2. Against the First Opinion

21. Again, against the first opinion [n.9] specifically, it seems to follow that the relations are real, because the reason of understanding as it is reason naturally precedes intellection, - and consequently as to nothing of it as it is the reason of understanding is it caused by intellection, nor does it follow intellection; if then the reason of understanding a stone is under a relation of reason, that relation of reason is not produced in the essence by intellection of a stone, because it naturally precedes the intellection. Therefore the relation is produced by some other intellection. But only that which is essence as essence precedes it; but by this it is not produced (which they concede - where it seems less to be so - ‘about the divine persons and about the principles of producing them’); therefore the relation will be in the essence as it is reason, and not by some action of the intellect.

22. Further, according to some of them [sc. of those who hold the two opinions, nn.9, 12], a distinction of reason in the principles suffices for a real distinction in what is from the principles; therefore this distinction of reason as it is the reason of understanding a and b will suffice for a real distinction between a and b (and conversely), so that one reason will suffice for the distinction of a and another for the distinction of b.

23. Further, an external thing is immediately understood [sc. according to the first opinion], because the whole distinction that is posited precedes intellection; nothing internal then as it is a secondary object is term of intellection.

24. Against the second opinion [n.12]:

Every relation of reason, which is in the object from the fact that it is compared by the intellect to something, is in the object precisely as a diminished entity, have being in the intellect as a known in a knower; and it could be in the object if per impossibile it did not have the being of existence, provided however it have being in a like way in the comparing intellect. Therefore those relations would be or will be in the divine essence precisely as it has diminished being in the intellect, as it compares it to the creature, and not as the essence is something in itself; and further, they would be in the essence if per impossibile the essence did not exist, provided however it be compared to those terms by some thinking intellect; and further, if per impossibile there were two Gods, the relations would be in the intellect of this God comparing that God to the creature, and not in that God in himself.

25. In addition, God is naturally imitable by the creature before he is understood to be imitable; for because he is imitable, therefore he is truly compared as imitable by creatures, as it seems, and not conversely; therefore, before the comparison of the essence as imitable is made by the intellect, there is imitability in the essence. But according to some of those who follow this way [n.12], aptitudinal relation is the same as actual (because of which identity in God they say that there is no new relation, nor another old one, of the creative and the creating [n.11]); therefore these relations in the essence as in the compared object will not be first outwardly directed, but there will be other and prior relations, as it seems, because they will be before any act of the comparing intellect.

26. Besides, although the essence ‘as known’ is the reason of coming to the knowledge of a stone, yet it seems afterwards that the divine intellect could know a stone in itself and not precisely by the fact that it compares its essence to a stone, because thus can we, without such comparison of something else to it, understand a stone. In the case of this understanding of a stone, I ask what the relation of reason to a stone is in? Not in the essence as in the object compared, because in this object as such ‘to understand’ does not exist as compared object; therefore one has to look for the relation of reason in intellection [sc. the third opinion] or in the reason of understanding [sc. the first opinion], and then return will be made to one of the other opinions [sc. the first or third].