B. Reasons against the Opinion

51. Against this position [n.44] there are two reasons,Note by Scotus: “For the commonness of being, besides the two argument of distinction 3 and their confirmations [I d.3 nn.27, 30, 35], there are these: comparison in being [n.83] (a); number of any beings whatever, and that the determinable of that which is ‘other’ is common to both the others [n.84] (b); Aristotle Metaphysics 2.1.993b23-29 [n.79] (c); Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.4 n.6 [n.71] (d); the confirmation that God is not called a stone [n.74] (e); Anselm On Free Choice ch.1 [n.72] (f); Dionysius On the Divine Names ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7 [n.73] (g); the masters [n.72] (k); against the one holding this opinion [sc. Henry of Ghent, nn.44, 53-54] (h).” ⁴⁷ which were touched on above in distinction 3 in the aforesaid question [I d.3 n.35, 27].

[First reason] - One reason is ‘that this concept proper to God could not naturally be caused in our intellect’; for whatever is naturally a mover of our intellect for the present state, whether the agent intellect or a phantasm or an intelligible species of the thing, has for adequate effect causing in us a concept of the quiddity and of what is contained essentially or virtually in such quiddity; but that proper concept is contained in neither way in the quiddity, neither essentially nor virtually (that it is not essentially is plain, because it denies univocity, - that not virtually because the more perfect is never contained in the less perfect); therefore etc.That is, since we could never naturally get this concept proper to God, we do not now have it, and so we do not now have a concept of God that is proper to God and not univocal with creatures; therefore any concept of God we do now have cannot be proper but must be univocal with creatures. ⁴⁸

52. The response of some peopleProbably Richard of Conington, according to the Vatican Editors, who give references to Robert of Walsingham, John Baconthorp, Giles of Nottingham, and Giles of Alnwick. ⁴⁹ is that the being which is thought on causes knowledge of itself insofar as it is a being which is thought on (that is, insofar as it is a being related to the first being), and so to conceive it under that idea is not to conceive it under an absolute idea, but under an idea related to the first being; but the relation has to cause in the intellect a correlative concept, or a concept of the corresponding relation -and although the corresponding relation is not conceived of ‘as subsisting in itself’, yet it will be conceived in some way by virtue of the foundation of that relation.The relation corresponding to the relation of the thought-on being to the first being will, of course, be the relation of the first being to the thought-on being. Hence (or so goes the theory) to think this correlative relation is to think the first being as in some way the foundation of the relation, and so to have a non-univocal concept of this first being. ⁵⁰

53. Against this argument [n.51] the fact seems to stand that, if there is anything adequate to the object, the one naturally knowable and intelligible to us (whatever way it is present to our intellect), it can cause a concept of itself and of the things that it essentially or virtually includes, and, according to what was already said [n.51], it in no way includes the absolute that is the foundation of the relation in God, as I will prove [nn.54-55]; therefore it follows that in no way is a concept of that absolute caused in us, and so we will not naturally be able to have any concept of anything absolute about God.

54. Proof of the assumption [n.53], - because although the said response [n.52] supposes that a relation in creatures is naturally first conceived before the relation corresponding to it, or before the foundation of the corresponding relation (which I believe to be dubious, because the term of a relation is naturally pre-understood to the relation, just as the foundation is too), - although it supposes too that a created thought-on thing is not understood by us save insofar as it is related (which was refuted in distinction 3 in the question ‘On the Footprint’ [I d.3 nn.310-323] and seems to be against Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.9: “Each thing subsists to itself, - how much more God?” - and Augustine is speaking about subsistence as about that by which a created thing naturally is not, and which naturally subsists in itself, otherwise the remark, ‘if each thing subsists to itself, how much more God’, would, if the same thing were taken in the premises as in the conclusion, not be an argument), - omitting these things, I say, which perhaps would be denied by the adversary, I argue as follows: although relation in a creature is able, by its virtue, to cause a concept of the relation corresponding to itself, yet that corresponding relation does not include in itself some absolute concept on which it is founded, because the relation of a creature - conversely - to God, which is only one of reason, does not include the divine essence or any perfection absolute in God (which perfection it naturally is), which essence, however, or perfection must be set down as the foundation of the relation of God to creatures; and so there could not, by these relations, be caused in us any concept of absolute perfection unless another relation possessed in itself virtually that absolute which is the proper perfection of God, and that is impossible.

