Forty First Distinction

Single Question. Whether there is any Merit of Predestination or Reprobation

1. About the forty first distinction I ask whether there is any merit of predestination or reprobation.

That there is:

Because if by his will alone - without any reason - God were to predestine this person and reprobate that one, then he would seem not to be supremely good, because not supremely generous and communicative; for he could equally communicate his good to him whom he does not predestine; by the fact that - without any reason in something else - he has by his sole generosity predestined that person, so he could predestine this one.

2. Further, if two people, equal in natural endowments, are apprehended by his intellect, and by sole act of will - without any reason on their part - he reprobates this one and predestines that one, then there seems to be acceptance of persons; because although they are equal as concerns their own part and equally capable of being ordered to the end, he does not equally love them for that end; for ‘to have acceptance of persons’ seems to be to prefer this person to that one for the end for which he is not of himself more to be preferred. But the consequent is impossible, and contrary to Peter in Acts 10.34: “In truth,” he says, “I find that there is no acceptance of persons with God.”

3. On the contrary:

Romans 9.11-13: “Although they were not yet born, or had done anything good or bad, so that the election of grace might remain according to his purpose,” - look there.

4. Further, 9.21: he gives an example about a potter, who from the same mass of clay can form one vessel for honor and one for contempt - from which he seems to argue by similarity about the predestination of one and the reprobation of another.

I. To the Question

A. First Opinion, Proposed and Retracted by Augustine

5. About this question Augustine once thought that although good works in the fore-knowledge of God are not the reason of predestining, yet faith is in his foreknowledge the reason for predestining - as is plain from him On the Epistle to the Romans (the one namely where he intends that because of the faith - which God foreknew - by which Jacob would believe and because of the infidelity of Esau God preferred Jacob and not Esau), and is contained in the text [of Lombard]. But Augustine retracts this in Retractions I ch.23, indicating his reason against it ‘because faith is a gift of God just as are also other good works’ (which is proved by the Apostle 1 Corinthians 7.25); hence Augustine says that ‘I would not have said that, if I had known to number faith among the gifts of the Holy Spirit’.

B. Second Opinion, Proposed by Peter Lombard

6. The master seems to think that there is altogether no merit of predestination or reprobation; and he seems to rely precisely on the authority of the Apostle [n.3] and on the statement of Augustine On the Predestination of the Saints ch.19 n.38: “Not because,” he says, “he knew that we would be such did he choose us, but so that we might become such through his choice.”

7. And the Master adduces the authority of Augustine against himself [n.6] saying in 83 Diverse Questions q.68 n.4: “On whom he wills,” he says, “he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens” [cf. Romans 9.18]; but this will of God cannot be unjust; for it comes from very hidden merits, because although sinners themselves, because of general sin, have made one mass, yet there is some diversity between them; for something precedes in sinners by which, although they are not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification - and again, there precedes in other sinners that whereby they are worthy of being dulled.”

8. The Master replies that this authority [n.7] seems to have been retracted by Augustine by similarity when what he said on Romans was retracted [n.5]; and the Master confirms this by the fact Augustine retracts certain things he added in the same question [n.7], as is plain in Retractions I ch.26, - and what he added seems to agree with this opinion [n.7], from which it also seems he retracted this opinion.

9. But against this response of the Master - about the retraction of his authority on Romans [n.8] - an objection might be made that Augustine published the book on Romans when he was priest, but the book 83 Questions he did not have compiled before he was bishop; therefore it does not seem that when he retracts something from the first book he is retracting something from the second, because to retract something said before - when he knew less - is not to retract something said later, when he knew more.

