought.”

13. “The point is confirmed by what is said in Romans 9.11-2 about Jacob and Esau: “When they were not yet born, or had done anything bad or good, so that the purpose of God by election might stand, - not from works;”The Vatican editors refer to Aquinas ST I q.23 a.5. ¹⁶ the Gloss: ‘just as not for preceding merits, so not for future ones, because good and bad merits were not future without grace added or removed’.”

14. “Which also the Apostle makes clear when he subjoins, 9.21: “Or does not the potter have power from the same lump, etc.” Hence just as the will alone of the potter is the reason that from this part of the lump he makes an honorable vessel and from that part a vessel of contempt, while no difference exists in the lump (just as neither in prime matter, which however the agent cause clothes in one part with a nobler form but in another with a less noble one), thus the good pleasure alone of God is the reason that from the same mass - equally vitiated in our first parent - he chose this one for glory, but that one he leaves for condemnation; or even if the lump had not been vitiated but all were equal, he would only gratuitously choose one, while another he would leave - in both cases giving grace to him whom he chose (but a greater grace than for one chosen from the vitiated lump), and justice to him whom he did not choose from the damned mass, but not injustice to him whom, though existing in a state of innocence, he did not choose” [from Henry of Ghent].

15. Further, “this position [n.12] says that there happens to be an extrinsic reason assigned that God from the whole lost lump wanted in mercy to free some and not others, but there is no reason that he chose this one rather than that.”

16. “A reason is posited for the first, namely so that his goodness - existing simple in himself - might be manifested in manifold ways in diverse things at the same time, by the fact that in no one thing can the whole be manifested, because it does not reach the divine perfection; so just as for the perfection of the universe are required diverse grades of things in material reality (even from the same matter, equally disposed to all forms), so too for manifesting the same goodness diverse grades in moral reality are required for perfection, because in this his goodness as to any supernatural degree would be manifested; for in justly punishing the reprobate the goodness of his justice is manifested, as the goodness of his mercy is manifested in the glorified.”

17. “For thus does God permit these evils to come to be, so that goods not be impeded (but that they may happen), and this both in moral reality, as in the issue at hand - and in natural reality, as in the man born blind (John 9.3), in whom Christ showed that the sole reason was that the glory of God might be manifest in him; but this is not from the defect of sight in the blindness, but from the marvelous illumining of him by the Lord.”

18. “And it seems that this reason is assigned by the Apostle in Romans 9.22-23 when he says: “God wishing to show the anger of his justice etc.;” with which the example of the potter agrees, who makes from the same clay one vessel for honor and another for contempt [n.14], about which in 2 Timothy 2.20 the Apostle says: ‘Now in a large house not only gold and silver vessels, but also earthenware’.” [Henry of Ghent]

19. About the second [n.15] - namely in particular - “it is said that (as in natural reality), since the whole of prime matter is uniform, an intrinsic reason that one part is under the form of fire and another under the form of earth can be assigned (namely the perfection of the universe), and an extrinsic one (namely the manifestation of the power and goodness of God), but no reason can be assigned that this part of matter is under this form, and that part under that form and not conversely, save the sole will of the artificer who so determines things; just as in human works, that this stone is so fashioned as to be placed in an altar but another placed in a privy (according to what the Philosopher says Physics 26.197b9-11, that some stones are fortunate but others not), this depends on the mere choice of the artificer; so do they say in the issue at hand, that there is no reason in particular that he prefers this person and not that.” And this “is confirmed by Augustine on John 6.44: ‘No one comes to me unless my Father draw him etc.’, where Augustine says: ‘Why he draws this one and not that one, do not wish to judge if you do not wish to err’.” [from Aquinas].

20. “And they say from this that the fact God thus makes inequality for equal things is not iniquity - because in things that happen by grace, without debt, the giver can without any iniquity give as he wishes, according to the remark of Matthew 20.14-15: ‘Take what is your own, and depart; am I not permitted to do what I wish?’ But it would then be iniquity if it were given from debt.” [Henry of Ghent]

21. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this opinion, someone argues - first against the reason that is assigned in general [n.16]:

For no defect of guilt or penalty belongs of itself to the perfection of the universe; therefore neither is it per se required for the manifestation of divine goodness. And from this it is plain that the differences of things in natural and moral being are not similar, because all the species of things - distinct in natural being - belong to the perfection of the universe; it is not so, as to moral being, between good and bad or between the blessed and the miserable.

22. Again, he argues that if the damnation of some is necessary for the manifestation of divine justice, the damnation of demons seems sufficient for this; for men and demons, and guilt and penalty, do not seem to differ by species in moral being; but a plurality of individuals does not per se belong to the perfection of the universe. Or if you say that in some way divine justice is manifested in these and those when punished -on the contrary: so would divine mercy be manifested in several ways, if God had glorified some men (or if he had beatified some, either men or angels) without merits, which he did not do; however it would seem to belong to the perfection of divine goodness for God’s mercy rather to be manifested in many ways than God’s justice.

23. In addition, he argues that it does not seem God intentionally permits sins to come to be so that he may later punish them, because it does not seem that by anyone’s intention ‘evils done’ are more to be permitted to come to be than evils to be done, because no evil of guilt or penalty can be intended per se insofar as it is evil. - And if it be said that “the will in giving permission is in no way borne to evil but only to permission, so as to intend to permit evil by reason of a part,” he argues that at any rate “it is not manifest how God by intention would wish one and not the other.” Hence it does not seem that God by intention permits evil, but only so that good may happen; this is plain in the man born blind, whom God permitted to be born blind, not so as to be glorified in the man’s blindness but in the marvelous illumining; this is also plain in natural things; for God does not intend defect, but if second causes are impotent, he permits the effect be of the sort that the causes can produce; in the case of men, too, we see that he who permits someone to sin himself sins if he could prohibit or impede it. Therefore this is not to be posited in God.

24. In addition, against the second member (namely that there is no reason in the special case [nn.15, 19]), - because the example is not similar; for in matter as it is bare, there cannot be a difference why it should be thus disposed to such or such a form (as neither in a lump of clay with respect to diverse vessels [n.14]), but in the case of men it seems possible for some diverse disposition to be found why being predestined should fit this person and not that person, just as in the case of matter ‘not as bare matter’ there is a proximate disposition for it to be under another form (as is plain about wine and vinegar), but it would not have been proximately disposed to the later form if it had not been under the prior form.

25. And as to the fact that they adduce Apostle [n.18] for themselves, he says (according to the Gloss there) that the Apostle says this “not because of wanting means for giving a reason but to repress the rashness of the incapable;” “nor is the case similar in the Apostle’s example” - about the lump of clay and the potter - “save on the part of the end, but not on the part of the subject,” because in the case of the end in choice there can be a difference of the subject, but not in the case of the subject; and as far as this is concerned, there is a more fitting example form the Apostle in 2 Timothy which he posits about silver and gold vessels [n.18], “because there is a difference there in the subject whereby earthen vessels are made for greater contempt, wooden vessels for lesser contempt, gold vessels for greater honor and silver vessels for lesser honor.”