55. This point [sc. that nothing absolute is included in the concept we have of God] is also proved by the fact that, according to them [sc. those holding the opinion in n.53], the divine essence is of a nature only to cause, about itself, a single concept in the intellect, - therefore only a single real concept about it is of a nature to be possessed. The proof of this consequence is that the divine nature itself is of a nature to cause in the intellect every real concept that is, as to its simple understanding, of a nature to be possessed about it (and more imperfect objects are not capable of this). I infer further: therefore any object that is of a nature to cause, about itself, some real concept, is of a nature to cause that single concept which is itself of a nature to be possessed about it -and, if it does not cause that concept, then it causes no concept about it; but no creature can cause that single concept, because then the concept could, under the idea in which it is a singular essence, be understood from creatures; therefore through no creature -according to this position [n.53] - can any singular concept be possessed about the divine essence.

56. [Second reason] - The second reason, touched on in the aforesaid question [I d.3 n.35, 27], was about one certain concept and two doubtful ones, where the certain concept is common to them.A reference to an argument from I d.3 n.27: “Every intellect which is certain about one concept, and doubtful about diverse ones, has a concept about what it is certain of that is different from the concepts about what it is doubtful of; the subject includes the predicate. But the intellect of the wayfarer can be certain about God that he is a being, while doubting about finite or infinite being, created or uncreated being; therefore the concept of the being of God is different from this concept and from that; and so neither term [finite or infinite, created or uncreated] is, in itself and in each of those concepts, included in it [sc. included in the concept of the being of God]; therefore [the concept of the being of God] is univocal [sc. of the same meaning whether it is a concept of something finite or something infinite, of something created or something uncreated].” ⁵¹

57. To this there is a threefold response.Presumably from Richard of Conington et al.; see footnote to n.52 above. ⁵² - First, that there is some concept one and the same that is ‘certain’ and ‘doubtful’; as the concept of Socrates and Plato is doubtful while the concept of some man is certain, - and yet both this and that concept are the same.

58. This is nothing, because although the same concept might be diversified in grammatical and logical modes (grammatical ones as in any modes of signifying; logical ones as in any diverse modes of conceiving, as universal and singular, or explicitly or implicitly: explicitly, as definition expresses it - implicitly as the defined thing expresses it), and not only could one posit certitude and incertitude by these differences, but also truth and falsehood, congruity and incongruity, - yet the fact that the same concept, conceived or taken in the same way, may be certain and doubtful according to, or as to, the modes mentioned, is altogether the same as to affirm and deny. Therefore if the concept of being is certain and the concept of created and uncreated being is doubtful (and this is not because of grammatical modes of signifying, nor is it in logical modes of conceiving), then either the concepts will be simply other, which is the intended proposition - or there will be a concept diversified in mode of conceiving universal and particular, which is also the intended proposition.

59. In a second way it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that they are two concepts close to each other, but that also, because of their closeness, they seem to be one concept - and the concept about the ‘one’ seems to be certain, that is, about these two concepts when doubtfully conceived, while doubtful about the two concepts when distinctly conceived.

60. On the contrary. When there are concepts that cannot be conceived under any unity unless they are at the same time, or beforehand, conceived under a distinction proper to them, which distinction is presupposed to the unity, the intellect cannot be certain about them insofar as they have that unity and doubtful about them insofar as they are distinct; or thus: the intellect cannot be certain about the unity of them and doubtful about their distinction; or thus: the intellect cannot be certain about them under the idea of the unity and doubtful about hem under the idea of some proper distinction. But the intellect conceiving the being that is said of God and creatures - if they be two concepts, it cannot have those concepts according to any unity unless it naturally have them first, or at the same time, under their idea as distinct; therefore it cannot be certain about them under the idea of them as one and doubtful about them under the idea of them as many.