10. But this argument [n.9] is not compelling, because although he wrote one book before another, yet he produced the Retractions at one time (and at that time he had had both those books published), and an opinion stated in one book he could retract in other books, whether earlier or later published. For it appears that all those books - about which he makes mention - he had published before the book of Retractions, and yet if in the first chapter of the first book of the Retractions he had retracted another opinion which he had stated in some other book, published later indeed and retracted, he would not again have to repeat the retraction of the opinion in some chapter assigned to another book later published. Hence he says in book 1 chapter 3 retracting the opinion ‘God, whom sense does not know’: “An addition should have been made,” he says, “so that it would say ‘whom the sense of the mortal body’ does not know;” and he subjoins: “Nor need I continuously repeat what I also already said above, but this is to be recalled wherever this opinion is found in my writings.” Therefore when the opinion was asserted in a book retracted and published before, he retracts the same opinion as asserted in books published later rather than the reverse.

11. But one can in another way argue against the exposition of the Master, -because no place is found where Augustine retracts those words; because, as the Master himself admits (and as is true), after the words he adduces [n.8] there are other words that follow that he retracts (from that question 68) in Retractions I ch.25 - and these other words he does not retract; but it seems that if he did intend those words to be retracted, he would not begin from the following words while omitting those.

C. Third Opinion

12. [Exposition of the opinion] - In another way “it is said that whatever God does with respect to creatures, he does only by the good pleasure of his will, and for this no reason or cause needs to be sought.”

13. “The point is confirmed by what is said in Romans 9.11-2 about Jacob and Esau: “When they were not yet born, or had done anything bad or good, so that the purpose of God by election might stand, - not from works;”The Vatican editors refer to Aquinas ST I q.23 a.5. ¹⁶ the Gloss: ‘just as not for preceding merits, so not for future ones, because good and bad merits were not future without grace added or removed’.”

14. “Which also the Apostle makes clear when he subjoins, 9.21: “Or does not the potter have power from the same lump, etc.” Hence just as the will alone of the potter is the reason that from this part of the lump he makes an honorable vessel and from that part a vessel of contempt, while no difference exists in the lump (just as neither in prime matter, which however the agent cause clothes in one part with a nobler form but in another with a less noble one), thus the good pleasure alone of God is the reason that from the same mass - equally vitiated in our first parent - he chose this one for glory, but that one he leaves for condemnation; or even if the lump had not been vitiated but all were equal, he would only gratuitously choose one, while another he would leave - in both cases giving grace to him whom he chose (but a greater grace than for one chosen from the vitiated lump), and justice to him whom he did not choose from the damned mass, but not injustice to him whom, though existing in a state of innocence, he did not choose” [from Henry of Ghent].

15. Further, “this position [n.12] says that there happens to be an extrinsic reason assigned that God from the whole lost lump wanted in mercy to free some and not others, but there is no reason that he chose this one rather than that.”

16. “A reason is posited for the first, namely so that his goodness - existing simple in himself - might be manifested in manifold ways in diverse things at the same time, by the fact that in no one thing can the whole be manifested, because it does not reach the divine perfection; so just as for the perfection of the universe are required diverse grades of things in material reality (even from the same matter, equally disposed to all forms), so too for manifesting the same goodness diverse grades in moral reality are required for perfection, because in this his goodness as to any supernatural degree would be manifested; for in justly punishing the reprobate the goodness of his justice is manifested, as the goodness of his mercy is manifested in the glorified.”

17. “For thus does God permit these evils to come to be, so that goods not be impeded (but that they may happen), and this both in moral reality, as in the issue at hand - and in natural reality, as in the man born blind (John 9.3), in whom Christ showed that the sole reason was that the glory of God might be manifest in him; but this is not from the defect of sight in the blindness, but from the marvelous illumining of him by the Lord.”

18. “And it seems that this reason is assigned by the Apostle in Romans 9.22-23 when he says: “God wishing to show the anger of his justice etc.;” with which the example of the potter agrees, who makes from the same clay one vessel for honor and another for contempt [n.14], about which in 2 Timothy 2.20 the Apostle says: ‘Now in a large house not only gold and silver vessels, but also earthenware’.” [Henry of Ghent]

