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Nineteenth Distinction
Question One. Whether the Divine Persons are Equal in Magnitude
1. About the nineteenth distinction I ask first whether the persons are equal in magnitude.
That they are not:
Because in the Categories 6.6a26-27 is said that “it is proper to quantity that according to it a thing is said to be equal or unequal;” but quantity is not in God, according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.1 n.2, “God is great without quantity, good without quality;” 
therefore etc 
.
2. Again, nothing is to be posited in God which asserts imperfection. Equality is of this sort, - the proof is that it is repugnant to perfection in creatures; the thing is plain from Augustine 83 Questions q.41: “If all things were equal,” he says, “they would not now be ‘all things’;” therefore the perfection of the universe could not stand along with equality; equality, therefore, is not in everything better than its opposite, therefore it is not a perfection simply [I d.8 nn.22, 185]. Therefore it should not be posited in God as an essential feature or as common to the three persons.
3. Again, perfect equality is mutual; this [sc. equality in God] is not mutual, according to Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.10 n.11: “An image, if it is perfect, is coequal with what it is the image of, but not the latter with the image.”
4. The opposite is found in the Creed of Athanasius: “The persons are coeternal with each other and coequal,” - and the Master in the text gives a special proof of this from Augustine [rather Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter ch.1 n.4.
I. To the Question
5. Here one must look first at equality properly taken, second at equality taken generally, and third at how there is equality in the proposed case [sc. the divine persons], and fourth one must show that in this way [sc. of taking equality] there is perfect equality in the divine persons.
A. About Equality Taken Properly
6. On the first point the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5.15.1021a8-12 ‘On Relation’, distinguishes three relations founded on unity or ‘one’, namely the same, the like, and the equal - and speaking of these strictly and properly he appropriates them to three categories, as identity to substance, equality to quantity, and likeness to quality. And thus perhaps other relations can be founded on the principles of other categories, as proportionality on relation, - and this is what Avicenna seems to say [Metaphysics III ch.10 83rb], at least about the three common relations that the Philosopher expressly posits.
7. However, I say that the remote foundation of these relations is the thing in the category, as that the foundation of equality is the thing in the category of quantity, and of likeness the thing in the category of quality, and of identity the thing in the category of substance; but the proximate foundation or the proximate idea of the foundation is the unity of such thing, because disparate and not common relations are founded on things in categories in the way those things are diverse.
B. On Equality Taken Generally
8. On the second point [n.5] I say that any being in itself is a ‘what’, and has in itself some determinate degree among beings, and is a form or has a form; and accordingly, just as any being can be considered in these three ways, so also there can be founded on it a triple relation taken commonly; because identity [and diversity] are founded on any being insofar as it is a ‘what’, equality and inequality are founded on any being insofar as it has some magnitude of perfection (which is called ‘quantity of virtue’, about which Augustine says in On the Trinity VI ch.8 n.9 that “in things that are not great in bulk, to be better is the same as to be greater”), while likeness and unlikeness can be founded on any being insofar as it is ‘of a certain sort’ and is a certain quality (about this mode of quality the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 5.14.1020a33 ‘On Quality’, that “one mode of quality is difference in substance,” that is, substantial difference, and in this way individuals of the same species are essentially alike insofar as they have the same specific difference, which is as it were their essential quality).
9. In this way, namely taking the common relations and not the relations in the strict sense, the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 10.3.1054b25 that “any being compared with any being is the same or diverse;” so too any being compared with any being is equal or unequal. Just as then the foundation of identity, equality, and likeness - taken in this common way - is being in general compared with any being in general, so also the relations are transcendental along with being (though not convertible with it), but they are disjuncts and divide being, as being is divided into necessary and possible.
C. How there is Equality in the Proposed Case
10. On the third point [n.5] I say that just as no genus nor anything of any genus is said formally of God, so neither is a property of any genus so said of him, and consequently not any of the common relations either, in the way they are taken strictly, namely as they are properties of determinate genera or categories [n.6]; but because being is said formally of God, and any property convertible with being, and so always also the nobler extreme of non-convertible - but disjunct - properties, therefore in this way will that extreme be said of God that either asserts nobility or is not repugnant to nobility, while the other extreme is repugnant.
D. About Equality in the Divine Persons
11. On the fourth point [n.5] (setting aside for the present identity and likeness, which are not now in question [I d.31 q. un]), I say about equality that it exists perfectly in the divine persons.
12. And although equality in the case of some created beings can be taken according to quantity, whether continuous or discrete, and according to permanent and successive continuity, and although on this basis one could ask ‘whether there is in the divine persons equality in number’ (if perfect number were to exist there) and ‘whether there is perfect equality there in duration and according to eternity’ (which corresponds to successive quantity in creatures) - the first [sc. discrete quantity, or number], however, does not pertain to the present Distinction but to Distinction 24 (nor does the Master touch on anything about this here in the present Distinction, because he does not posit number here positively in the way perhaps it will be touched on in Distinction 24); but the Master does in a way touch on the second [sc. duration] (and he adduces Augustine [or rather Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter [n.4], and the thing was proved in Distinction 9 nn.6-11). The question is about the third [sc. continuous quantity], namely about equality in magnitude.
13. And that the equality is perfect is proved both from the remote foundation, namely magnitude, - and from the proximate idea of the foundation, namely unity [n.7].
The first proof is plain from the fact that magnitude of virtue is not perfect unless it is infinite; because infinity is not repugnant to it [sc. to magnitude of virtue], and nothing ‘which infinity is not repugnant to’ is perfect unless it is infinite; but every other magnitude of virtue is finite, and only it is infinite, as was made plain in I d.2 nn.131-136.