61. Proof of the major [n.60], that if there was certitude about any concept (or about all concepts whatever) while there was a doubting about a and b (or along with doubt about a and b), then this one concept or these two concepts [sc. which seem to be one] are conceived first naturally - under the idea under which there is certitude about it or about them - before a and b are conceived [sc. but this is false].The point seems to be that one cannot be certain about a given concept and doubtful about whether it does or does not include some other concepts unless one first conceives those other concepts (for otherwise what is one doubting about?). ⁵³

62. However it is conceded that concepts that have a relation are pre-conceived. -On the contrary. Either conceived as altogether disparate, - therefore they do not ‘seem’ one; or conceived as having some unity, or any unity, of order or distinction among themselves, - and then comes the proof of the minor [n.60]: being in God and being in creatures, if they are two concepts having attribution, cannot be conceived insofar as they have unity of attribution unless this concept and that are first - or at least at the same time - naturally conceived insofar as they are distinct, to wit this concept under its own proper idea and that one under its own proper idea, because these concepts under their own proper ideas are the foundations of the unity of ‘order’ or of ‘attribution’.

63. This is confirmed by an argument of the Philosopher On the Soul 2.2.426b8-15 about the common sense, which sense he concludes is common through its knowledge of the difference between white and black, from the knowledge of which difference he concludes that it knows the extremes. For if it could know them under the idea of this respect which is ‘difference’, without knowing them under their proper idea, then his argument would not be valid. Therefore likewise in the intended proposition, a and b cannot be known at the same time under the idea of this relation - namely of the unity of order - unless a is known under its own proper idea and b under its own proper idea (since for you there is nothing common between them), and so any intellect that conceives these two under the unity of order conceives them as in themselves distinct.

64. A better argument is as follows, against the claim ‘they seem to be one concept’ [n.59]:

Two simply simple concepts are not in the intellect unless each is there distinctly, because such a simply simple concept is either altogether unknown or totally attained (Metaphysics 9.10.1051b17-26); therefore no intellect is certain about it in some respect and doubtful or deceived about it in another. Form, then, a reasoning as follows: an intellect has two concepts; therefore, if ‘they seem’ to be one, something is plain to the intellect about each concept, and something else is not plain -clearly - otherwise they would always seem ‘one’; therefore neither concept is simply simple, therefore they are not first diverse or most abstract.

65. Again, an intellect in possession of a distinct concept can distinguish by it ‘a known object’ from the concept which it has; here [n.59] it cannot distinguish because it does not have a distinct concept, - therefore neither does it have a proper concept, because a proper concept is a concept that is repugnant to another one; therefore the intellect conceiving this proper concept conceives a something that is repugnant to another concept; for example, sight does not see something repugnant to black without thereby distinguishing it from black. I call concepts formal objects. - For because two objects under their proper ideas (one of which is diverse first from the other) are understood by me, and yet I cannot distinguish what this one is, then I do not understand their proper ideas; therefore I understand nothing or I understand something common.

66. Again, when it is know ‘if a thing exists’, the question ‘what it is’ remains, Posterior Analytics 2.1.89b34.Therefore, presumably, while one can know that something is, one does not know what it is, or does not have a concept of it (as opposed to a name for referring to it), until one asks what it is, and asking what it is will force one to come to a concept which, if not entirely adequate to the object, will be sufficiently adequate to itself that it is known to be the concept that it is and not, say, two concepts seeming to be one [cf. n.69]. ⁵⁴

67. Again there is a more brief argument thus: when the intellect is certain, either it is certain about a concept simply one, or it is not but about a concept one ‘by unity of analogy’. If in the first way, and the intellect is not certain about this concept or about that one (because it is in doubt about each in particular), then it is certain about some third concept that is simply one, which is the intended proposition. If in the second way, it is true, insofar as it is thus one concept, - but about that which is thus one I argue: the intellect cannot be certain about something one ‘by unity of analogy’ unless it is certain about the two as they are two; therefore those two do not seem to the intellect to be ‘one’, because they are at once conceived as distinct concepts.

68. The response in the third way [nn.57, 59] is that there is not certitude about some one concept and doubt about two, but certitude about two concepts and doubt about one or other of them; as for example, ‘I am certain that this is a being, that is, that it is a substance or an accident, but I doubt whether it is determinately this being, as substance, or that being, which is accident.’

69. On the contrary. The certitude precedes all apprehension of anything whatever that divides being itself, therefore it precedes certitude ‘about the whole disjunct’. - The proof of the antecedent is that in the first apprehension by which ‘this’ is known to be something, or a being, there is no need to apprehend it from itself or from another, in itself or in another, and so on about other disjuncts.