19. About the second [n.15] - namely in particular - “it is said that (as in natural reality), since the whole of prime matter is uniform, an intrinsic reason that one part is under the form of fire and another under the form of earth can be assigned (namely the perfection of the universe), and an extrinsic one (namely the manifestation of the power and goodness of God), but no reason can be assigned that this part of matter is under this form, and that part under that form and not conversely, save the sole will of the artificer who so determines things; just as in human works, that this stone is so fashioned as to be placed in an altar but another placed in a privy (according to what the Philosopher says Physics 26.197b9-11, that some stones are fortunate but others not), this depends on the mere choice of the artificer; so do they say in the issue at hand, that there is no reason in particular that he prefers this person and not that.” And this “is confirmed by Augustine on John 6.44: ‘No one comes to me unless my Father draw him etc.’, where Augustine says: ‘Why he draws this one and not that one, do not wish to judge if you do not wish to err’.” [from Aquinas].

20. “And they say from this that the fact God thus makes inequality for equal things is not iniquity - because in things that happen by grace, without debt, the giver can without any iniquity give as he wishes, according to the remark of Matthew 20.14-15: ‘Take what is your own, and depart; am I not permitted to do what I wish?’ But it would then be iniquity if it were given from debt.” [Henry of Ghent]

21. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this opinion, someone argues - first against the reason that is assigned in general [n.16]:

For no defect of guilt or penalty belongs of itself to the perfection of the universe; therefore neither is it per se required for the manifestation of divine goodness. And from this it is plain that the differences of things in natural and moral being are not similar, because all the species of things - distinct in natural being - belong to the perfection of the universe; it is not so, as to moral being, between good and bad or between the blessed and the miserable.

22. Again, he argues that if the damnation of some is necessary for the manifestation of divine justice, the damnation of demons seems sufficient for this; for men and demons, and guilt and penalty, do not seem to differ by species in moral being; but a plurality of individuals does not per se belong to the perfection of the universe. Or if you say that in some way divine justice is manifested in these and those when punished -on the contrary: so would divine mercy be manifested in several ways, if God had glorified some men (or if he had beatified some, either men or angels) without merits, which he did not do; however it would seem to belong to the perfection of divine goodness for God’s mercy rather to be manifested in many ways than God’s justice.

23. In addition, he argues that it does not seem God intentionally permits sins to come to be so that he may later punish them, because it does not seem that by anyone’s intention ‘evils done’ are more to be permitted to come to be than evils to be done, because no evil of guilt or penalty can be intended per se insofar as it is evil. - And if it be said that “the will in giving permission is in no way borne to evil but only to permission, so as to intend to permit evil by reason of a part,” he argues that at any rate “it is not manifest how God by intention would wish one and not the other.” Hence it does not seem that God by intention permits evil, but only so that good may happen; this is plain in the man born blind, whom God permitted to be born blind, not so as to be glorified in the man’s blindness but in the marvelous illumining; this is also plain in natural things; for God does not intend defect, but if second causes are impotent, he permits the effect be of the sort that the causes can produce; in the case of men, too, we see that he who permits someone to sin himself sins if he could prohibit or impede it. Therefore this is not to be posited in God.

24. In addition, against the second member (namely that there is no reason in the special case [nn.15, 19]), - because the example is not similar; for in matter as it is bare, there cannot be a difference why it should be thus disposed to such or such a form (as neither in a lump of clay with respect to diverse vessels [n.14]), but in the case of men it seems possible for some diverse disposition to be found why being predestined should fit this person and not that person, just as in the case of matter ‘not as bare matter’ there is a proximate disposition for it to be under another form (as is plain about wine and vinegar), but it would not have been proximately disposed to the later form if it had not been under the prior form.

25. And as to the fact that they adduce Apostle [n.18] for themselves, he says (according to the Gloss there) that the Apostle says this “not because of wanting means for giving a reason but to repress the rashness of the incapable;” “nor is the case similar in the Apostle’s example” - about the lump of clay and the potter - “save on the part of the end, but not on the part of the subject,” because in the case of the end in choice there can be a difference of the subject, but not in the case of the subject; and as far as this is concerned, there is a more fitting example form the Apostle in 2 Timothy which he posits about silver and gold vessels [n.18], “because there is a difference there in the subject whereby earthen vessels are made for greater contempt, wooden vessels for lesser contempt, gold vessels for greater honor and silver vessels for lesser honor.”

