I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others

4. [Reasons for the opinion] - Here look at the opinion of Henry [of Ghent] about the eternity of essences, and specifically in Summa 21 q.4.a

a [Interpolation] Here some say [sc. Henry] that being taken most commonly - or thing - can be said to be from ‘think’ [Latin reor, thing in Latin is res], and thus it is common to figments and many other things. In another way, proceeding further, a thing is said to be from ‘ratitude’, as it is a ratified or valid thing and distinct from a fictitious thing; and this is double: for it is distinguished as thing to which being can belong or as thing to which being does belong, - and prior there is ‘to which being can belong’; and this thing, as it is by relation to the exemplar, is thus the essence, because just as God as efficient cause produces the thing in being of existence, so he produces it as exemplar in being of essence.

5. For this opinion the strongest argument is from what was touched on in the second principal argument, about the knowledge of God and the real eternal object [n.2].

6. There is added to this [n.5] that proportion is a property of being; but the proportion of an object known in eternity is something related to the knower, and the sort of thing that is ‘impossible to be’ is not so proportioned.

7. Further, as being is to non-being, so is possible to impossible - therefore by permutation [sc. being is to possible as non-being to impossible]; but every being is possible; therefore everything that is a pure non-being is impossible.

8. And there is a confirmation, because if some pure non-being (or a nothing) were possible, and some pure non-being (or a nothing) were impossible, one nothing would be more nothing than the other, which seems absurd; therefore a ‘possible’ is not altogether nothing but some being.

9. Further, Augustine On the Nature of the Good ch.18: “If good is some form, something not non-good is capacity for form;” therefore something not non-good is a possibility for actual goodness.

10. Again, On John homily 18 n.8: “Heart and mind form the same letters, but in different ways;”     therefore they are made by the heart before they are by the hand.

11. And Avicenna Metaphysics VIII ch.7, about the double flow of things from God [sc. according to the being of essence and the being of existence].

12. It is also added by them [sc. Henry etc     .] that the distinction of the being of essence from the being of existence [n.4] suffices for composition, because of the fact that essence (understood as having the being of essence) is still in potency to the being of existence, which it receives from the efficient cause insofar as it is efficient - and then “it is composed of potency and act.”

13. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against these points the arguments are:

First, that creation is production from nothing; but if a stone pre-had from eternity true real being, then, when it is produced by the efficient cause, it is not produced from nothing simply.

14. Secondly as follows: if it is not produced save only according to a new respect to the efficient cause, it does not seem to be produced in being simply, but only in being in a certain respect - and the creation will be less ‘a production simply’ than is alteration, where there is production (at least of something) as to absolute being.

15. Third (according to the same way) it is argued that it posits the same actual and aptitudinal relation on the part of God, and that because of this there cannot, on account of the old aptitudinal relation, be a new actual relation in God [d.35 n.35]; therefore likewise on the part of what is referred to God there is the same actual and aptitudinal relation, and it will, on account of the old aptitudinal relation, not be an actual new one; therefore since the aptitudinal relation to the being of existence was always in a being having the being of essence, there will be no new actual relation in it insofar as it is existent.

16. Fourth (according to the same way), because in the same immutable foundation there cannot be a new respect; here the foundation is the same, namely the being of essence, - and an immutable term, namely God; therefore there is no new respect to such a term, of the sort of respect that is posited as ‘being of existence’.

17. Again, fifth (according to the same middle term, about creation [sc. creation from nothing, n.13]), because the production of a thing according to the being of essence is most truly creation (for it is purely from nothing as from the term from which, and to a true being as to the term to which); and this production according to them is eternal [n.12]; therefore the creation is eternal, - the opposite of which he [sc. Henry] tries to show and says he has demonstrations for.

18. Sixth (according to the same way, through the opposite about annihilation), it follows that nothing can be annihilated; for just as it is produced from a being in essence, so it seems to return to a being in essence, - not to nothing.

19. Further, second principally [sc. after the arguments in nn.13-18]: the reasons -which were touched on in distinction 8 nn.263, 269 against Avicenna - that ‘nothing other than God is formally necessary’, can be made against this opinion [sc. the opinion about the being of essence from eternity, n.4], because these reasons are as conclusive about quidditative being (if it is true being) as about the being of existence; for the will does not more necessarily will ‘something other than itself’ in quidditative being than it wills ‘something other than itself’ in being of existence, because there is the same reason in both cases [d.8 nn.270, 272] - and so about the other middle terms there [d.8 nn.271, 273-274].

