The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus :: Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 4 to 10. ::

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Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 4 to 10.

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translator's preface

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book one. distinctions 4 - 10

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fourth distinction. first part. on the predication of otherness in divine generation

single question. whether this proposition is true ‘god generates another god’

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fourth distinction. second part. on the predication of the name of god in the divine persons

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single question. whether this proposition is true ‘god is father and son and holy spirit’

I. to the question

II. to the principal argument

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appendix. [ reportatio IC d.4 q.1] fourth distinction. first part.

single question

second part. single question

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fifth distinction. first part. on the generation of the divine essence

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single question. whether the divine essence generates is or generated

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I. to the question

a. opinion of abbot joachim against peter lombard

b. against the opinion of abbott joachim

C. for the opinion of peter lombard

II. to the principal arguments

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fifth distinction. second part. on the generation of the son

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single question. whether the son is generated from the substance of the father

I. the opinion of others

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II. scotus’ own response to the question

a. the son is not generated from the substance of the father as from matter or quasimatter

b. the son is truly from the substance of the father

C. how relation and essence can exist in the same person

III. to the arguments of the opinion of others

IV. to the arguments

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sixth distinction

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single question. whether god the father generated god the son by will

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I. to the question

a. how the father generates the son willingly

b. how the father does not generate the son by will as by productive principle

II. to the principal arguments

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seventh distinction

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question 1. whether the power of generating in the father is something absolute or a property of the father

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I. the opinions of others

a. first opinion

b. second opinion

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II. to the question

a. on the distinction of powers

b. the father’s power of generating is something absolute

C. to the form of the question

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III. to the arguments

a. to the principal arguments

b. to the arguments against the first opinion

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question 2. whether there can be several sons in divine reality

I. the opinions of others

II. to the question

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eighth distinction. first part. on the simplicity of god

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question one. whether god is supremely simple

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I. to the question

a. proof of the simplicity of god through particular middle terms

b. proof of the simplicity of god through common middle terms

II. to the principal arguments

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question two. whether any creature is simple

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I. to the question

a. the opinion of others

b. scotus’ own opinion

II. to the arguments

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question three. whether along with the divine simplicity stands the fact that god, or anything formally said of god, is in a genus

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I. first opinion

a. exposition of the opinion

b. reasons against the opinion

C. to the arguments for the opinion

II. second opinion

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III. scotus’ own opinion

a. proof of the first part of the opinion

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b. proof of the second part of the opinion

1. by the reasons of augustine and avicenna

2. by what is proper to god

3. statement and refutation of some people’s proof

IV. to the arguments for the second opinion

V. to the principal arguments

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question four. whether along with the divine simplicity can stand a distinction of essential perfections preceding the act of the intellect

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I. the opinions of others

a. first opinion

b. second opinion

II. to the question

III. to the principal argument

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appendix. [ reportatio IC d.8 p.1 q.3] eighth distinction. first part.

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eighth distinction. second part. on the immutability of god

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single question. whether only god is immutable

I. god is simply immutable

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II. nothing else besides god has immutability

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a. of the intention of the philosophers

1. the opinion of henry of ghent

2. scotus’ own opinion

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b. reasons for and against the true intention of the philosophers

1. reasons on behalf of this intention

2. reasons against this intention

C. scotus’ own opinion

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III. to the arguments

a. to the principal argument

b. to the reasons for the intention of the philosophers

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ninth distinction

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single question. whether the generation of the son in divine reality is eternal

I. solution of the question

II. to the principal arguments

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tenth distinction.

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single question. whether the holy spirit is produced through the act and mode of the will

I. solution of the question

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a. response of henry [of ghent] to the two first doubts

b. against the response of henry

C. scotus’ own response

III. to the principal arguments

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appendix. scotus’ extended annotation to n.41

[from the cambridge reportatio ]

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appendix. distinction 3 from the commentary on the sentences by antonius andreas

question one. whether god can be naturally known by the intellect of the wayfarer

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question two. whether god is the first thing naturally known by the wayfarer

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response to questions one and two

to question one

to the arguments

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to question two

to the arguments

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question three. whether god is the sufficient object of our intellect

to the question

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question four. whether some sound and certain truth can be known by the intellect of the wayfarer without special illumination from the uncreated light

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to the question.

henry of ghent’s answer

andreas’ own answer

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question five. whether a trace or footprint of the trinity is found in all creatures

to the question

to the arguments

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question six. whether in intellectual nature taken properly there is memory properly, that is an intellect possessing an intelligible species naturally prior to the act of understanding

to the question

to the arguments

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question seven. whether the intellective part of the soul taken properly, or some part of it, is the whole cause, or the whole principle of generating, which generates actual knowledge

to the question

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question eight. whether the more principal cause of generated knowledge is the object in itself or present in the species or the intellective part of the soul

to the arguments

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question nine. whether the image of the trinity exists in the mind distinctly

to the question

to the arguments

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All Collections > The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus > Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 4 to 10. > book one. distinctions 4 - 10 > eighth distinction. second part. on the immutability of god > single question. whether only god is immutable > I. god is simply immutable

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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus

Ordinatio. Book 1. Distinctions 4 to 10.

Book One. Distinctions 4 - 10

Eighth Distinction. Second Part. On the Immutability of God

Single Question. Whether only God is Immutable

I. God is Simply Immutable

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I. God is Simply Immutable

226. The affirmative part of this question [the negative part begins n.230] is proved by the Philosopher Physics 7.1.242a13-20, 242b18-10, through the fact that “everything that is moved is moved by another;” the proof of which is that “when the part rests, the whole rests,” and it is not possible to proceed to infinity in things moved by another, because then an infinite movable could be made from them which would be moved in a finite time (which is rejected in Physics 8.10.266a25-b6, and before in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.152]); therefore one must make a stand at some mover which is not moved by another, and which consequently is altogether unmoved.

227. The same conclusion is also proved by him in Physics 8.4.255b31-5.256a21 through a division of movers and things moved naturally or violently, and because one must ultimately make a stand at some mover which is not moved of itself ‘per se and first’, and must also ultimately make a stand at something simply unmovable.

228. But these processes (which are the principal ones in two books, namely books 7 and 8 of the Physics) need a greater exposition so as to show that the reasonings are valid, and if perhaps they are valid, yet they have a diminished conclusion, as will be shown elsewhere [II d.2 p.2 q.6 nn.10-15]; perhaps they entail no more than that the First thing is not moved as a body, or as a virtue in a body, in the way the soul is moved per accidens in the moved body.

229. Therefore, without pausing now to make these reasonings clear, I show briefly the affirmative part from the simplicity of God: for because God is perfectly simple (as was proved from his infinity [nn.17-19]), therefore he cannot be changed to any form that is received in himself; also because he is necessary existence (as was proved from the primacy of his efficient causality in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.70]), therefore he cannot be changed from being to not-being or from not-being to being, which change is called ‘turning’ by Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.3. Therefore God is said to be simply immutable in respect of any change, whether substantial or accidental.

I. God is Simply Immutable