14. As to the second proof [n.13], the proposed conclusion is proved from the fact that in all other natural equalities the unity of the magnitude, in respect of which they are said to be equal, is diminished - because the magnitude in those equal things is separately counted; here however [sc. in the divine persons] there is perfect unity of magnitude and yet, along with it, a sufficient distinction between the related persons as is required for real relation.
15. But there is here a doubt because, since magnitude passes over into the essence, a relation founded on magnitude does not seem to be different from a relation founded on essence the way essence is a ‘what’, and so the equality does not seem to differ from the identity, - or if equality could be attended to in things that seem to be quasi-properties of the essence [sc. the attributes: power, wisdom, goodness etc .], this is not attended to in them save insofar as they have magnitude of virtue; but this magnitude is not an attribute different from such perfection as asserts a mode intrinsic to the attribute (as was said often above [I d.8 nn.192, 220-221; d.10 n.30; d.13 nn.72, 80]); therefore if likeness ‘in accord with such a property’ [sc. one or other attribute] is equality in the magnitude of the property, equality would not differ from likeness in the property - and thus it seems that equality insofar as it is equality should not here [sc. in the divine persons] be posited, because it exists neither as distinct from identity, speaking of the equality of essence, nor as distinct from likeness, speaking of the equality that is in magnitude of attributal perfections.
16. There is also another doubt because, if there can be infinite attributal perfections, infinite equalities of divine persons should be posited; for each perfection has its magnitude as a mode intrinsic to itself in accord with its own proper nature; therefore there will be as many magnitudes and equalities as there are attributal perfections.a
a [Interpolation] And further, since magnitude in divine reality is of itself of one idea, the consequence is that something of one idea in divine reality is not itself a this, and then the reason is not valid that was given above [Reportatio IA d.19 n.28] as to why there cannot be several supposits of the same idea in divine reality, namely that each of them is of itself a this and each production is of itself a this; but the opposite hereof seems to be true in the case of magnitude and equality in divine reality.
17. In response to these doubts.a To the first I reply - see the response etc. [I d.31 q. un. nn.6-7].
a [Interpolation] [I reply] that magnitude in divine reality does not state an attribute distinct from the others (as was said above about infinity [see reference in n.15 above]) but a degree that is intrinsic to any one of them, because there is no attribute in divine reality so simple that one may not ask about the quantity of its virtue; for if there were only one attribute in divine reality, as wisdom for example, it would still be possible to ask, as to its degree of virtue, how great it was; hence if each [sc. perfection simply, such as wisdom] existed without any other, each would still have a certain degree in its quantity of virtue, and each would be infinite and would have a magnitude formally infinite. And therefore magnitude is not in divine reality a single foundation merely of equality but is a single indifferent foundation, because it is preserved and included in every perfection simply, each of which perfections can be the foundation of equality, because each has its own magnitude; hence if in divine reality there are infinite ‘perfections simply’ there will also be infinite magnitudes, and likewise infinite equalities corresponding to them. But on the essence as it is a quiddity there is founded identity, - and as it asserts an infinite magnitude for the quantity of virtue, there is founded on it an equality between the persons that possess that essence. - But is equality distinguished in divine reality from likeness and identity? I reply that it both is so and is not so. For equality is not distinguished from likeness and identity as much as likeness and identity are distinguished from each other, because neither is its foundation (i.e. magnitude) distinguished from their foundations as much as their foundations are distinguished from each other, because magnitude - on which equality is founded - only asserts a mode or degree intrinsic to the foundations of identity and likeness, and is not distinguished from them formally as a ‘what’ or a ‘some sort of’ in the way they are distinguished form each other. Hence equality does not seem to assert in divine reality a different relation simply from likeness and identity, but it asserts only a perfect mode of each relation; a clarification can be given of the point: for if there are two white things one of which is whiter than the other, they are indeed alike although not equal - but they are not perfectly alike unless they be equal in whiteness, such that equality does not assert quasi-simply a relation other than their likeness, but asserts a perfection of likeness in each of the extremes and one that is in accord with a perfect mode of existence of the foundation in respect of which there is a likeness in each. So, if in the Father - according to the error of Arius - there were a greater deity and in the Son a lesser deity, the Son would indeed be like the Father; but he would not be equal with the Father because he would not have the form of deity as perfectly as the Father has it. Positing however - as we from the Faith posit - that nothing is less there in deity than anything else, the Son is perfectly alike, because they [sc. Father and Son] are altogether and perfectly equal in foundation of likeness. Hence, just as magnitude only states a perfect mode intrinsic to any essential perfection in divine reality, as with the essential perfections that are the foundations of identity and likeness, so equality states a perfect mode of these foundations and thus it does not state simply a relation different from them.
To the second doubt [see the interpolation to n.16] one can reply in two ways. In one way as follows, that nothing of one idea can be multiplied unless it first require several things of another idea, through whose plurality the things of one idea are determined to their own plurality; but this does not hold of the divine persons, as is plain in the same place [Rep. IA d.19 n.29]; but in the proposed case equality requires a distinction of persons and of perfections simply, each of which has its own magnitude and all of them are distinct formally and in idea (the point is plain about justice and wisdom, which are of a different idea). One can say in another way, and equally well, that although unity goes along with the foundation of equality, yet it is not so remote a foundation of equality that by its diversity the equality is not multiplied, - which fact is plain in the relation of likeness: for just as knowledge is distinguished from charity, so is the likeness which is founded on unity in knowledge distinguished [sc. from the likeness which is founded on unity in charity]. But nevertheless one must say, as to the proposed case, that those equalities, founded on the magnitudes of diverse perfections, are not of the same idea formally, but of different ideas; and therefore, just as magnitude in wisdom is of a different idea from magnitude in goodness and the unity different from the unity, so the equality is of a different idea in the one case and in the other - and then one does not have to concede that something of the same idea is multiplied in divine reality.
