B. Proof of the Simplicity of God through Common Middle Terms

16. Second I prove the intended proposition [n.5] generally.

[From necessary existence] - First from the idea of necessary existence, - because if the First thing is composite, let the components be a and b; I ask about a, whether it is of itself formally necessary existence, or is not but is possible existence (one of these two must be given in each thing, or in the whole nature, from which something is composed).

But if it is of itself possible existence, then necessary existence of itself is composed of possible existence, and so it will not be necessary existence; if a is of itself necessary existence, then it is of itself in ultimate actuality, and so with nothing can it make itself to be per se one thing. Likewise, if the composite is of itself necessary existence, it will be necessary existence through a, and by parity of reasoning it will be necessary existence through b, and so it will be twice necessary existence; it will also be a composite necessary existence through something which, when taken away, will leave it to be no less necessary existenceI.e., if it is necessary existence through a and through b, then, if b is taken away, it will still be necessary existence through a; therefore it will not really be necessary existence through b, and so it will not be a necessary existence composed of a and b. ⁴¹, which is impossible.

17. [From infinity] - Second I show the intended proposition from the idea of infinity, - and first that God is not combinable; for this reason, that everything combinable can be part of some composite whole which is combinable from itself and from something else; but every part can be exceeded; but to be able to be exceeded is contrary to the idea of infinity;     therefore etc     .

18. And there is a confirmation of the reason, and it is almost the same, - because everything combinable lacks the perfection of that with which it is combined, such that the combinable does not have in itself complete identity, and identity in every way, with that with which it is combined, because then it could not be combined with it; nothing infinite lacks that with which it can in some way be the same, nay everything such has all that in itself according to perfect identity; because otherwise it could be understood to be more perfect, for example if it had all that in itself as a ‘composite’ has it and if the

‘infinite’ does not have it;Sc. suppose the infinite combined with something, then by itself, or uncombined, it does not have it; therefore, when combined with it, it is more perfect. ⁴² but it is contrary to the idea of infinity simply that it could be understood to be more perfect, or that something could be understood to be more perfect than it.

19. From this follows further that it is altogether incomposite, - because if it is composite, then composed either of finite things or of infinite things; if of infinite things, nothing such is combinable, from what has been proved [nn.17-18]; if of finite things, then it will not be infinite, because finite things do not render anything infinite in the perfection that we are now speaking of.