D. Fourth Opinion

26. [Exposition of the opinion] - He [Henry] rejects this opinion [nn.21-25] and speaks in another way, and this as follows:

A divine act can be considered as it is from God the agent or as it is received in some passive thing or as it has a term in some object.

27. In the first way there is no reason for the divine action; neither as end, save his goodness - nor as efficient cause, save his will.

28. In the second way, however, it is possible to assign some reason, namely for which the existence that the action concerns - as an entity for the end - agrees with the end.

29. And that there is some such reason on the part of the entity for the end is shown by him in three ways:

First, because in things altogether equal choice cannot be talked of; therefore if God chooses some things, there is some difference in the thing chosen, - or there is no choice.

30. Second, because in all the works of divine mercy it seems that justice concurs; therefore there is some congruence on the part of the thing he does mercifully.

31. And third (as if in like way): there seems not to be or to be a merit of choice and reprobation, and so although malice on the part of him who receives [sc. damnation] is not the cause of damning on the part of God (because “then God would be passive” and “the temporal would be cause of the eternal”), yet it is well conceded that on the part of the act of damning there is a motive reason for the act’s receiving in itself this action and its being about this person; therefore by similarity it seems - on the other side [sc. choice] - that without imperfection of God in acting there could be posited some reason on the part of the person predestined. And it rests on this conclusion, the authority of Augustine cited before [n.7], 83 Questions, which does not seem to have been retracted.

32. Further, in particular he says what this reason is: that it is the good use, foreseen, of freewill on the part of the elect person - and the bad use, foreseen, of freewill on the part of the reprobate.

33. And this is made clear as follows: although grace operates principally in good acts yet freewill cooperates; this is proved from Augustine “on the remark of Psalms ‘Help us, God, our savior” [On Psalms 78, 9 n.12] where Augustine says, “When he wants us to be helped, he is neither ungrateful nor does he take away freewill; for he who is helped also does something of himself.” When grace, then, is offered to the wayfarer, if he receives the offered grace and cooperates with it well in accord with his use of freewill, he merits grace according to a further degree - as he exemplifies in many intermediate degrees, from the state of mortal sin up to the state of glory, all which it is not necessary for us now to enumerate; and so it seems that the whole use of freewill, foreseen for all its states, can be the reason for eternal election of him who will use freewill well, and so on the other side about evil use and reprobation.

34. And if it is objected against this that the good use of freewill is by grace, therefore it pertains to the effect of predestination and so is not a reason for election - the response is that the good use “is in a certain way included under predestination, but not under its effect (although it is not without its effect), nor is that which belongs to predestination distinct from that which belongs to freewill.”

35. Thus, therefore, according to him, and in general, good use and bad use can be assigned for the whole human race, and about any man a reason can be assigned on his part (not “because of which it is so” but “without which it is not so”); yet in particular, about a definite man, “it is not for man to investigate the reason, although it is not lacking and could be multiple.” However “in particular” - according to him - “the Apostle labored under a want of means for giving a reason, when he said (Romans 11) ‘O the depth of the riches’,” because in this “consists a great abyss of God’s judgments.”

36. [Rejection of the opinion] - But against this I argue:

First, that God does not foresee that this man will use freewill well, save because he wills or pre-ordains him to use it well, because - as was said in distinction 39 [in the interpolation above] - definite foreseeing of future contingents is from the determination of his will. If therefore two equal persons are offered to the divine will, I ask why he preordains this to use freewill well and not that one; it is not possible, as it seems, to assign a reason for this other than the divine will; and this is the first distinction among them, which for you [Henry] election or reprobation has to follow; therefore in the first distinction, pertaining to predestination or reprobation, the only reason is the divine will.

37. Besides, the reason that he posits [n.32], does not seem common to all the predestined and reprobate:

First indeed because not for children, in whom God does not foresee good or bad use of freewill.