II. To the Principal Arguments
18. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that there is not there [sc. in divine reality] a quantity of bulk but of virtue; and if the name of quantity is made proper to magnitude of bulk (but if magnitude is not made proper to magnitude of bulk), then one could concede that there is magnitude there without quantity; and this magnitude is truly the foundation of transcendent equality, because every being is in this way great or small, and equal or unequal, although the magnitude is not a foundation of equality as equality is a property of quantity, which is a category.
19. But against this an argument is made that it does not seem anything can be said of God unless what belongs to the understanding of that thing is said of him; therefore, since quantity belongs to the understanding of magnitude, then magnitude cannot be conceded of God and quantity denied of him.
20. Again, when asking how great God is, one may well reply that he is immense; but if there is no quantity in God, no such question would arise.
21. Again, a property common to every being does not belong to any being by a specific difference; equality is a property common to every kind of quantity; therefore it does not belong to anything by any specific difference in the category of quantity, - and thus one cannot posit in God any difference in the category of quantity by saying that the category of quantity is not there but that there is there, by a difference in quantity, the idea of equality.
22. To the first [n.19] I reply that magnitude is equivocal according as it is a species of quantity distinct from multitude (Metaphysics 5.13.1020a7-10) and according as it is opposed to smallness and as its concrete from - that is, ‘great’ - is opposed to small (this distinction is sufficiently got from the Philosopher Metaphysics 10.6.1056b3-14 in the likeness ‘about long and short, great and small, many and one’). In the first sense magnitude is not applied to God, nor its difference as something belonging to him, as is plain from I d.8 nn.124, 136, because then the genus included in it would be applied to him; nor is magnitude in the second sense applied to him, in the way ‘great’ is taken properly and states a property of quantity, because a property proper to a thing does not exist without its proper subject. But magnitude taken in another sense is a property of being, and it is distinct from small, and in this way one or other extreme exists in every being; this is plain from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5.13 1020a23-26, in the chapter on quantity: “But great and small, greater and smaller, are said absolutely and in relation to another; absolutely indeed they are properties of quantity; these names are also applied to other things” (as if he were to say: ‘properly taken’ they state properties of quantity, ‘commonly taken’ they state common properties of being).
23. As to the other [n.20] - how great God is - a rational question should be denied if quantity is denied of God; but if a rational question is conceded then a quantity of virtue should be conceded in God, not a quantity of bulk.
24. The third argument [n.21] only concludes that equality as it is a property in the category of quantity does not belong to God by any difference in the category of quantity, and that it is not applied to divine reality; and I concede that no difference in the category of quantity belongs to God; nor does any property in that genus belong to him, but a transcendent property does so belong.
25. To the next [sc. principal argument, n.2] I say that perfection simply, that is, a perfection that could formally be infinite, only asserts that in divine reality which can be essential to it and self-referred (and such is what is in some way pre-understood in the relations of origin), of which sort are wisdom and goodness etc . But equality is not preunderstood in the relations of origin, nor can it be self-referred; for the Father is not equal to himself but to the Son, and therefore equality in this way does not state a perfection simply; yet it does state a perfection which, in the case of every nature - when comparing it to something of the same nature -, is better than its opposite, because its opposite of necessity states imperfection; for no inequality in the same nature exists unless a second individual has the nature imperfectly. From the fact, then, that a relation can exist between supposits in that nature, an inequality of imperfection might exist in them because it might posit a diminished perfection in one of them; but equality of imperfection does not exist there, nay rather equality first requires perfection simply, because it first requires a nature that is perfect and that exists perfectly in each of the terms of the relation. And this is what Augustine says in his book On the Quantity of the Soul ch.9 n.15 when he speaks to the disciple: “Equality,” he says, “you rightly put before inequality, nor do I reckon there is anyone endowed with human sense to whom this would not be apparent.” This is indeed true, when making comparisons with things in the same nature; and things with which equality is compossible are simply more able to be perfect than things with which equality is not compossible, because in the latter case one or other of them is imperfect.
26. Next, as to the proof about perfection in creatures [n.2], - I reply that some things are necessary for perfection in creatures that do not state a perfection simply; and this is because creatures - being of themselves imperfect - cannot without these things have perfect perfection (as much perfection as they can have and of the sort they can have), and therefore these things in some way make up for the imperfection of creatures, as was said above in I d.7 n.64 where it was denied that the specific difference of anything was a perfection simply. Thus I say that limited perfection cannot be as great in one limited nature as it can be in several natures that are ordered; and so there an order of nature, that is an order of unequal perfection, is necessary for the greatest perfection they are capable of, - but it is not simply necessary for the greatest perfection, because that can exist in the most perfect unlimited nature, without an order of imperfection.
27. And if you argue that order belongs to perfection and that order seems to require inequality, - I make reply: I say that an order of origin stands along with perfection but that an order of inequality does not stand along with perfection. Therefore not every order belongs to perfection, but some order stands along with perfection in the same nature and some order does not.