70. [Third reason, nn.51, 56] - Against this opinion [n.44] there is also a confirmation for the fourth argument stated above [point (d) in footnote to n.51], which was about the inquiry of the intellect, which inquiry we make by natural investigation about God [I d.3 n.39]; here the ideas of creatures that state imperfection of themselves are separated by us from the imperfection with which they exist in creatures, and we consider them, taken in themselves, as indifferent, and we attribute to them supreme perfection; and, when thus taken as supreme, we attribute them to the Creator as proper to him.

71. Thus does Augustine argue On the Trinity XV ch.4 n.6: “Since we put the Creator without any doubt before created things, he must both supremely live, and perceive and understand all things.” This he himself proves from the fact that “we judge that living things are to be preferred to non-living ones, things endowed with sense to non-sentient ones, intelligent things to non-intelligent ones, immortal things to mortal ones,” - which argument does not seem valid if such things, as they are displayed in creatures, were not of the same idea as those which, when such in supreme degree, we attribute to God.

72. The like arguments [sc. taking creaturely imperfection away and attributing supreme perfection to God, n.71] are frequently made or held by the doctors and saints.

For thus are intellect and will posited formally in God, and not only absolutely but along with infinity, - thus too power and wisdom; thus is free choice posited in him; and Anselm On Free Choice ch.1 blames the definition that says free choice ‘is the power of sinning’, because according to him free choice would then - according to this definition -not exist in God, which is false; and this refutation would be no refutation if free choice were said of God and creatures according to a wholly different idea.

73. This is also the way of Dionysius [On the Divine Names ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7], because when by the third way, or on the third level, he has come to the

‘knowledge by remotion’ [n.49], I ask whether the negation is understood there precisely, - and then God is not more known than a chimaera is, because the negation is common to being and non-being; or whether something positive is known there to which the negation is attributed, - and then about that positive thing I ask how the concept of it is possessed in the intellect; if no concept by way of causality and eminence is possessed, previously caused in the intellect, nothing positive at all will be known to which the negation may be attributed.

74. There is a conformation for this reason [n.70], that we do not say that God is formally a stone but we do say that he is formally wise; and yet if the attribution of concept to concept is precisely considered, stone could be formally attributed to something in God - as to his idea - just like wisdom is.

75. The response is that God is not called wise because the idea of wisdom is in him, but because such a perfection simply is in him, although of a different idea from created wisdom.

On the contrary:

76. Our wisdom is a certain participation in the ‘wisdom in God’, and likewise also in the idea; but only some single same perfection participates essentially.

77. Again, the relation of what participates the idea to the idea is the relation of measured to measure; but a single measured is referred only to a single measure, - the idea is its measure; therefore since the wisdom by which God is wise is the measure of the same, it is not distinguished from the idea (response: the idea is the proper measure and the proper participated, or rather, is the relation of measure and participated, -wisdom is not thus but is the foundation of the relation of measure and participated, and is common, not proper, because one creature participates the perfection in just the way another does).

78. And similarly, if you say that we conclude something about God by reason of effects, where proportion alone and not likeness is sufficient - this does not reply to, but confirms, the argument [n.70], because, by considering God under the idea of cause, he is from creatures known proportionally well enough, but in this way there is not known about God any perfect thing’s perfection that is in creatures formally, but only causally, namely that God is cause of such perfection. But attributes are perfections stated simply of God formally - therefore such attributes are known about God not only by way of proportion but also by way of likeness, such that it is necessary to posit some concept in such attributes common to God and creatures, and the common concept in the first way, knowing God by way of causality, is not of this sort.

79. For this argument [n.70] there is the authority of the Philosopher Metaphysics 2.1.993b23-29, who, when arguing that ‘the principles of eternal things are most true’, proves it through this major, that ‘that thing is in each case maximally such whereby univocity is predicated in other things’, and he exemplifies it about fire; and from this he concludes that ‘the principles of eternal things must be most true’. This consequence is not valid save in virtue of the following minor, that the eternal principles ‘are the univocal cause of truth in other things’. For if in the minor the proposition is taken that the principles are equivocal or analogical, there will be four terms in the Philosopher’s syllogism, which is not likely.