38. And if you say that, although he does not foresee such use, yet he foresees that this one would have used it well had he survived, and that one would have used it badly if he had survived (and therefore he leads the former to baptism and the latter not, and the former is saved and the latter damned), - this he himself thus rejects, because on account of the foreseen good use by someone, if he had survived, he is not accepted or reprobated; for then - according to him - an adult dying in grace would not pre-merit according to the merits he already has, but according to those that he is foreseen to have, if he had survived.

39. Let us speak likewise of the predestined and non-predestined angels; which use of freewill does God foresee in this one - if grace is offered - which he does not foresee in that one, because of which he predestines this one and reprobates that one?

E. Scotus’ own Opinion

40. [Exposition of the opinion] - One can say in a different way that there is no reason of predestination, even on the part of the predestined, that is in anyway prior to the predestination itself; but some reason is prior to reprobation, not indeed a reason for which God by efficient causality reprobates, insofar as the action is from God (as was argued in the previous opinion, because then ‘God would be passive’ [n.31]), but a reason for which this action thus has this object as term and not that one.

41. The proof of the first point is that he who in ordered way wills the end and what is for the end wills the end first before any of the things for the end, and he wills other things for the end; therefore since, in the whole process by which a creature capable of beatification is led to the perfect end, the ultimate end is perfect beatitude, God -willing something of this order for this person - first wills the end for this creature capable of beatification and as it were afterwards wills him other things, which are in the order of things that pertain to the end. But grace, faith, merits and good use of freewill, all these things are for the end (although some more remotely and others more near to it). Therefore God wills beatitude for this person first before any of the other things; and he wills for him each of these others first before he foresees that he will have each of them, therefore not because of foreseeing any of these does he will him beatitude.

42. The proof of the second point is that damnation does not seem to be good save because it is just, for - according to Augustine On Genesis XI ch.17 n.22 - ‘God is not avenger before someone is sinner’ (for it seems to be cruelty to punish someone when there is no guilt pre-existing in him); therefore by similarity, God does not wish to punish before he sees someone to be a sinner. Therefore the first act of the divine will about Judas is not to will to damn Judas as Judas is presented in his purely natural state (because then God seems to damn without guilt), but he sees that Judas must be presented to the divine will under the idea of sinner before he wills to damn him. Therefore reprobation has its reason on the part of the object, namely foreseen final sin.

43. This is confirmed by the authority of Augustine in his book On the Predestination of the Saints ch.19 n.38 and it is put in the text.

44. [Objections against the opinion] - Against this [n.41]. Peter and Judas, equal in natural state, willed by God in being of existence, in the instant in which they are presented to the divine will in natural existence and equal: God - for you [sc. Scotus] -first wills beatitude for Peter; why then did he will what for Judas? If damnation I have the conclusion intended ‘therefore he reprobates without any reason’, - if beatitude, then he predestines Judas.

45. One can say that in that instant God wishes nothing for Judas; there is only a negation there of volition for glory. And likewise, as if in the second instant of nature, when he wills grace for Peter, there is still no positive act of the divine will about Judas, but only a negative one. In the third instant, when he wills to permit Peter to be of the mass of perdition or worthy of perdition (and this either because of original sin or actual sin), then he wishes Judas in a like way to be a son of perdition; and here is the first positive act - a uniform one indeed - about Peter and Judas, but by this act this statement is true ‘Judas will be finally a sinner’, with the negations in place, namely that God does not will to give him grace or glory. In the fourth instant, then, Judas is presented to the divine will as finally a sinner, and then God wills to punish him justly and reprobate Judas.Tr. This explanation is no doubt compatible with orthodoxy but it seems wholly unconvincing that God should make creatures whose perfect end is glory and yet not choose to give them the grace to reach glory (this criticism would apply to Aquinas’ position too, of course, but not perhaps to Henry’s, as Scotus reports it nn.26-35). Better, then, perhaps to focus on the fact of free choice (also necessary for glory) and say that while God chooses to give grace to everyone yet some, like Peter, do not choose to resist the gift while others, like Judas as it seems, do so choose. The gift is free and precedes all merit; the resistance comes, not from God, but from the creature. And if it be said that grace is irresistible, or that God also gives the grace not to resist grace, the answer will be that free choice is precisely free and so can resist any grace, including the grace not to resist grace. If it be said, further, that then God is passive with respect to who resists or does not resist grace, let it be conceded. But the passivity is not with respect to the possibility (God knows all possibilities by his eternal essence); it is only with respect to this possibility being actual in creatures and that other one not. But the relation of God’s knowledge to creatures is real on the part of creatures and not on the part of God, and so no change is undergone by God because of anything that happens in creatures. Thus there is no real passivity on God’s part either. But this proposal is made under correction. ¹⁷

