2. Second Opinion

12. Another position is that these relations are in the divine essence as it is the altogether first know object; the divine essence indeed is understood ‘by an intellection altogether first’ as completely without distinction, but so that creatures may be understood the intellect first compares the essence - known first - to creatures under the idea of its being imitable, and then, by understanding the essence as imitable, it understands creatures through that first object, thus considered under such a relation of reason.

13. And this opinion differs from the first [n.9] as the two ways of speaking differ, one of which would posit ‘the same species’ to be the reason of knowing both the principle and the conclusion, only however as under distinct relations of reason corresponding to those known things under their proper ideas - but the other would say that ‘the known principle itself’ is the reason of knowing the conclusion, and this not as a principle absolutely understood, but in comparison or relation to the conclusion.a

a [Interpolation, from Appendix A] A third opinion posits almost the same, and it posits ideas or ideal reasons in the act of understanding. And they [proponents of this opinion] have the following reasoning.

     Our understanding, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.6.1016b18-21, has a respect to the intelligible as measured to measure; therefore if it were infinite as the divine intellect is, it would have a respect to infinite intelligibles, and so there would in our intellect be infinite respects to infinite intelligibles; but because it is finite, it has respect to one intelligible; therefore since the divine understanding is infinite, there will in its ability for understanding be infinite relations to infinite intelligibles.