Second Part. Single Question

[Point B]

4, 13 - Hence God, in subject position, indicates the divine nature in agreement with the supposit, - Father and Son and Holy Spirit, on the part of the predicate, indicate the same nature by indifference and they state supposits; from which it follows that the proposition is true. However it is true that in its converse there is rather formal predication, because there the superior or common thing is understood to be predicated of its per se supposits; but predication is always more formal when the common thing is predicated of the less or quasi-common than conversely.

[Point C]

8, 6 - To make evident the second argument, one must know that, as was said in the preceding question, to any unique nature there adequately corresponds one singular, because the singular is either incommunicable, as it is in creatures, - or it is communicable, as it is in God. But the divine nature is altogether unique, un-multipliable and un-numerable, therefore to it there adequately corresponds one singular, which is expressed by the name of God, because this is understood by natural intelligence before any property of persons is. And that singular is considered to be some being for itself, with which agree all the properties, essential and perfective, before any property of persons; but that indeed which is a being for itself and of itself is in no way multipliable or numerable, although it is communicable to several supposits, which communication is understood through the notional properties. And just as this proposition is true ‘God is

Father and Son and Holy Spirit’, so is this one ‘this God is Father’ etc. An example of this has been touched on, that if there were one color in three surfaces, that color -suppose it whiteness - would diffuse sight and would have all the perfections belonging to whiteness, but not as it is first in this surface or that, but by itself, although it have them as a universal existing in those surfaces, yet not first. Now it is the same way here.