46. Nor is it surprising that a like process for predestination and reprobation is not posited, because all goods are attributed to God principally, but evils to us; and thus, that God ‘predestines without reason’ agrees with his goodness, but that ‘he wills to damn’ does not seem able immediately to be attributed to him with respect to the object as known in its pure natural state, but only in respect of the object as known in final mortal sin.

47. This response can be confirmed by a likeness: let us posit two people, equally graced on their own part, one of whom I love and the other of whom I do not, - and him whom I love I pre-ordain to some good through which he can please me, but him whom I do not love I do not pre-ordain to such good. If things were so that it was in my power to permit them to offend, I could will to permit both to offend - and from the fact that I do not will to lead the latter to that by which he could please me, I would fore-know that his offense would be perpetual (and thus that I could justly punish him), but I would foreknow that the offense of the other was to be remitted or committed to what I will.a

a [Interpolation, from Appendix A] From these points there follow four corollaries:

     The first, that the number of the elect is complete before anyone is reprobated, because in the first instant one person is fore-ordained, another fore-known.

     The second is that the predestined, insofar as they are predestined, are objects of the first divine act after their pure natural existence; in the second instant God foresees their final justice, namely their damnation and impenitence (which is perseverance in sin). From this there follows that none of the blessed can or should rejoice in the damnation of someone on the ground he himself was elected in his place, because the blessed have been predestined before the others were reprobate - and thus that good would never have belonged to the damned, even had they stood.

     The third follows, that no one is predestined because of the fall of another, nor is anyone saved by occasion; nor was Christ by occasion of sin made incarnate or thus supreme in merit and reward, because this would have happened if no one had ever sinned.

     Again, fourth, if follows that they alone who were to be saved would have been saved if Adam had not sinned, because they were all predestined or foreseen and guilty of sin before Adam had sinned

48. But still there is an instance against this:

Because God does not with certitude see that Judas is bad according to this way [n.47] - for the sole permission of some act and certitude about the permission do not make for certitude about this act, because it has to have some efficient cause; therefore from the sole fact that God fore-knows he wishes to permit Judas to sin, it is not certain that Judas will sin; or let us speak of a good and bad angel (who were not in original sin): from this fact alone - I say - it does not seem God knows that Lucifer sins, and from this (as it seems) Lucifer is not presented to him as sinner.

49. In addition, what is this ‘will to permit Lucifer to sin’? If this is some positive act of the will with respect to the sin, then it seems God wills him to sin. If it is not a positive act with respect to the act of sin but with respect to the act of permission, then it will be a reflex act, - and then it will be necessary to ask, as to the permission, what act it is; if a positive act of will, then it still seems God has a positive act with respect to the sin that he permits.

50. The first of these [n.48] is solved by the fact God fore-knows that he will cooperate with Lucifer in the substance of the act that will be a sin (but he fore-knows this, because he wills to co-operate with him if it is a sin of commission), or he fore-knows that he will not co-operate in some act if he does not will it (and this if that first act is a sin of omission); and knowing that he will co-operate in such substance of the act (without the due circumstances), or will not co-operate with Lucifer in a negative act (and consequently in an act he will omit), he knows that he will sin; such that he knows ‘this one will sin’ not only because he knows he himself will permit it, but because he knows he will co-operate with him in the substance of an act that is lacking in due circumstances, and consequently that the latter would commit it - or he knows that he will not co-operate with him in a negative act, and consequently that the latter will omit it.

