IV. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others on the Question

51. To the reasons for the first opinion [n.35].

To the first [n.36] I say that the relation remains there both according to quiddity and according to being. For in whatever way it remains according to quiddity, in that way it remains according to the being of that which is ‘being toward another’, because the quiddity of relation cannot be without ‘being toward another’, because by understanding a relation without ‘being toward another’ one understands not a relation but something absolute, because - according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.8 n.9 - if it is toward another it is not substance, and so if it is substance or toward itself, it is now not relation; for in whatever way the relation passes into essence, the being and the quiddity pass into it, because just as ‘being toward another’ - which is the being of relation - is truly the same as the essence, so also the quiddity of the relation is the same as the essence; for nothing is there which is not the same. Therefore both the being and the quiddity remain, because relation is not formally the divine essence, because, as Augustine says On the Trinity V ch.2 n.1: “he is not Word by that which he is wisdom;” but both pass into the essence because, along with the fact that they are not formally the same, they are truly the same, as has often been said [I d.2 n.410, d.4 n.10, d.5 nn.43-45, 117-118, 138].

52. When, therefore, you say ‘it is distinguished either according to its quiddity or according to its being’ [n.36], - I say that it is distinguished according to quiddity and according to ‘being toward another’. And when you say ‘thus it passes into essence, therefore it does not thus distinguish’ [ibid.], the consequence is not valid, because it passes according to identity, because true identity does not have to be formal identity, because the formal idea of that which passes is not formally the idea of the essence into which it passes; and therefore to this formal idea belongs what is proper to it; but it is proper to it to be distinguished really from every relation, both an opposite one and a disparate one incompossible with it, and therefore, along with the fact that it truly passes, it truly remains, as much as is sufficient for being really distinguished both from the opposite relative and also from a disparate relation incompossible with it.

53. To the second, when the two properties in the Father are talked of [n.37], the response is in distinction 2 question 3 [I d.2 nn.221-237]. For there need not be as much distinction or incompossibility of active productions as of passive productions, because it is incompossible for the same thing to be produced by, and to receive being from, two opposite productions [ibid. n.357]; but it is not incompossible for the same thing to communicate being to distinct persons by two active productions.