B. To the Reasons for the Intention of the Philosophers

302. To the arguments posited for the philosophers [sc. that the first cause necessarily causes, nn.259-262].

To the first, about ‘the things that divide being’ [n.259], I say that ‘necessary’ is a more perfect condition (than ‘possible’) in any being for which the condition of necessity is possible; but it is not more perfect in that being with which it is not compossible, because a contradiction does not posit any perfection, and this is not from its own nature but from the nature of the being with which it is repugnant. And so I say that necessity is repugnant in every respect to what is posterior, because, from the fact that every posterior is non-necessary, the first thing cannot have a necessary relation to any of them.

303. And when you say that ‘all of the more perfect dividers of being are concomitant with each other’ [n.260], I say that this is true of the dividers that state a perfection simply and in themselves (as are act, infinity, and the like), but not of those that state a respect to something posterior, because to have a necessary relation to something of that sort is not a mark of perfection, because it does not stand with the perfect necessity of that which is said to have such a relation; the confirmation of this is that such a relation is not formally infinite, although however infinity is the more noble extreme in the division of being.

304. To the other remark, when it is said ‘if it causes naturally, it would necessarily cause and would then give necessity to the product     etc .’ [n.261], I say that it does then follow that it would cause necessarily, just as from an antecedent that includes incompossibles follows a consequent that includes incompossibles; for in the antecedent that mode ‘naturally’ is repugnant to ‘what it is to cause’, because ‘to cause’ states the production of something diverse in essence, and so of something contingent, but ‘naturally’ states a necessary mode of causing and thus a mode of causing in respect of something necessary; and therefore      the consequent follows which includes two opposites at the same time, by reason of the causation and of the mode of causing. It is in this way that the first proposition is true. - And when you add ‘no perfection is taken from the caused because of the more perfect mode of causing of the cause itself’, I concede it; nor does the mode of causing ‘voluntarily’ take from the causable any perfection that is possible for it, but it takes necessity from the causable (which is in itself a perfection, but one incompossible with the causable), and it gives the caused the perfection compossible with it, just as ‘voluntarily’ in creation states a mode compossible with causation.

305. By this is apparent the response to the confirmation about the many producible differences of being [n.261]; I say that causable being cannot have those several differences, necessary and possible, but every causable being is only possible; and therefore it is not a mark of perfection in the cause to be able to cause those several differences, because there is no power for what is impossible, - likewise, if it were per impossibile to cause necessarily, it would also therefore necessarily not cause several differences of being, because it would produce only necessary things and not contingent ones.

306. To the final one [n.262] I say that no natural connection of cause and caused is simply necessary in creatures, nor does any second cause cause simply naturally or simply necessarily but only in a certain respect. The first part is clear, because any second cause depends on the relation of the first cause to the caused; likewise, no second cause causes save by the first cause causing the caused along with it, and this naturally before the proximate cause causes; but the first cause only causes contingently, therefore the second cause causes simply contingently because it depends on the causation of the first, which causation is simply contingent. The second part, namely about necessity in a certain respect, is plain, because many natural causes, as far as concerns themselves, cannot not cause their effects, and so there is necessity in a certain respect - namely as far as concerns themselves - and not simply; just as fire, as far as concerns itself, cannot not heat, yet, with God cooperating, it can absolutely not heat, as is clear, and as was clear about the three boys in the furnace [Daniel 3.49-50].