20. Further, third: a thing according to being of essence is either the term of a relation of the idea (which they posit in God) or it is not but is according to some other known being. If in the second way, then things are posited in vain in the former being; for essences do not seem to be posited because of anything other than as they are terms of the ideal relations that are eternally in God. If in the first way, then there is in God by act of the divine intellect something according to which God can be otherwise or change, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 30 n.41. - The proof of this last inference is that every ‘being’ other than God is formally non-necessary of itself; therefore let this ‘being’ (although per impossibile) be posited to be quidditatively otherwise, it follows that the entity in God - whether it is real or of reason -, which has this ‘being’ for term, will be otherwise, and thus from the positing of something about what is other than God something that is in God by act of his intellect will be able to be changed, which is impossible.

21. Further, when a cause is perfect and naturally independent in causing and it acts naturally, it seems that it can cause the things more immediate to it to be more perfect, because it produces according to the ultimate of its power; the divine intellect as intellect precisely - according to this way - produces in God ideal reasons and the essences themselves in reason of essence, and produces ideal reasons as it were first in itself before these essences in this being (for they exist by the fact they are of the exemplars); therefore the ideas have a truer being - since the divine intellect is naturally acting - than the things patterned after them; but the divine intellect does not cause ideas save as ‘beings of reason’ and not in any real being - therefore neither does he give any real being to the things patterned after the ideas, which things are more remote ‘caused things’ as it were.

22. Besides, fifth: it produces these essences in being either knowingly or not. If knowingly, then they are in the knower before they are in this being, and so in vain are these entities [sc. ideas] posited on account of God’s eternal knowledge. If not knowingly, then he produces them merely naturally (as fire heats), which seems absurd about any produced thing that is other than himself in nature; nay he even produces the Son as he is intellect, although not as understanding formally, as was expounded elsewhere [d.2 nn.290-296].

23. In addition, that he [sc. Henry] attributes one effect to the exemplar cause and another to the efficient cause does not seem probable, because the exemplar cause is only a certain efficient cause; for the efficient cause is divided into efficient cause by intellect or intention and efficient cause by nature, according to the Philosopher Physics 2.5.196b17-22. Just as therefore a natural producer is not a different cause from the efficient cause, so neither is the exemplar cause or the exemplar producer - and so ‘what is effected’ will be the same as ‘what is produced as exemplified’ by any understanding that produces artificially, insofar as it is understanding and insofar as it is exemplar.

24. Also as to what he adds ‘that composition exists in creatures through this potentiality to act’ [n.12] does not seem rational, because there seems to be nothing there that may be compared with something else; for if the whole of whiteness pre-exists in potency as the term of power, and afterwards it comes to be in act, not for this reason is there any composition of thing and thing; therefore if a thing pre-exists in being of essence and it is produced in being of existence (which is not different - according to them - from the essence, just as neither generally is a relation different from its foundation, for which reason they do not posit that relation and foundation make a composition), there will not be a composite being because of these two.

25. And this might be the seventh argument (according to the first way [nn.13-18]) for rejecting creation, because of the identity of relation with the foundation [n.24]; because the same thing cannot be really new and not new; therefore if being of existence states a relation that is the same as essence, no creature will be simply new.

B. Scotus’ own Response

26. I concede the conclusion of these reasons [nn.13-18, 25], namely the negative part of the question [n.24].

27. As to which, this result seems specifically to hold, that not only does the being of essence found this sort of relation to God but so also does the being of existence, because according to Augustine On Genesis V ch.18 n.36: “he knows things made no otherwise than he knows things to be made;” he foreknew then the being of existence just as he foreknew the being of essence - and yet not because of this founded relation does someone conclude that the ‘being of existence’ was a true such being, namely true being of existence from eternity; therefore by parity of reason, it should not be conceded of the being of essence.

28. Also all the motives that are adduced about the divine intellect seem able to be adduced about our intellect:

Because if something does not exist, it can be understood by us (and this as to either its essence or its existence), and yet not because of our intellection does one posit that it has true being of essence or of existence; nor is there any difference - as it seems -between the divine intellect and ours in this respect, save that the divine intellect produces those intelligibles in their intelligible being, and ours does not produce them first. But if this being is not of itself such that it requires being simply, then ‘to produce it in such being’ is not to produce it in any being simply; and therefore it seems that if this intelligible being - when comparing it to our intellect - does not require being simply, then when comparing it also to the intellect ‘producing it in this being’ there will not be being simply, because if being white is only qualitative being, then ‘to produce it in being white’ is not to produce in being substance but in that qualitative being.

