C. Scotus’ own Response

27. One can say to the question [n.1] that relations of the third mode differ per se from the others of the other two modes, because in the third mode there is no mutuality as there is in the other two modes, - and from this follows (as was deduced in distinction 3 question 1 n.31) that the term of the relation is something absolute as absolute. As therefore the object of our intellect is the term of the relation of the intellect insofar as it is purely absolute, and thus the intellect is measured by it, so - it seems - since the divine intellect simply is measure of all understood things other than itself, it follows that the other things are referred precisely to divine intellection, and this will be the term of the relation under the idea of a pure absolute; this is confirmed by the fact that the altogether first divine intellection, which is beatific, is of the essence as it is essence, without any respect real or of reason, and this because of the perfect real identity of the intellect with the essence as object.

28. One need not then, because of the intellection of any object precisely, look for a relation, either in both extremes or in one of them, - therefore one must, because of the fact that a relation exists in both or one of them, add something else; but that addition seems to be only either a mutual co-requirement, if the relation is mutual, - or a dependence in one of the extremes, if it is not mutual; but here, when God understands something other than himself, no mutual co-requirement can be posited in either extreme, as it seems, - therefore it is enough precisely to posit a relation in one of the extremes, where there is dependence; that is the object as known.

29. In addition, the will when loving or enjoying the end, does not produce something other than itself in willed being by loving the end in an order to something else or by comparing it to another lovable thing, but rather by comparing another thing to the end, so that the relation caused by the comparison of the will seems to exist in another thing ‘willed for the end’; but no comparison by the will seems to be in the willed end; therefore, by similarity, there does not seem to be in the intellect knowing the first object, and knowing, from that knowledge, a secondary object, a relation produced in that first object to the secondary object, but conversely.a

a [Interpolation, from Appendix A] Besides, this first intellection is direct and has a real mode, the second is of reason; for if I understand man absolutely, this intellection is real and has a real mode; but if I understand humanity afterwards by comparing it to Socrates, this is a comparative intellection and is of reason. So if these dispositions are understood by non-reflex intellection, then they are real.

30. Besides, as was argued [nn.18-19], it does not seem one can lay down what the act of intellect is by which the relation would be produced; not by first act, because of the absolute perfection of that act; if by second act, then the relation is not the principle of that second act, and in that second act the creature is perfectly known; therefore in no act will such relation be as it a were a reason prior to the creature in idea of object.

31. The conclusion of the three reasons given can be conceded against both common opinions reported above [nn.14, 16, 19], and the reasons now given here can be conceded [nn.27-30]; and in this respect one can concede that there are eternal relations in God to known things, but not naturally prior to those known things in idea of objects.

32. Things can be set down as follows: God in the first instant understands his essence under a purely absolute reason; in the second instant he produces a stone in intelligible being and understands a stone, so that there is there a relation in the understood stone to the divine intellection, but no relation yet in the divine intellection to the stone, but the divine intellection is the term of the relation to it ‘of stone as understood’; in the third instant, perhaps, the divine intellect can compare its own intellection to any intelligible which we can compare to, and then by comparing itself to the understood stone the divine intellect can cause in itself a relation of reason; and in the fourth instant there can be as it were reflection on the relation caused in the third instant, and then the relation of reason will be known. Thus no relation of reason therefore is necessary for understanding a stone - as if prior to the stone - as object, nay this relation ‘as caused’ is posterior (in the third instant), and it will still be posterior as known, because in the fourth instant.a

a [Interpolation] According to this way [nn.31-32] it is plain of what the idea is; because it is of every secondary object (whether it be producible or co-producible), and one is singular and universal, and the others (universally) of an inferior and superior, - as you advance from the intellect [sc. the process described in n.32].

33. And this fourth way [nn.31-32] can hold the proposition - which seems probable - that ‘a relation is not naturally known save when the term is known’ (but neither does the intellect make comparison with anything, save when the term is naturally first known), which proposition cannot be held by the other way [the second, [n.12], because it must say that by the relation by which it compares this intellection, it compares the essence to something not naturally first known.

34. This opinion ‘about the relations to the divine intellect as absolute of things other than God as these are understood’ is confirmed and understood in a similar way to the one above - in distinction 30 nn.31-39 - ‘about the relations to God of understood creatures’.