28. To the third [principal argument, n.3] I say that sometimes equivalent opposite relations are founded on a common relation, just as if one were to speak of ‘the assimilating and the assimilated’. These state a relation of the active to the passive, founded on this common relation of ‘likeness’; for the assimilating is what causes likeness as the whiten-ing is what causes whiteness, and the assimilated is what is caused as to likeness just as the whitened is what is caused as to whiteness. There is here, then, a relation of active to passive in the assimilating and the assimilated, just as in the whitening and the whitened; but, in the case of the whiten-ing, that on which the relation of the active is founded is something absolute, but here - namely in the case of the assimilating - that on which the relation of the active is founded is the relation of equivalence. And such a name imports two relations of the following sort: one common and one of nonequivalence. As to the common relation, it exists in mutuality with the correlative of the relation; but it does not exist in mutuality with the correlative according to a relation of non-equivalence. - So also here, to be made co-equal imports the relation of the coequaled with the co-equaling, and so the equality is mutual; for the Son, who is made coequal with the Father, is equal with the Father and conversely. But the other relation, by way of what is passive, namely ‘to receive equality from another’, is not mutual but belongs precisely to the Son, and the opposite relation of non-equivalence - namely to make co-equal - belongs to the Father, that is ‘to give equality to the Son’. The image then [i.e. the Son] is equal, and conversely, but only the image is made co-equal in the sense of the two aforesaid relations.
Question Two. Whether each Person is in the other Person
29. Second I ask about the circumincession of the divine persons, whether each person is in the other.
And argument to the negative is:
That if anything whatever were in anything whatever (according to the position adopted by Anaxagoras) there would be the greatest confusion; therefore if the divine persons were in each other they would be in confusion - against this is the remark of Athanasius [Athanasian Creed] “not confusing the persons.”
30. There is also a confirmation of the argument, because an indivisible is not distinguished from an indivisible unless it is outside it, - which is proved by the Philosopher Physics 6.1.231b3-4 through the fact they would be one indivisible; therefore since the divine persons are indivisible, they would, if they were together, not be distinct.
31. Further, if any distinction stand along with the ‘being of person in person’, then composition would stand along with it also. Proof of the consequence: if there were something in deity that were not deity itself, then deity would be composite or compositional, - which is plain from Augustine City of God XI ch.10 n.1 (and it is put by Lombard in Sent. I d.8 ch.8 n.89): “Therefore God is simple because he is what he has, excepting that person is said relatively to another person and is not that person;” therefore if the person has something in itself which is not itself, it is composite or compositional, which is false and was refuted before [I d.2 nn.376-410, d.8 n.209].
32. Again, in the same thing in which there is the Son there is also filiation; in the Father there is the Son (on the supposition of circumincession); therefore in the Father there is filiation. And further, what there is filiation in that is the Son; therefore the Father is the Son.
33. Further, if the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, then the Father is in himself. The proof of the consequence is from the Philosopher Physics 4.2.209a33-35: “If air is in fire and fire is in the heaven, then air is in the heaven;” therefore by similarity here too. There is also a confirmation from the Philosopher’s remark in Categories 3.1b10-12: “whatever follows on the predicate follows on the subject,” and by the maxims [from Walter Burleigh and Nicholas Ambianensis] “whatever follows on the consequent follows on the antecedent” and “whatever antecedes the antecedent antecedes the consequent” and “what is prior to what is prior is prior to what is posterior” and “what is cause of the cause is cause of the caused” and the like.
34. Again, if the Father is in the Son, then God is in God; and then, further, God is distinct from God.
35. Again, what comes from something is not in that thing; but the Son came from the Father (as is said in John 16 v.28: “I came from the Father”); therefore etc .
36. To the opposite:
John 14 vv.10-11: “I am in the Father and the Father is in me,” - and the Master adduces authorities in the text, namely from Augustine and Ambrose and Hilary.
I. To the Question
37. The truth of this question [sc. circumincession, that one person is in another and conversely] is plain and certain from the authority of the Savior in John and in many places elsewhere, as well as of expositions of the saints [n.36]. But so that it can be in some way made intelligible, three things need to be seen: first about the mode in which person is in person, second what is the reason for this being in, and third whether this mode of being ‘in’ can be reduced to some mode of being ‘in’ found in creatures when speaking of the modes that the Philosopher lays down in Physics 4.3.210a14-24, or whether it could be made clear by some mode that could be found in creatures.
A. About the Mode in which a Person is in a Person
1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent
38. [Exposition of the Opinion] - About the first point [n.37] the statement [sc. of Henry] is of the following sort, that something’s being in another can be understood in two ways: by being in it ‘first’, that is, totally - the way wine is in a jug; or by being in it partially, and this in two ways: either such that a part is in another and is not anything of the other, as the foot of the bird is in the trap and is not anything of the trap (and for this reason the whole bird is said to be in the trap), or that a part of it is in another and is something of that other (and for this reason that of which it is a part is said to be in that other).a
a [Interpolation] just as if some monster, possessing two bodies and two heads, had only two feet, then one [body and head] would be said to be in the other [body and head] by that other’s foot, because the foot is a part of the other.
39. As to the proposition then [n.37], the statement [of Henry] is that the Father is not in the Son in the first way.
40. The proof given is threefold:
First, because everything whatever of that which is in another in the first way is equally first in it - just as if earth is first in the center, then any part whatever of earth, as far as concerns itself, is equally first in the center; therefore if the Father is first in the Son, everything whatever of the Father will be first in the Son, and so paternity will be as equally first in the Son as deity. And from this further: just as by deity the Son is God, so by paternity he will be Father, which is false
41. Second, because that in which something is first seems to surround it and penetrate and contain it; but that the same thing with respect to the same thing contains and is contained, surrounds and is surrounded, is unintelligible; therefore etc .