29. Likewise, our agent intellect produces a thing in intelligible being, although it was produced beforehand - and yet not because of this producing of our agent intellect is the thing ‘so produced’ posited to have being simply.

C. Objections against Scotus’ own Response

30. [Exposition of the objections] - Against this solution it is objected that the foundation of a relation, when it founds a relation, exists according to the being according to which it founds, - otherwise it would not found according to that being; but a stone according to true being of essence founds the eternal relation to God as knower, and this in eternity; therefore the stone exists in eternity according to this being. Proof of the minor: it founds the relation to God as knower according to the being according to which its being as object is known by God; but it is known by God under the idea of true essence, not under the idea of diminished essence, because the first intellection of a stone by God is not reflexive.

31. Further, production is not of some relation merely, because relation only exists in something absolute; therefore since it was conceded in the preceding question [d.35 nn.31-32, 40, 42] that God produces things in intelligible being ‘according as the known thing is said to be an idea’, it follows that in the second instant [ibid., nn.32, 49] one must posit some absolute entity of the produced thing, so that on the absolute being having such entity the relation to the producer may be founded.

32. [Response to the objections] - To the first [n.30] I say that a canceled term is not canceled with respect to the canceling term but with respect to a third to which it is compared under the reason of what cancels, - because according to the Philosopher De Interpretatione 11.21a21-24, when predicating of someone that he is ‘a dead man’ there is an opposition in the adjective, on which contradiction follows [sc. a dead man is not in fact a man]; therefore when comparing a determinable precisely to the determination, the determinable is not canceled with respect to the determination but includes a contradiction to it; but with respect to the third term - about which ‘dead’ is said - there is a canceling determination and that which is determined by it is canceled, so that it is only said to be it ‘in a certain respect’ [sc. a dead man is not a man simply but a man in a certain respect, as a body that was a man].

33. Thus I say that a diminished thing is not diminished with respect to the diminishing term but with respect to a third, to which it is compared under the diminishing determination; just as when I say ‘he is white as to his teeth’, the white is not diminished but is taken for white simply with respect to this determination (otherwise it would be frivolous); but, as it is taken under the determination, it is said of a third thing -as of an Ethiopian - as diminished.

34. Now this determination ‘to be in opinion’ is a diminishing one (according to the Philosopher, ibid. 21a24-33), and the way being in opinion is, so being in intellection also is or being from an exemplar or being known or represented, - all which are equivalent. Although therefore what is compared to any one of these, as it is compared to it, is not diminished - yet as it is under any of these compared to a third, it is diminished; for the being of man simply - and not diminished being - is the object of opinion, but the ‘being simply’ as it exists in opinion is being ‘in a certain respect’; and therefore the inference does not follow ‘Homer is in opinion, therefore Homer is’, nor even ‘Homer is existing in opinion, therefore Homer is existing’ - but there is a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect.

35. So here: when comparing to divine intellection a stone in eternity, the stone is indeed simply compared to the intellection (and this according to the being not only of essence of the stone, but also of existence), and anything comparable is so compared -yet as it is taken under this comparison to the knowledge of God it is diminished; it is not indeed canceled, as if ‘being simply’ could not stand with this sort of respect, but it is diminished so that such respect does not necessarily posit that ‘its determinable’ is a being simply.

36. Next to the form of the argument [n.30]: ‘the foundation of a relation is according to the being according to which it founds the relation’ is true when the founded relation is not simply diminishing the being of the foundation. And the real reason for the ‘in a certain respect and simply’ seems to be this, that the first distinction of being seems to be into being outside the soul and being in the soul, - and the ‘outside the soul’ can be distinguished into act and potency (of essence and of existence), and any of these beings ‘outside the soul’ can have being in the soul, and the being ‘in the soul’ is other than every ‘being outside the soul’ and therefore about no entity nor about any being does it follow that, if it has diminished being in the soul, it has because of this being simply -because the being is in a certain respect, absolutely, which however is taken ‘simply’ insofar as it is compared to the soul as foundation of the being in the soul.

37. Argument [sc. against nn.35-36]:

A stone is not of itself a necessary existence in any existence;[Text canceled by Scotus] This does not follow, if it is a true being, and not divisible into necessary and possible. ⁵ therefore in being known it is caused; only by an efficient cause - whose term is only being simply.

38. Again what is only in something virtually is never formally such save through actual causation; a stone ‘as known’ is only virtually in the divine essence; therefore it does not become actually known without causation - and then as before [n.37].

39. In response to these [nn.37-38]:

One can respond otherwise than is responded here above [nn.35-36], namely that the intellection of God, although it is not absolutely caused, yet as it is of this secondary object (to wit, a stone) does as it were have a principle, and this from the essence as an equivocal objective formal nature - and so it is more from a principle then when it is of the first object because in this latter way it is from a principle as from a univocal objective formal nature. And to be an intellection, as it is ‘of this’, as from a principle equivocally is for the ‘this’ to have a principle in diminished being, just as for an intelligible species to be from a principle in the intellect is for the object ‘in a certain respect’ to be from a principle as it is actually intelligible, or - a better example for the purpose - in the way that through the species of the subject ‘the intellection of the property is from a principle’ is for the property as actually understood to be from a principle; therefore this example is fitting, because a stone does not have a principle equivocally from the essence as intelligible first before it does so as understood; for nothing has formal being in the memory before it does so in intelligence, but only virtual being. Nor does it seem unacceptable to concede that the divine intellect has as it were a principle (not in itself, but as it is of this object), because one must posit this about volition (as it seems), since volition is contingently of this object, and nothing contingent is altogether uncaused.

40. Thus there will be an order between the altogether without a principle (as the essence) and the from a principle univocally (as the intellection of the essence) and the as it were from a principle equivocally but necessarily (as the intellection of a stone) and the as it were from a principle equivocally and contingently (as the willing of a stone).

41. This way well says, in this regard, that the essence as ‘moving reason’ is altogether without distinction, univocally as it were when moving to itself as to first term of act, and equivocally as it were when moving to a secondary object as to second term of act; such that neither in the intellect (as is plain) nor in motive reason nor in understanding nor in the first term must one posit any distinction. But when it is said ‘the act is as it were equivocally from a principle as it is of a secondary object’ [n.39], this is nothing other than that it is extended - as if beyond the first object - to the second in virtue of an objective principle that is equivocal to the second term.

42. But what is it for an act to be thus extended? Not to be a relation in act, nor to be a relation in the first object to the second, - for you [sc. Scotus himself]; therefore it is for the second object to be referred to the act or the first object; this object is only of what possesses some being [sc. diminished being], - and then follows what is had there [nn.35-36].

43. So the imagination is false that ‘to understand’ is distinguished (so that it might be of many things) as if into many ‘to understands’; nay there is no need for any difference in it, as it is a sort of mean between reason and the first term, which secondary objects follow;     therefore it is false that the secondary objects are the immediate term of

‘to understand’, just as neither do they move - for in no way are they necessarily required for act, but they are required in idea of term, to the act as it is of this; this only asserts a relation in the second mode.a

a [Note of Duns Scotus] God: intellect, essence as reason; to understand: essence as first term, -stone, angel etc     ., secondary objects.

44. To the second [n.31] I say that this production is in the being of a reason different from all being simply, - and it is not being of reason simply, but also of the foundation; not indeed according to the being of essence or existence, but according to diminished being (which is ‘to be’ true), which is a to be in a certain respect also of absolute being, which ‘absolute being’, however, according to this diminished being has a relation of reason as concomitant.

45. An example of this: if Caesar were annihilated and yet there were a statue of Caesar, Caesar would be represented by the statue. This ‘being represented’ is of a reason different from all being simply (whether of essence or existence), nor is it a diminished being of Caesar, as if something of Caesar had this being and something of him did not -as an Ethiopian is diminished white because something of him is truly white and something not [n.33]. But of the whole Caesar ‘the being of him from a cause’ is true being of essence and of existence, and to that whole - according to such being of his -this being in a certain respect belongs, and in him, according to this being in a certain respect, there can be some relation to the statue.

46. And although one could suppose there to be calumny in the example, it cannot thus be said in the issue at hand about intellection and the object without the whole object, and in accord with its whole being, having ‘diminished being’ in act. And if you wish to look for some true being of this object as such, there is none to look for save ‘in a certain respect’, save that this ‘being in a certain respect’ is reduced to some being simply, which is the being of the intellection itself; but this ‘being simply’ is not formally the being of that which is called the ‘being in a certain respect’, because it is of it as term or principle, so that to this ‘true being in a certain respect’ is thus reduced the fact that without this true being of it there would not be this ‘being in a certain respect’ of it.

47. Now from this becomes clear something said above in distinction 3 nn.265-267 (‘About knowledge in the eternal rules’), namely that the moving of our intellect ‘by intelligible quiddities’ is reduced to the divine intellect, through whose ‘being simply’ those objects have being in a certain respect, namely objective being (which is the being that moves our intellect to know genuine truths), and because of their motion the intellect is said to move, just as too they have ‘their own being in a certain respect’ because of the being simply of it.