III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

56. And as to what is argued for the first opinion, that the indeterminate reason needs to be made determinate [n.11], - I say that it is determinate of itself, with a determination opposite ‘to the indetermination which is to contradictories’ [n.17], although it is not of itself determinate with a determination of limitation; nor is this necessary so that by it the object may be determinately understood.

57. And if you say ‘whatever exceeds the middle term is not a reason for understanding this thing in particular unless it is determined to it by something else’, - I reply that always, when arguing from the antecedent to the consequent along with distribution [sc. of the terms], there is a fallacy of the consequent, from the form of arguing. But it holds by reason of the matter when the consequent cannot exist unless it is counted up in several things; and, because of this, the form of arguing by Augustine in On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.7 ‘if two men, then two animals’ holds, but this is from the imperfection and limitation of the consequent to the antecedent. Hence this inference does not follow ‘if the Father, then God, - if the Son, then God, - therefore if the Father and the Son are two, then two Gods’. So I say that to the intellection of ‘this thing’ one must give a reason by which it is understood, and a reason that is proper (either formally, or eminently containing whatever there is of perfection in the proper reason), and for understanding ‘that thing’ one must have a proper and determinate reason; but to infer ‘therefore for understanding one thing and another thing one must have one determinate reason and another determinate reason’ is a fallacy of the consequent, because this consequent - namely to have a determinate reason of understanding - is unlimited as to other antecedents [sc. so it is not distributed, or counted up, as they are]

58. As to what is added there for the first opinion, that the reason of understanding is an ‘intelligible’ likeness [n.10], - I reply: not a formal likeness, but either that or something else analogically alike, that is, containing the formal likeness perfectly, according to everything of perfection that is in it as it is the relation or reason of understanding - and so it is in the issue at hand.