The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus :: Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 26 to 48. ::

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Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 26 to 48.

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translator's preface

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book one. distinctions 26 - 48

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twenty sixth distinction

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single question. whether the persons are constituted in their personal being through relations of origin

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I. opinions of others

a. first opinion

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b. second opinion

1. exposition of the opinion

2. arguments against the opinion

C. third opinion

II. what one should think about the third opinion

III. to the arguments for the second opinion when holding the third opinion

IV. to the reasons against the second opinion when holding the second opinion

V. to the principal arguments

VI. to the arguments of the first opinion

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twenty seventh distinction

question one. whether a created word is actual intellection

question two. whether the word in divine reality states something proper to the generated person

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question three. whether the divine word states a respect to the creature

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I. to the first and second questions

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a. the opinion of others

1. exposition of the opinion

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2. rejection of the opinion

a. as to the first question

b. as to the second question

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b. scotus’ own response

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1. to the first question

a. which of the things found in the intelligence is the word

b. whether any actual intellection at all is the word

c. whether will concurs in the idea of the word

2. to the principal arguments of the first question

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II. to the third question

a. the opinion of others

b. rejection of the opinion and scotus’ own response

C. to the principal argument

D. to the arguments for the opinion of others

e. a doubt about the expression of the divine word

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twenty eighth distinction

question one. whether ‘unbegotten’ is property of the father himself

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question two. whether not being able to be born is a property constitutive of the first person in divine reality

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I. to the first question

a. in what way unbegotten agrees with the father alone

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b. how unbegotten can be a property of the father

1. first opinion

2. second opinion

3. scotus’ own opinion

C. to the principal arguments

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II. to the second question

a. opinion of others

b. rejection of the opinion

C. to the principal argument

D. to the arguments for the opinion of others

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question three. whether the first divine person is constituted in personal being by some positive relation to the second person

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I. to the question

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a. opinions of those who hold that the persons are constituted by relations

1. first opinion

2. second opinion

3. third opinion

4. against the three opinions together

b. opinion of those who wish to hold that the persons are constituted by absolutes

C. scotus’ own response

II. to the principal arguments

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twenty ninth distinction

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single question whether principle is said univocally of principles inwardly and outwardly in god

I. to the question

II. to the arguments

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thirtieth distinction

question one. whether some relation is said of god from time

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question two. whether there can be some real relation of god to creatures

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I. the opinions of others as to each question

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a. first opinion

1. exposition of the opinion

2. rejection of the opinion

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b. second opinion

1. exposition of the opinion

2. rejection of the opinion

II. scotus’ own response to the first question

III. to the principal arguments of the first question

IV. scotus’ own response to the second question

V. to the principal arguments of the second question

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thirty first distinction

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single question. whether identity, likeness, and equality are real relations in god

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I. to the question

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a. as to the first condition for relation

1. opinion of others

2. scotus’ own opinion

b. as to the second condition for relation

C. as to the third condition for relation

II. doubts about equality

III. to the principal argument

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thirty second distinction

question one. whether the father and the son love each themselves by the holy spirit

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question two. whether the father is wise by generated wisdom

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I. opinion of others to the first question

a. first opinion

b. second opinion

C. third opinion

D. fourth opinion

II. scotus’ own response to the second question

III. to the principal argument of the second question

IV. scotus’ own response to the first question

V. to the principal arguments of the first question

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thirty third and thirty fourth distinctions

questions one to three. whether the property is the same as the person, whether it is the same as the essence, and whether the person is the same as the essence

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thirty third and thirty fourth distinctions

questions one to three. whether the property is the same as the person, whether it is the same as the essence, and whether the person is the same as the essence

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thirty fifth distinction

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single question. whether in god there are eternal relations to all knowables as quidditatively known

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I. to the question

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a. opinions of others

1. first opinion

2. second opinion

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rejection of the opinions

1. against the common conclusion

2. against the first opinion

C. scotus’ own response

D. instances against scotus’ own solution

II. to the principal arguments

III. to the arguments for the first opinion

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thirty sixth distinction

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questions one to three. whether the foundation of an eternal relation to god as knower has truly the being of essence from the fact it is under this sort of respect

