[From the Cambridge Reportatio]
Point F. [See n.25]
Further, when things are so disposed that they join together as ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ for some action, the one that is ‘prior’ joins in more principally for the action; but the essence, which is the nature (insofar as they [Henry and his followers] take ