I. The Opinions of Others

A. First Opinion

     As to these questions one position holds the certitude of divine knowledge - with respect to all things as to all conditions of existence - on account of the ideas that are posited in the divine intellect, and this on account of their perfection in representing, because they represent ‘the things of which they are’ not only in themselves but in every reason and relation of the extremes; and so they are in the divine intellect a sufficient reason, not only for simply apprehending the things patterned after the ideas, but also for apprehending every union of them and every mode of the patterned things pertaining to their existence.The Vatican editors were unable to find any author of this opinion. ⁸

     On the contrary:

     The reasons of knowing the terms of some proposition that combines them are only a sufficient cause of knowing the combination if the combination is of a nature to be known from the terms; a contingent combination is not of a nature to be known from the terms, because it would then not only be necessary but also first and immediate; therefore the reasons of knowing the terms, however perfectly these reasons represent them, are not sufficient causes of knowing the contingent combination.

     In addition, the ideas purely naturally represent what they represent, and under the reason under which they represent anything; the proof of the fact is that the ideas are in the divine intellect before any act of the divine will, so that in no way are they there by act of the will; but whatever precedes the act of the will is purely natural. I take then the two ideas of the extremes that are represented in those ideas, for example the ideas of man and of white; I ask whether of themselves they represent the combination of the extremes, or the division of them, or both? If only the combination, then the divine intellect naturally knows it (and so knows in a necessary way), and consequently in no way does it know the division. And I raise a question in the same manner if the ideas only represent the division. If they represent both, then God knows nothing by them, because to know contradictories to be true simultaneously is to know nothing.

     In addition, the ideas are of possible things in the same way as they are of future things, because the difference between ‘non-future possibles and future possibles’ is only by act of the divine will; therefore an idea of a future thing does not more represent that thing to be of necessity future than an idea of a possible thing does.

     Further, an idea of a future thing will not represent it more by positing it to exist in this ‘now’ than by positing it to exist in that.

B. Second Opinion

     Another position is that God has certain knowledge of future contingents by the fact that the whole flow of time, and all things that are in time, are present to eternity.The Vatican editors refer to St. Thomas Aquinas, e.g. ST Ia q.14 a.13, Sent. I d.38 q.1 a.5, De Veritate q.2 a.12, CG I ch.66. ⁹

     The proof for this is from the fact that eternity is immense and infinite, and consequently, just as the immense is present at once to every place, so the eternal is present at once to the whole of time.The Vatican Editors refer this argument to Richard of Middleton, Sent I d.39 princ.1 q.1. ¹⁰

     And the point is made clear through examples, and one example indeed is ‘about the stick fixed in water’, that although the whole stream flows past the stick (and so the stick is present successively to all the parts of the stream), yet the stick is not immense with respect to the stream, because it is not present to the whole; therefore in the same way, if eternity were something standing (like the stick), past which time flowed, such that there was never present to it at once save a single instant of time (just as there is not present at once to the stick save one part of the stream), eternity would not be immense with respect to time.

     There is also the confirmation that the ‘now’ of eternity is together with the ‘now’ of time, not coequal with it; therefore as it is together with this latter ‘now’ it exceeds it; but it would not exceed it unless - as it is together with this ‘now’ - it were together with another ‘now’.

     There is also this confirmation, that if the whole of time could exist at once extrinsically, the ‘now’ of eternity would be at once present to the whole of time; but although it is repugnant to time - because of its succession - to exist at once, nothing of perfection is, because of this, taken away from eternity; therefore eternity itself is now equally present to the whole of time and to anything existing in time.

     This is confirmed by another example ‘about the center in a circle’, because if ‘time flowing’ were posited to be the circumference of a circle and the ‘now’ of eternity were posited to be the center, then, however much of flux there was in time, the whole flux and any part of it would always be present to the center. Thus therefore all things that have to exist in any part of time (whether they are in this ‘now’ of time, or whether they are past or future), all of them are present with respect to the ‘now’ of eternity, - and thus what exists in eternity sees them as present because of such co-existence, just as I can see as present what in this instant I am seeing.

     Against this opinion I argue:

     First, by bringing back against them what they themselves adduce about immensity [sc. in the first proof for this opinion] - because once it is posited that space can continually increase to infinity (so that just as time is in continual flux so God continually expands space by its coming to be), yet the immensity of God would not be a reason for him to co-exist with any place (in any ‘now’) unless the place is existent; for God by his immensity does not co-exist with anything save what is in him, although he could create space outside the universe, and then by his immensity he would co-exist with it. If then immensity is not a reason for co-existing with a place save an actual one and not a potential one (because a potential one does not exist), then by parity of reasoning eternity will not be a reason for co-existing with anything save what is existent; and this is what is argued, that ‘that which does not exist cannot co-exist with anything’, because ‘to co-exist’ states a real relation, but a relation is not real whose foundation is not real.

