B. Scotus’ own Opinion

32. I concede then that some creature is simple, that is, not composed from things. However no creature is perfectly simple, because it is in some way composite and combinable.

How it is composite I clarify thus, that it has entity along with privation of some grade of entity. For no creature has entity according to the total perfection that is of a nature to belong to entity in itself, and therefore it lacks some perfection which is of a nature to belong to entity in itself, and so it is ‘deprived’, - just as a mole is said to be blind ‘because it is of a nature to have sight according to the idea of animal, but not according to the idea of mole’ according to the Philosopher at Metaphysics 5.22.1022b24-27. Therefore any creature is composed, not from positive thing and thing, but from positive thing and privation, namely from some entity, which it has, and from lack of some grade of perfection of entity - of which perfection it is itself not capable, though being itself is capable of it; just as a mole is, according to itself, not of a nature to see but is, according to that which is animal, of a nature to see. Nor yet is this composition ‘from positive and privative’ in the essence of the thing, because privation is not of the essence of anything positive.

33. On this composition there also follows composition of potency and act objectively; for anything that is a being and that lacks some perfection of being is simply possible and is the term of potency simply, whose term cannot be infinite being, which being is necessary existence.

34. It is also the case that any creature at all is combinable:

This is plain about accident, which is combinable with a subject. In the case of substance too it is plain, about form as well matter. Also plain about substance per se generable and corruptible, because it is receptive of accident; no substance then would be non-receptive of accident save on account of its perfection. - But the most perfect intelligence [sc. creaturely intelligence] is receptive of accident, because it is capable of its own intellection and volition, which are not its substance; first, because then it would be formally blessed in itself, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 1 [I d.1 n.175]. Second, because any intelligence can understand infinite things, because these are all intelligible; therefore, if its own intellection were its essence, it could have an infinite essence, because it would have one intellection of infinite things. Third, because its own intellection would not depend on any object save that on which its own ‘existence’ would depend, and so it could understand nothing inferior to itself - not even itself - in its proper genus, but only in the superior object moving it; nay no intelligence could understand anything save in God, because its own existence is not caused by any other intelligence -therefore not its intellection either. Fourth, because the word of an angel would be personally distinct from it and essentially the same as it, as was proved in distinction 2 about the divine Word [I. d.2 n.355].