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I. to the question

a. the opinion of others

b. scotus’ own response

C. objections against scotus’ own response

II. to the principal arguments

III. to the reasons for the opinion of others

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thirty seventh distinction

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single question. whether god’s omnipotence necessarily entails his greatness

I. to the question

II. to the principal argument

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thirty eighth distinction

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single question. whether god’s knowledge with respect to makeable things is practical

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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from appendix a: thirty eighth distinction, part two, and thirty ninth distinction questions one to five: on the infallibility and immutability of divine knowledge

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I. the opinions of others

a. first opinion

b. second opinion

C. third opinion

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II. scotus’ own response to the questions

a. how there is contingency in things

b. how along with the contingency of things there stands the certainty of divine knowledge

III. to the principal arguments

IV. to the arguments for the second opinion

V. to the authorities of the saints

VI. to the arguments for the third opinion

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fortieth distinction

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single question. whether a predestined person can be damned

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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forty first distinction

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single question. whether there is any merit of predestination or reprobation

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I. to the question

a. first opinion, proposed and retracted by augustine

b. second opinion, proposed by peter lombard

C. third opinion

D. fourth opinion

e. scotus’ own opinion

f. conclusion about the five opinions

II. to the principal arguments

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forty second distinction

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single question. whether it can be proved by natural reason that god is omnipotent

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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forty third distinction

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single question. whether the first reason for the impossibility of a thing to be made is on the part of god or of the makeable thing

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I. to the question

a. the opinion of henry of ghent

b. scotus’ own opinion

II. to the principal argument

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forty fourth distinction

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single question. whether god could make things other than he has ordained them to be made

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments on both sides

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forty fifth distinction

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single question. whether god from eternity willed things other than himself

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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forty sixth distinction

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single question. whether god’s will of being well-pleased is always fulfilled

I. to the question

II. to the principal arguments

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forty seventh distinction

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single question. whether divine permission is some act of the divine will

I. to the question

II. to the principal argument

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forty eighth distinction

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single question. whether a created will is morally good whenever it conforms to the uncreated will

I. to the question

II. to the principal argument

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All Collections > The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus > Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 26 to 48. > book one. distinctions 26 - 48 > thirty eighth distinction > single question. whether god’s knowledge with respect to makeable things is practical > II. to the principal arguments

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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus

Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 26 to 48.

Book One. Distinctions 26 - 48

Thirty Eighth Distinction

Single Question. Whether God’s Knowledge with respect to Makeable things is Practical

II. To the Principal Arguments

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II. To the Principal Arguments

11. To the authority from Augustine [n.2] I say that art is “a habit of making along with true reason” (Ethics 6.4.1140a20-21); and, to the extent the definition of art is taken completely, ‘right reason’ is understood, that is, reason which directs and makes right the power to which operation according to art belongs; but in a diminished way art is ‘a habit with true reason’, when it is only a habit that apprehends the rightness of things to be done and is not a habit that directs or makes right in things to be done. In this second way art can be conceded to exist in God because, when a determination of the will with respect to certain things to be done has been posited, his intellect knows this order of things to be done; and then there is ‘right reason’ there, that is reason knowing rightness - there is not there however a ‘right reason’ that, namely, is directive of the power of the one who operates, and this above all if the power ‘operating extrinsically’ is the will and not some executive power; but if some executive power is posited other than the will, then a ‘right reason’ in the second way seems able to be preserved, which is disposed with respect to the power of the one who operates according to that right reason, and it can be now preserved with respect to the will.

12. The same point makes plain the answer to the other argument from Augustine [n.3], that the ideas are secondary known objects (as was said before [d.35 nn.40, 42]), according to which things outside are made - but these secondary objects do not include any knowledge giving commands about operating or non-operating, although they represent doable things; but knowledge ‘of a doable’ is precisely not practical knowledge, unless it virtually includes a practical principle or conclusion; but there is no such inclusion in the case of the ideas in the divine intellect.a

a [An empty space for the second part of d.38 and for d.39 was left here by Scotus. The following Interpolation is found in its place, from Appendix A.]

II. To the Principal Arguments