C. To the Principal Arguments

171. To the principal arguments [nn.1-6].

To the first [n.1] I say that the argument of Augustine holds as follows: ‘everyone who loves his neighbor loves his own love formally, if he turns himself toward it; but everyone who loves his own love formally loves the Holy Spirit who is by essence love; therefore everyone who loves his brother loves the Holy Spirit who is by essence love’. -The second proposition in order here (which however would be the major if one arranges it in a syllogism) is proved as follows, that everyone who loves a lesser good in an ordered way ought to love more some greater good, especially when the reason for lovability in the lesser good is only from the greater good; but my love is formally a lesser good than the love by essence that is the Holy Spirit, and in particular it gets from that love its own reason of lovability. The reasoning of Augustine,     therefore , has to be reduced to two syllogisms as follows: ‘he who loves his love-act loves love by essence; but he who loves his neighbor loves his love-act; therefore he who loves his neighbor loves love by essence. But God is this sort of love; therefore etc     .’Text cancelled by Scotus: “This argument of Augustine, then, proves that God is to be loved and yet not that he is my love formally, nor that there is in me another love formally. Two arguments must, indeed, be understood in Augustine’s argument, one of which is: ‘he who loves his brother loves the love by which he formally loves; but that love is participated love; therefore he loves participated love’. Further, the other syllogism is: ‘he who loves participated love ought to love love by essence; God is love by essence; therefore etc.’ ²⁶

172. About his second argument, namely about the most excellent gift [n.2], one could say that the argument holds as follows: ‘no created gift is more excellent than created charity, therefore charity is perfection simply, and includes of its nature no imperfection or limitation’. - The proof of this consequence is that more eminent than any gift which is not perfection simply is some other gift in creatures that is perfection simply. Further: every perfection simply belongs more formally to the Holy Spirit from his being himself the simply most excellent gift, and thereby from God being so (because God can give himself), and so the most excellent gift is God; therefore the Holy Spirit, from his being the simply most excellent gift, is every perfection simply. But there stands along with this the fact that this ‘perfection simply’ is participated in by us and is essentially other than the divine person who is perfect by this perfection simply.

173. Absolutely, then, the arguments of Augustine [nn.1-2] presuppose [nn.171-172] that God is formally charity and love, - not only effectively, as ‘hope’ or ‘my patience’ is so effectively, because it effects patience as a non-perfection simply, and so as not agreeing with itself formally; but he effects in the soul charity - and love - as a perfection simply, and therefore as agreeing with himself formally. In this way he in one way makes humanity in a man and in another way goodness; from the fact, to be sure, that he makes humanity it does not follow that he is formally man, but only that he is effective cause of man; but from the fact that he causes goodness it does follow that he is formally goodness, - and the reason is that every perfection simply that exists in the caused thing is reduced to a cause that formally possesses that perfection. It is not so with a limited perfection.Tr. In this way Scotus shows and preserves the truth in Platonism that good things are good by participation in the perfect form of goodness but not that men are men by participation in some perfect form of man. ²⁷

174. But what do these authorities [nn.1-3], so understood [n.173], do for the proposal of the Master [nn.165-170]?

I reply that the habit by which the soul is inclined toward meritoriously loving is a perfection simply, insofar as the ‘perfection simply’ belongs to the Holy Spirit; it follows therefore that this habit could be an immediate habit with respect to the love that is perfection simply, and hereby the Holy Spirit - as indwelling through this habit - more immediately causes that act of love than do acts of believing and hoping, with respect to which acts there cannot be any proximate cause that is perfection simply.

175. But against this response there is the following argument:

First, that the proposition on which it relies is false, namely that ‘more eminent or more perfect than any perfection non-simply in creatures is some perfection simply’ [n.172]; for it seems to have an instance against it in the case of the essence of the supreme angel, which is not a perfection simply and yet nothing more noble than it seems to exist in the whole of creation.

176. Besides, the intention and reason of Augustine seem badly adduced for the intention of the Master [n.174], because from the first reason [n.1] is had that the Holy Spirit is formally love by essence [n.171], and from the second [n.2] - if it is valid - is had that the Holy Spirit is formally charity by essence [n.172]. How then from this is it inferred that there is not in us some habitual love, or charity, different from the habit by which the Holy Spirit is said to indwell? The habit indeed by which the Holy Spirit indwells is either not a perfection simply but some limited perfection, - or, if it is, there does not fail to follow that a habit other than it could be posited as the proximate principle for eliciting my act of meritoriously loving, for that act is limited and a limited ‘perfection’; one cannot speak about the reason of Augustine otherwise for the proposal of the Master.No response was given by Scotus to these two objections [nn.175-176]. ²⁸

177. To the other argument [n.9] it is plain how charity is a good by participation from I d.8 n.213, where it was expounded how a simple form participates its own cause.