C. Scotus’ own Opinion

24. As for this article [nn.15] I say differently that the first correlative for active power is the possible, - not taken generally, the way the possible is opposed to the impossible, because in this way God’s existence is possible; the possible then, as it is the correlative of active power, must be taken more determinately. But this correlative seems only to be what accords with how Avicenna takes the possible, Metaphysics VI chs.1, 3 (91va, 93rb) and elsewhere, VIII chs.4, 5 (99rb, 99vb), I ch.7 (73rab), in the way that what is opposed to the possible is the of itself necessary. And then, since anything intrinsic to God is in itself formally necessary (or exists by identity with the essence, which essence is formally necessary), nothing intrinsic to God will be the term of active power properly stated; and if so, since the three persons possess the same idea of principle with respect to everything other than the divine essence, because the principle of producing creatures is understood first to be communicated to the three persons before the principle is able to have the act of producing those other things, - the consequence is that the power of the three persons is equal as to number of possibles.

25. Now the assumption [sc. ‘the principle of producing creatures is understood firsts’] is made clearer in the question ‘On the Order of Extrinsic Productions to the Intrinsic Ones’ [II d.1 q.1 nn.8-11, 22].

26. It is also plain, in brief, from the fact that a principle necessary in respect of one production and contingent in respect of a second production is first a necessary principle of producing before it is a contingent one; now whatever be the principle of producing the persons, it is necessarily related to the production of them, but the principle of producing creatures is contingently related to the creatures themselves; therefore it is communicated to the three persons first before it can have an act with respect to possible things outside it.

27. Hereby it is apparent that power in the divine persons is equal not only as to extent but also as to intensity; for if power be taken for what is absolute (namely for the foundation of the relation of the principle), it is plain that it is in the three to the same magnitude, not only to same magnitude ‘in a certain respect’ but also to the same magnitude ‘simply’, as was said in the preceding question ‘About Equality of Magnitude’ [I d.19 nn.13-14]; or if it be taken for the relation (which is founded on what is absolute), then there is the same relation in the three and, if the relation has any magnitude, the magnitude of the relation is the same in the three, and so there is an equality of power in every way, both in extent and in intensity.

28. Now as to what is said about the first correlative of active power, which is the possible [n.24], one must understand it of the objectively possible (namely the object which is the term of the power), not of the subjectively possible, because the subjectively possible is not a convertible correlative in respect of active power; for not every active power has something that is thus [sc. subjectively] possible corresponding to it, but only that active power does which is transformative.Tr. An active power that transforms or changes things has a subject that it acts on and an object that is the term of its acting on the subject (as fire acts on a cold thing as subject and has heat as the object which it brings about in that cold thing and which is the term of its acting on that cold thing); but an active power can have an object it produces without having a subject which it transforms or changes in producing it, as is precisely true of the power of producing persons in divine reality or of producing creatures ex nihilo. ⁵⁶ The objectively possible then is, as correlative, equal to the active power, but the subjectively possible is not - and such an objectively possible is the possible that Avicenna was adduced for [n.24], namely the one that is opposed to the of itself formally necessary.

29. But that the objectively possible differs from the of itself formally necessary, or from the producer, may be confirmed from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.1.1013a17, where he intends it to be the case that principle and cause are really convertible; but everything caused is other than its cause, therefore the possible too (that is, the thing that has a principle) is other - according to him - than the principle.

30. There is a confirmation too from the idea of active power set down in Metaphysics 5.12.1019a15-16, 19-20, that it is “a principle of transforming that which is other, or insofar as it is other;” therefore much more is it a principle of producing what is other, because a caused thing cannot be as identical with the cause as the active can be identical with the passive in creatures.

31. But in that case there is a doubt how the power of generating may be called a ‘power’, since, according to what has been said [nn.24-30], it has no respect to anything possible.

I reply. The possible can be taken in a still more extensive way than as it is opposed to the of itself necessary, namely by saying that that is possible which is opposed to the by itself necessary - and in this way everything that is originated would be possible, but neither the saints nor the philosophers seem commonly to speak thus. And it is in this way that the Son could be conceded to be possible, because he is originated, and so the active power corresponding to this term is a ‘power’. However, the Son is more truly conceded to be something from a principle and not to be something possible; still there is conceded to be in the Father an active power of generating, because active power in creatures asserts a certain perfection - though the possibility corresponding to it, because it is repugnant to of itself necessity, asserts an imperfection; so the name for that which asserts perfection is transferred [sc. to God], but the name for the other correlative -which asserts imperfection - is not transferred in itself but in something more common than itself, so that in this way power is said to exist on the part of the producer and yet possibility is not said to exist on the part of the produced but only the idea of being from a principle.

32. Hence is apparent the irrationality of the saying that ‘under omnipotence, by virtue of the word, there is contained the power of generating, though not according to the usage of the saints’, because although the saints or the doctors sometimes say that ‘the power of generating is a power’ and that ‘to generate is the term of a power’, yet by virtue of the word neither is simply true but only when applying the idea of power to the idea of principle insofar as principle commonly has regard to that which can come from a principle.

33. By speaking in this way I reply to the question about the equality of power in the divine persons, - and I say that they are equal even in this way, because according to the Master in distinction 7 of this book [I d.7 ch.2 n.77] ‘by the same power by which the Father can generate the Son can also be generated’; but then this equality of power is not relative to the same thing; just as, if one were to posit an equality of power in color for affecting sight and in savor for affecting taste, these two would indeed have equal power yet they would not have the same power, nor relative to the same thing. Thus it is in the case of the issue at hand: when speaking of power in this way - extending it to the notional act - Father and Son are equal in power both in extent and in intensity, because the power that is in the Father for the act of generating is equally perfect in the Son and in relation to equal objects; yet it is not in this way altogether the same power the way a power is the same that has regard to what is possible - and in this respect one should concede that not every power is in the Son, or that there is not in him power for every possible, taking power in this extended way [sc. so as to include the notional act], although there is in him the omnipotence that means power as to all possible things.

34. And if you ask ‘if there is in the Father and the Son the same absolute reality on which a power equal in extent and in intensity is founded, even as to power that is inwardly directed, why is not every power the same in both of them?’ - I reply: I say that although the same absolute reality, which is the power, is in the Father and the Son, yet it is not in each of them under the idea of power as far as the notional act is concerned, because it is not under the idea of what is prior to act, and power or principle requires the order of priority to a term.