42. Therefore it is necessary that, just as in creatures something is said to be in another as a part and not first, so one person may be said to be in another as to something of itself; but not as to something of itself that is nothing of that in which it is, because that would be the personal relation of the in-being person, and that relation is not the reason whereby a person is in a person (as will be plain in the second article [nn.58-62], wherein I agree with Henry); therefore it is the essence which is in such way something of the inbeing person that it is something of that in which it is.
43. And the proof that it is by reason of this essence of the Son, which exists in the Father, that the Son is in the Father is that wherever the foundation of any relation is, there the relation founded on it is; therefore wherever the essence is on which filiation is founded, there filiation is.
44. A distinction, however, is made as to the person ‘which is in another’ and the person ‘which another is in’, because although the person ‘which is in another’ is placed in another not first but by something of itself, that is, by its essence [n.42], yet the person which it is in is what the other is in first, that is itself totally, because it is itself totally disposed in some way as the reason of that which is surrounding and containing deity, which, although it is not part of the in-being person, is yet something of the person.
45. [Rejection of the Opinion] - Against this opinion.
First: to be ‘in’, as everyone thinks, does not state something self-referred, because then the Father would be in himself; therefore it states the relation of a person to a person. Not the relation of origin, because that does not have the same idea in the extreme terms (while the persons are in each other uniformly, according to them [n.60]); therefore it states a common relation [n.6]. But a common relation in accord with the same idea of foundation is in the supposit that is referred and in the supposit that it is referred to, just as likeness requires the same idea of whiteness in the like thing that is referred and in the like thing it is referred to; therefore if that to which the in-being person is referred is first such as what that person is in itself, the consequence is that the in-being person will be related by this relation first through itself and not through something precisely of itself.a
a [Interpolation] this is plain in the example about a rivalry between a and b.
46. Secondly as follows: when something is said to be in another by a part, it is in it by a part in the same way as the part is in it ‘first’. An example: if a man is on the earth by his foot, just as the foot is located on the earth so the man is by a part located on the earth - but it is not the case that if the foot is there as by location, the man will be there as form in matter; so too if whiteness is in a man by a part, because it is in his face, then in the same way of being ‘in’ as to the category in which it is in the face first - to wit, as an accident in a subject - in that same way, I say, it is in the man by a part, because it is in him as in a subject. Therefore if the Son is in the Father because of the essence that is formally in the Father, the consequence is that the Son is in the Father formally as it were (although according to something of himself), which is not to be ‘in’ by way of circumincession [sc. one person being in another and conversely].
47. The response is made that the major premise [sc. when something is said to be in another by a part, it is in it by a part in the same way as the part is in it ‘first’] is true when speaking of that which is the proximate reason of something’s being ‘in’, but is not true of the remote reason; but the essence, as it is formally in the Father, is not the proximate reason of the Son’s being in the Father but the remote reason - the proximate reason, however, is that he falls under the property of the in-being person.
48. On the contrary. This response includes the proposed conclusion, because that is said to agree with the whole ‘first’ which does not agree with it according to any part of itself but according to what comes from all the parts of itself, in the case of creatures; therefore things are such here that, since - according to them [sc. Henry and his followers] - there is in the person only relation and essence, whatever belongs to a person not precisely by reason of one of these, but by reason of the essence together at the same time with the relation (and conversely), belongs to it first, because this states the person in its totality.
49. Further [i.e. thirdly], the property of a person, since it is incommunicable, does not belong formally to the essence (as: the essence does not beget nor is begotten, nor is it distinct or referred), and not the converse either (the property that belongs to the essence as it is communicable does not belong to the person, because this property is proper to the essence as essence is distinguished from person [I d.2 nn.389-390]), because essence is single in the three persons, but person in no way - neither first nor according to something of itself - is single in the three; therefore since this way of being ‘in’, by which the essence is in the Father as a quasi form (to wit, as that by which the Father is God), belongs in no way to the person, because it is proper to essence as essence is distinguished from person, therefore in no way will the Father be said by this to be in the Son, just as neither from the fact that ‘the Father is essence’ will the Father be the same as the Son.
2. Scotus’ own Opinion
50. As to this article [n.37] I say as follows, that a predicate belongs to the whole ‘first’ as ‘first’ is distinguished from that which is according to a part (as is said in Physics 5.1.224a21-34), because it does not belong to it precisely for the reason that it belongs to a part of it.52 And contrariwise, nothing is said to belong to any whole because of a part save what belongs to a part and is, through that part, said of the whole - as is plain from the Philosopher in the Physics [ibid.] in his example: “The man is healthy because his thorax is healthy;” the ‘to be healthy’ is said formally and first of the thorax, and by this it is said of the whole, of which whole the thorax is part.
51. A predicate that inheres first in some whole is sometimes in no part of that whole, and sometimes it is in some part of it.
52. An example of the first case: triangle is what first has angles equal to two right angles, and yet no part of the triangle (speaking of integral parts) has this predicate, namely ‘to have three angles equal etc.’; likewise man is what first is capable of laughter, and yet this property is not first in any part of man; and the composite is what is first generated, although no part of it [sc. form or matter] is first generated, speaking of this way ‘of that which is generated’; and so universally in all heterogeneous substances and their properties. And the reason is as follows, that the nature of such a subject is adequate to such a predicate, which adequacy is indicated by such primacy (as is plain from the definition of ‘universal’ in Posterior Analytics 1.4.73b32-33), and the nature of that adequate whole is not saved in any one part, and so its property does not belong to any one part of it.