51. The second argument [n.49] raises a difficulty touching on the divine will, -about which I will speak not here but elsewhere [d.47 nn.8-9].

F. Conclusion about the Five Opinions

52. About all these opinions [nn.5-6, 12-20, 26-35, 40-43]: because the Apostle, when disputing about this matter in Romans 11.33-34, seems to leave the whole thing as it were inscrutable (‘O depth’, he says, ‘of the riches of the wisdom and the knowledge of God,’ and ‘who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?’), therefore lest by investigating the depths - according to the opinion of the Master - one should fall into the depths, let that be chosen which pleases more, provided however that the divine liberty (without any injustice) be preserved, as well as the other things that must be preserved about God as freely choosing; and he who holds another opinion, let him respond to the things touched on above against him.

II. To the Principal Arguments

53. To the first principal argument [n.1] I reply: the supreme goodness can stand with free communication, although it not be equal for everyone. For someone ‘supremely good’ can with generosity freely communicate himself, and in order to show that he is not generous by necessity but is generous as ‘freely communicative’ he can for two persons -apprehended as equal - will ‘to communicate a good non-equally’; nor is any injustice committed in this (as the third opinion asserts [n.20]), because nothing is due.

54. To the second [n.2]: when two things are equally will-able for some end, and they have on their own part the reason for which they are to be willed by some will, a will that prefers one of them to the other for that end sins by acceptance of persons; such is every created will, because with respect to it the lovable good is the reason for right loving. The uncreated will is not so with respect to any good other than its own essence; for no other good thing is, because it is good, loved for that reason by that will, but conversely; and it cannot accept persons, because the good that is the reason for loving is not in them.

55. To the first argument for the opposite [not nn.3-4 but Rep IA d.41 nn.7, 81].

He who wants to hold another way [sc. other than Scotus’, nn.40-42] can say as the fourth way says [nn.25, 35] that the Apostle in this passage [Romans 11.33] is rebuking the presumptuous who inquire into things they have no capacity for, - not because of being in want of a reason to give, at any rate in general, although it not be known in particular the evil that God foresees in someone for which he reprobates him; and in these special sins, that are foreseen, there is ‘a depth of riches’ and that ‘the judgments are past finding out’. - With which agrees that word ‘judgment’, because judgment is about particular doables; for we do not usually say, when speaking of practical principle - or about established laws -, that they are ‘judgments’, but we do so when a judgment is made about some particular in accord with the practical principles or the established laws; and so notwithstanding that there is a practical principle, established by the divine will, that ‘everyone foreseen to be finally evil will be damned’, yet about the particulars to be assumed under it (‘this person is foreseen to be finally evil in this way, that one in that’, and as it were for this reason the former is reprobate for that evil and the latter for that other one), these judgments are inscrutable; for man does not know, nor can know, into what sin God wills to permit him to fall with respect to which there is a non-volition to confer grace, so that thus he be presented as finally a sinner in that sin and thus because of that foreseen sin he will be reprobated. But about the good it can be posited that there is no reason, as was said in the fifth opinion [nn.40-41].

56. And if you argue against this that at any rate about the good the judgments will not be inscrutable (for it is easy to say about them that ‘because he wills, therefore he saves’), - it can be said about them, insofar as he predestines, that there is no judgment, neither of the fact in existence nor of it in divine foreknowledge as it were; for judgment is about something done or foreseen. But about the evil, although there is no judgment about the fact (because they have not sinned), yet condemnation can be said to be a judgment about them in God’s foreknowledge (when they are called ‘evil’), and then the inscrutability of the judgments can be referred to the evil on whose part some reason is posited, although those reasons on the part of diverse things - because of which the judgments are as it were on their part passed - are inscrutable and for this reason the judgments are inscrutable.

57. To the other one [nn.6, 43]: Augustine responds to it for the fifth opinion [n.43], because he proves that on the part of the predestined there is no reason.