     Again, if an effect has being in itself with respect to the first cause, it is simply in itself, because with respect to nothing does it have a truer being; hence that which is said to be such with respect to the first cause can be said simply to be such. If then something future is in act with respect to God, then it is simply in act; therefore it is impossible for it to be posited in act later.

     Further, if my future sitting down (not only as to the entity which it has in knowable being but also as to that which it has in being of existence) is now present to eternity, then it has now been produced in that being by God, for nothing has from God existence in the flow of time unless it have been produced by God according to that being; but let God produce this sitting down (or the soul of Antichrist, which is the equivalent); then that which has already been produced by him will again be produced in being, and so it will be produced in being twice.

     Further, this position does not seem to be of help for what it is posited for, namely for having certain knowledge of future things:

     And first indeed because this sitting down, beside the fact that it is present to eternity according to its being in some part of time, is yet future in itself because of the fact it is future and needs to be produced by God. So I ask whether God has certain knowledge of it. If he does, then this is not from the fact that it already exists, but according to the fact that it is future, - and this certitude must be posited to come through something else, and this suffices for all certain knowledge of the existence of this thing. If he does not know it will be future with certitude, then he produces it without foreknowing it; but he will know it with certitude when he has produced it; therefore he knows in different ways things made and things to be made, which is against Augustine On Genesis V ch.18 n.36.

     Second, because the divine intellect receives no certitude from any object other than its own essence; for then it would be cheapened. Hence now too the divine intellect does not have certitude about my making, which is posited to be in act, in such a way that the making causes about itself certitude in the divine intellect; for it does not move God’s intellect. Therefore, in the same way, all temporal things - if they are in their own existence present to eternity according to those existences of theirs - fail to cause certitude about them in the divine intellect, but the divine intellect must have certain knowledge of them through something else about them, and that something else suffices for us.

     Besides, they posit that angelic time (the ‘aevum’) is altogether simple, co-existent with the whole of time;The Vatican Editors refer to Aquinas ST I q.10 a.5, Sent. II d.2 q.1 a.1. ¹¹,An opinion the Vatican Editors also attribute to Aquinas, Sent I d.38 q.1 a.5, ST I q.14 a.13, SG I ch.67. ¹² therefore an angel, who is in angelic time, is present to the whole flow of time and to all the parts of time; therefore an angel, it seems - according to this reason of theirs -, could naturally know future contingents.

C. Third Opinion

     A third position says that although some things be necessary with respect to divine knowledge, yet it does not follow that with respect to proximate causes they cannot be 12 contingent.

     And it is confirmed from Boethius Consolation of Philosophy V prose 6, where he speaks thus: “If you say, ‘that which God sees will come to be cannot not happen, - but that which cannot not happen happens of necessity’, and if you constrict me to this term of ‘necessity’, I will reply: the same future thing, when it is referred to divine knowledge, is necessary - but when it is considered in its own nature, it is altogether free,     etc .”

     In favor of this view the argument is also made that there can be imperfection in an effect from the proximate cause, although not from a remote or prior cause, - just as there is deformity in an act from a created will but not insofar as it is from the divine will; therefore      sin is not reduced to God as to the cause, but it is imputed only to the created will. Although therefore there were, as far as concerns the part of God - who is the remote cause -, a necessity in things, yet there can, from their proximate causes, be contingency in them.

     Against this an argument was given in distinction 2 nn.80, 85-86, where it was proved from the contingency of things that ‘God is understanding and willing’, because there can be no contingency in the causation of any cause with respect to its effect unless the first cause is contingently disposed to the cause next to it or to its own effect. Which proof, briefly, is from the fact that a moving cause - to the extent it is moved - is, if it is necessarily moved, necessarily a mover; therefore any second cause that produces insofar as it is moved by a first cause, if it is necessarily moved by the first cause, necessarily moves what is next to it or it necessarily produces its effect. The whole ordering of causes, then, right up to the ultimate effect, will produce necessarily if the disposition of the first cause to the cause next to it is necessary.

     Further, a prior cause has respect to its effect naturally prior to a later cause [d.8 n.287]; therefore in that prior stage, if it have a necessary disposition to the effect, it will give it necessary existence. But in the second instant of nature the proximate cause cannot give it contingent existence, because it is already pre-understood to have from the first cause an existence repugnant to contingency; nor can you say that in the same instant of nature the two causes give existence to the caused thing, because the cannot be founded on that existence a necessary disposition to a cause perfectly giving existence and a contingent disposition to some other cause.

     In addition, whatever is produced by posterior causes could be produced immediately by the first cause - and then it would have the same entity as it has now, and then it would be contingent as it is contingent now; therefore it has its own contingency even now from the first cause, and not only from the proximate cause.

     Besides, God has produced many things immediately (as he created the world and now creates souls), and he has produced them all contingently.