53. An example of the second case [n.51] is: if fire is what is first hot, any part of fire whatever is hot. So too does the Philosopher in Physics 7.1.241b32-242a15 argue that no body can be moved by itself first, because then it would rest on the resting of a part; for it would not be first moved unless motion were in every part of it; for if motion were not in some part of it, motion would not be in the whole ‘first’. And so it is universally in homogeneous substances and their properties, because the nature to which first - that is, adequately - such property belongs is of the same nature in the part as in the whole; therefore a predicate adequate to such a nature is in every part in which that nature is, and in this way it belongs to a part.
It is not therefore because of the idea of primacy that a predicate - which belongs to the whole - must belong to the part, nay never should it for this reason belong to the part, but rather when the nature of the whole is the same in such whole and in its part.
54. As to the intended proposition [n.37] I say that this way of being ‘in’ [sc. circumincession] is not in the way that nature is in a supposit or form is in matter, but as a subsistent is in a subsistent, according to Hilary On the Trinity ch.7 n.41 when he speaks as follows: “The being-in is not as one thing is in another, the way body is in body, but it is to be the way that to subsist is in the subsistent, but to be in it such that it itself also subsist.” Now to subsist, that is, ‘to exist per se incommunicably’, belongs first to the person (for it is not said of the person because it is said of the essence or the relation), just as also ‘to act’ in the case of creatures, or ‘to be produced’, belongs first to the supposit of the whole (that is, does not belong to it because it belongs to a part). Therefore also ‘to be subsistently in’ belongs first to the person; for although the nature is first in the Father, as nature in a supposit, this however is not the subsistence or the in-being of a subsistent in a subsistent, but is precisely the in-being by which the whole Son by presence and intimately is in the whole Father; and to this alludes the remark of Ambrose in his hymn [Splendor of the Father’s Glory]: “The whole Son in the Father, and the whole Father in the Word.”
3. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Henry
55. And next to the arguments for the aforesaid opinion against this [n.51].
To the first [n.40] I say that the major premise is false in two ways:
First, because there is no need for the predicate that agrees ‘first’ with the whole to agree with any part (as is plain enough from the clarifications [nn.52, 54]), because its primacy is that of adequacy.
Second, because if it do agree with any part, or agree with the whole by reason of any part [n.50], it need not agree with a second part by reason of any part,a especially when the parts are not of the same idea in being integral to the whole [n.52]. It is just as if man is first rational because his specific difference (as ‘rational’) is said first of the species, and also man has first that act which agrees with rational animal insofar as it is rational, namely the act or understanding or reasoning; and yet this predicate [sc. rational] does not agree equally with each part of man, namely with soul and body; for perhaps it can be said formally of the soul and in no way of the body, but it is not said of man because it is said of his soul, because then it would agree with man as to a part, just as ‘to be tall’ agrees with man as to a part, because it agrees with him as to the body. Also if ‘to understand’ were to agree with each part in such a way that it could be said of the part, nevertheless each part is not equally disposed to that predicate as regard the inherence of the predicate in the ‘whole’; for the body is not the reason for the inherence of this sort of predicate in the way the soul is, and this because the parts - namely body and soul - are not parts possessed of the same idea in being integral to the whole, but one part is matter and the other form; for matter is not the reason for the operating of the whole, which is what operates first, in the way the form is.
a [Interpolation] and so it need not be the case that it agree equally with the parts because it is first present in the whole, because the parts in a whole are not equally cause of the property as it exists.
56. So it is then in the intended proposition [n.54, 37]: one should not concede that because ‘the Father is first in the Son’ therefore deity or paternity is in the Son in the same way of being ‘in’ [sc. the way of being ‘first’ in]; but if one do concede it, one should yet not concede it equally, because they [sc. deity and paternity] are not of the same idea in the person that includes them. And further, when it is argued ‘if they were equally in the Father, then if one of them were in him formally, the other would be too’ [n.40], - the argument is not valid, but there is a fallacy of equivocation, because when the ‘to be in the Father’ is taken in the antecedent it is taken as being in a subsistent by way of presence, while in the consequent a different mode of being ‘in’ is inferred [sc. the mode by way of informing], which mode is not formally this mode [sc. the mode by way of presence], although it is presupposed to this mode of being ‘in’; hence from a mode of being ‘in’ by way of presence a mode is concluded to that is ‘in’ by way of informing [sc. which is the fallacy of equivocation].
57. To the second [n.41] I say that it is not only contrary to the part about being ‘in’ first, but also contrary to the principal conclusion [sc. about being ‘in’ simply and not first]; for it seems in creatures as impossible that the same thing should with respect to the same thing contain and be contained, or should contain by reason of the whole and be contained by reason of a part, as that the same thing should first contain and be contained. And therefore I reply to the argument and say that this mode of being ‘in’ [sc.
circumincession] does not state containment but the presence of the subsistent in the subsistent, and it has the same idea in both of them, because just as this subsistent is present to that one so that one is present to this one.
B. What the Idea is of the Being in of the Divine Persons
58. As to the second article [n.37] I say that the reason for this being in is neither the essence nor the relation alone [n.42].
59. My proof of the first point [n.58] is that then the Father would be in himself, which is false in the way in which the Savior understands the Father to be in the Son and the Son in the Father [n.36], because this way of being in requires a real distinction.
60. My proof of the second point [n.58] is:
First that the relations of origin do not have the same idea in the related persons, and so if these were the formal reasons for the being ‘in’ of the persons in each other the persons would not be in each other uniformly, - which is contrary to what was before said [nn.54, 57].
