I. Opinion of Others

241. [Exposition of the Opinion] - An opinion that rests on the arguments given for the first part [nn.235-239, the opinion of Godfrey] seems to say that, when one removes the form from a subject, there is not, because of the added reality, a more and a less in the form in itself; and because one must, according to the authorities, preserve there a more and less in some way, one must posit them there according to the existence of the accident in the subject itself (which indeed is to be existent in the subject’s existence), and so a more-ness as to existence is attributed either to a greater disposition of the subject or to a greater removal of the opposite indisposition.

242. [Rejection of the Opinion] - Against this position I argue first as follows: contraries when extreme cannot coexist in the same thing, but they can when in mild degrees.a But this is only because there is something in the intense degree that is not in the mild one; for if the whole reality that is in the mild degree is in the intense one, then there is no repugnance between the mild and intense degree. - But this inability to coexist, or incompossibility, is not a relation to the subject nor is it from any relation to the subject; for the incompossibility of forms in themselves is prior to the incompossibility of forms in some third thing, as in the subject that receives them (for it is because they are incompossible in themselves that they cannot be received in the same subject, - not contrariwise). Therefore that which is the reason for their incompossibility in intense degrees is something in them that is positive in itself and not only in order to a subject.

a [Interpolation] that is, hot and cold when extreme but not when in milder degree (the thing is plain, because when the hot or the movement of the hot or of heat are made mild, the movement of cold is made more intense, and conversely).

243. Further, the same thing cannot be produced twice, and consequently some reality cannot be acquired by some change; therefore the reality that is acquired by movement or change in intensity is not the same in positive being as that which existed before, because then that which was before would be really acquired.a

a [Interpolation] I make this supposition [sc. that the same thing cannot be produced twice]: again I make supposition that a real motion or change is impossible without a real term. From this I argue as follows: in the increase of charity the lesser charity is the term ‘from which’ and the greater charity is the term ‘to which’, and this is a real production; therefore it is, in accord with the second supposition, necessarily toward some real term: not to the reality that altogether preceded, because the same thing cannot be produced twice, and the preceding reality was the term of a different production; therefore to another reality.

244. Further, if the form is indivisible it gives indivisible being to the subject and does so indivisibly; for the subject is not of such a sort in form save because the form is of such a sort; therefore if the form is of such a sort in itself, there is no more-ness of perfection to it, and the subject that accords with it will not be said to be more such in accord with it.a

a [Interpolation] for it is because the form is such that what has it is said to be such in accord with it. Therefore if the form is indivisible in itself, it is impossible that the subject could be more or less in accord with it; for it is contradictory that a ‘form in itself’ be indivisible and yet that the subject be divisible in accord with it.

245. Further, against these modes whereby more and less are posited in forms [n.241]. First against the mode about the disposition [sc. of the subject] to more and less:

For if there is the same disposition - that is, same in idea of being one - to more and less, and if that disposition is the form, the result is that there is more and less in some form.a If then in some form there is a disposition to more and less but not according to the idea of being one disposition, as some want to say becauseb humidity in air is a disposition to greater heat and dryness in fire is a disposition to greater heat,c - against this I argue: one species, taken in its totality, seems to have, in what is susceptible to it, the idea of one disposition.d Further,e then there will not be one motion from an intense to a mild degree, nor conversely; for nothing will be moved to a mild degree save what has a disposition agreeing with the reception of that mild degree; but an intense degree does not have the disposition that agrees with a mild degree; therefore, in order for it to be moved to a mild degree, it must be moved to a disposition agreeing with a mild degree -and thus, in order for the mild degree to come to exist from the intense degree, there must first be a motion from the disposition that is to the intense degree to a disposition that is to the mild degree, and sof there will never be one motion from an intense to a mild degree, because they do not have the same immediate susceptive subject agreeing with each disposition.

a [Interpolation] Again, against their mode [sc. Godfrey’s] of positing more and less in the case of a form, and first against the mode about disposition of the subject, on account of which the form will be said to receive more and less; that disposition either is some form or it is not. If it is a form, and the subject is said to be more or less disposed according to it, the proposed conclusion follows, that in some form there is more and less.

b [Interpolation] If the disposition is not a form according to which the subject is said to be more such but it is some other form, then the subject will be said to be more such according to that form because of some preceding disposition, - and then one must ask about that disposition whether it is some form or not, and so there will either be a process to infinity in dispositions or a more and less in some form in itself must be granted. Again, there must first be a disposed subject before it may be moved to the term of the motion, because nothing is moved to anything save what is disposed to receiving that thing; since therefore in every motion, in the term of it, something is acquired that was not there before at the beginning of the motion, the consequence is that something is acquired in the term of the motion other than the sole idea of disposition. - He says [sc. Godfrey] that more and less are in diverse subjects because of diverse dispositions, not dispositions of the same idea but of contrary idea, just as fire is said to be more hot than air, because...

c [Interpolation] and therefore that more-ness is not in any single disposition.

d [Interpolation] hence all individuals of one disposition of accident have a disposition of one idea just as they also have a form of the same idea; therefore, when everything else is taken away that is not the proper disposition, there can be more and less in individuals of the same species and so an intensity and a mildness in the form of that species without any such contrary or opposite dispositions preceding them in the subjects. Then the question is asked, as before, why something is more disposed now than it was before, as was argued [in interpolations a. and b. just above].

e [Interpolation ] if such opposed dispositions precede, to more and to less...

f [Interpolation] and so, in order for the intense degree to become mild, there must first be a movement from the disposition that is in the intense degree to a disposition agreeing with the mild degree before the mild degree may come to be from the intense degree, and conversely, - which is impossible, because then.

246. The other way, which speaks of disposition or of removal of the contrary indisposing factor [n.241], seems to be refuted by the fact that in angels in the state of innocence there was not a greater or lesser disposition toward charity; therefore all would have received an equal charity, which is not what is maintained.a

a [Interpolation] Again, the good angels did not in meriting have any indisposition, and yet they did not have equal charity; hence this does not follow, that ‘any angel in the same species is equally disposed to grace, therefore any angel has grace equally’.

247. Also a third way - which is held by some people - about ‘the rooting down of the form in the subject’ seems to be refuted by the fact that this rooting down is either some absolute form (and the proposed conclusion is obtained, because in such a form there is a more and a less), or not. If not but there is only a respect, then it seems they cannot have a more and a less save by a more and a less in the foundation, just as absolutes do not agree in respect save in their foundation.

248. Then too a more intense form is not properly saved,a because when a form is less rooted in a subject it can in itself be more intense; just as redness from shame can be more intense than a redness that is a quality able to be received in another.

a [Interpolation] Again, this mode does not save the fact that one form is more intense than another.