Second that if per impossibile this God were to produce another God, this God would not be in that God, because - according to John Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.5 - if there were two Gods they could not be together at the same time, and so neither would be immense, and so neither would be God; and yet there would be a true relation of the producer to the produced.
Next, third, that if per impossibile there were two persons without origin, but if they had the same essence along with a real distinction, they would be in each other, because the essence of one person could not be in the other if the relation itself (which is altogether the same as the essence) were not in it, although in another way of being ‘in’, because what the foundation is in the relation is also in, even though one person would not be from the other in origin; therefore the relative property is not ‘in’ the cause.
Then, fourth, that in creatures there are truly relations of origin, of the thing that is a principle and of the thing that has a principle, and yet there - because of the diversity of nature in the things related - neither is in the other.
61. And from these arguments it follows that, since there is in the persons only essence and relation, according to the common opinion [e.g. of Henry of Ghent and Thomas Aquinas], therefore both of them will be the total reason for the being in [n.42].
62. And to understand how this is so, one can take an example about likeness in creatures: for according to Hilary ([On the Trinity III n.23] and it is set down in Lombard, Sent. d.31 ch.1 n.266), nothing is like itself but like another; yet likeness is founded on unity in quality, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.15.1021a11-12, the chapter ‘On Relation’; so neither the mere diversity of the related things, nor the mere unity of the foundation, suffices for likeness, but both are required per se as one total cause. - So it is here: neither the distinction between the person who is in another and the person in whom the other is, nor the unity of the essence by which they are in each other, is the whole reason for the being in, but both together are. Yet just as unity of foundation in the case of likeness is the more principal, and likewise the more immediate, reason than the distinction between the related things, so here unity of essence can be posited to be the more immediate and more principal reason for this being in than the distinction of the persons.
C. There is no Like Example in Creatures for the Being in of the Divine Persons
63. As to the third article [n.37] I say that this mode of being ‘in’ [sc.
circumincession] is not any of the modes that the Philosopher sets down in the Physics, -formally, I mean, because all those modes are based on the fact that the contained thing is something of the containing thing and not vice versa, or on the fact that something of the contained thing is something of the containing thing and not vice versa; neither of these accounts or ideas holds in the proposed case [sc. of circumincession], because diversity is there a greater reason for being ‘in’ than unity is. Therefore did Hilary well say, On the Trinity III n.1 (and it is set down in the text, Sent. I d.19 ch.4 n.172): “The nature of human intelligence cannot grasp the idea of this statement [sc. “I am in the Father and the Father is in me”], nor will human comparison provide any example for divine things.”
64. However, by taking what belongs to perfection in the case of creatures and by removing what belongs to imperfection, one can set down some examples of this mode of being ‘in’, at least imperfect ones and ones that imperfectly represent the mode:
First indeed from the flowing in of the divine essence in respect of creatures, which flowing in has the simultaneous concurrence of the divine nature’s immensity and its sustaining of things. Let then the idea of sustaining be removed from the flowing in, such that the idea of presence, because of the immensity, is preserved but without the idea of conservation or of the active power that pertains to sustaining; once this is removed then, just as God - because he is immense - is present to every creature, so too then is his presence to something understood without the fact of his sustaining it; and then, if a single nature is posited for that which is present and for that which it is present to, because of which single nature it must be present, then there will be an example for the proposed case about this way of being ‘in’.
65. Another example is from the soul not informing the body though being present to the body (as in the moment of death); or from an angel being present to a body but not informing it; or from a glorious body present to a non-glorious body, - or a better example, if a glorious body could exist in another glorious body that was equally subtle. In all these cases the being ‘in’ is that of a thing subsistent and present, but not by informing or by way of part; and if in these cases there is added unity of nature, which by necessity of nature requires such presence, there will be a more perfectly similar example.
66. There is also another example from the powers of the soul, which if they are posited as differing on the part of real existence and yet, along with this, as being really the same as the essence of the soul, then of necessity one will be in the other, because the essence of the soul, with which the power is identical, is in the other; therefore things in some way distinct will be really indistinct. If each of these distinct things were per se existent, a distinct subsistent will be in a subsistent by presence to it, and will be an example of being ‘in’.
67. On behalf of all these examples - and to make clear the two preceding articles [nn.61-63] - one can add that in this way of being ‘in’ each extreme is in the other according to the same idea of being ‘in’, because here what is being noted is mutual presence, not the containing of one extreme by the other. Just as when a body is understood to be in a place, this is in the way that a contained thing is in the containing thing; but if two bodies be understood to be in each other in the same place, this is according to the same idea or account, because the bodies are together and togetherness states the common relation of a single idea in both extremes; and if per impossibile place be removed and a simultaneous presence of bodies be posited, there will be the relation of a single account in the extremes, and each extreme will be in the other without one of them being contained by the other or both being contained by a third.
II. To the Principal Arguments
68. To the principal arguments [nn.29-35].
To the first [n.29] I say that there would be confusion if anything whatever were in another according to the opinion of Anaxagoras, because thus anything whatever would be in another thing as a part of it, the way the Philosopher seems to impute the opinion to him; but a person is not in a person as something of it; and so the conclusion does not follow.
69. When the reason is confirmed by the remark in the Physics 1.4.187b4-7 ‘about indivisibles’ [n.30], I reply that either it is false that ‘indivisibles of quantity are not distinct unless they differ by position’ (about which elsewhere, II d.2 p.2 q.5 nn.9-13), or, if it is true, it is not to the purpose, because the account that would hold in that case is not found in the divine persons, to whom position does not belong.
70. To the second [n.31] I say that deity is common to everything subsisting in the divine nature, and is a something of that which subsists in that nature, and therefore it could not really be distinct from another unless it were in some way compoundable with it, because that there be several things in some subsistent is not intelligible unless one of them is compoundable with the other; but the person is not a something of each thing that subsists in that nature, and therefore, although person is in person, yet there is no necessity that this person be that person or that it be compoundable with it in the way one has to say this about deity.
71. To the third [n.32] I say that when something abstract is said to be in something, either the virtue of the words denote that it is ‘in’ it the way a form is in the informed thing (as when it is said that ‘color is in the stone’), and they indicate that it is ‘in’ not as a part is in the whole but as a form is in the formed thing, and then the proposition ‘filiation is in the Father’ is to be denied, - and in that case the first consequence is not valid; or this denoting is not got from the virtue of the words but from use (as we say ‘heat is in light’ not in the way of being in a subject), and in that case one can concede this proposition ‘filiation is in the Father’ by taking the being ‘in’ for intimate in-being, as has already been said [n.54]. Nor does the further conclusion follow that ‘therefore the Father is the Son’ [n.32], but there is a fallacy of equivocation, by making an inference in the antecedent as if the ‘in’ there were taken after the manner of a form.
72. To the fourth [n.33] I say that that way of arguing holds when this sort of proposition is true (through which proposition the sort of arguing in question holds): ‘whatever has some relation to something has a like relation to that to which that something has such a relation’. This proposition is frequently true in the case of relatives where one of the things related is above in position and the other below,53 but it is not universally true. But I am not speaking of this now, because the argument here [sc. the fourth] proceeds of being ‘in’, which - as is assumed in the proposed case - indicates a common relation [n.45].
Therefore as far as the common relations are concerned I say that the proposition is universally false, to wit ‘whatever is like Socrates is like everything that is like Socrates’: for this proposition includes saying that something is like itself, because this falls under the universal quantifier ‘everything that is like’. But for the proposition to be true one must add this specification ‘everything other than himself that is like [Socrates]’; and then by virtue of this specifying proposition the sort of argument in question here holds in the direct sense forward but not in the converse sense backward, - I mean, the inference ‘Socrates is like Plato and Plato is like Socrates, therefore Socrates is like Socrates’ does not hold, for this proposition is false ‘whatever is like Socrates is like everything that is like Socrates’, unless one adds ‘everything other than himself that is like Socrates’, and then Socrates is not included under the universal quantifier ‘everything’, nor can the argument be made to go backward to Socrates54 but to go forward. Yet such an addition is still not enough for the truth of the proposition in question, nor for the efficacy of the argument in question, but one must add that the middle term - to which the extremes are compared - is limited as to the sort of idea of comparison in question, because it is not necessary that whatever is together with a be together with everything that a is together with (everything - I say - other than itself) if the a is unlimited, - because then someone existing at Paris would be together with someone existing at Rome, because they are both together with deity, which is immense and unlimited with respect to them. Nor even do all these additions suffice unless one add that the middle term not vary in its comparison with the extremes.
73. As to the proposed case, then, I say that the argument [n.33] is not valid because it argues by converting back and not by going directly forward; and the proposition confirming this sort of way of argument [sc. ‘whatever has some relation to something has a like relation to that to which that something has such a relation’] is false. The argument of the Philosopher, however, in the Physics [ibid.] holds because he only argues by directly going forward and by taking a middle term that is limited and not varied; but his argument is about relatives where one of the related things is above in position and the other below, hence it is not much to the purpose about the being ‘in’ of the proposed case as this case is talking of a common relation. In order, however, to make a brief remark about the relatives of disparity [sc. where one of the related things is above and the other below in position], I say that such a way of arguing generally fails to hold unless it is on the basis of prior and posterior, which is something pretty much common to all such relatives; for whatever is prior to the prior is prior to the posterior [n.33], - and, to speak more generally, ‘whatever has an order toward another has a like order to anything else that that other has a like order to’; this proposition is true in the case of essential order, when no special condition of order is understood (to wit, mediate, immediate, near, remote). Because, therefore, the being ‘in’ of air in fire states an essential order, and the being ‘in’ of fire in the heaven states a like order, so that consequence holds [n.33] by directly going forward, and that because it proceeds in accord with a general idea of order and does not specify a mediate or immediate order. Hence the inference ‘a is father of b, b is father of c, therefore a is father of c’ does not follow because ‘father’ denotes an immediate order to c as to a son; but the inference does well follow as it indicates paternity in general, to the extent that ‘father’ is extended to include grandfather and great-grandfather.
74. To the other argument [n.34] I concede that ‘God is in God’ and Hilary concedes it On the Trinity VII n.32. But when the inference is made ‘therefore God is distinct from God’ I deny the inference, because there is a fallacy of the consequent; for this preposition ‘in’ does not mark a power of confusedly embracing the whole of the term whose case it governs (nor does it have this power), and so the term whose case it governs can stand for some determinate supposit indeterminately; but ‘to be distinct’ distributes the term of this relation [sc. the relation of being distinct] confusedly and distributively, because of the negation it includes, and therefore the term of this relation [of being distinct] is not inferred from the term governed by the proposition ‘in’, - just as, for a like reason, the inference does not follow that ‘God generates God, therefore God is distinct from God’.
75. To the final argument [n.35] I say that the Son’s from the Father is the procession of the produced from the producer, but is not a diversity in nature; such a coming from in no way prevents that which comes-from remaining in that from which it comes, because it receives the same nature as what it proceeds from has.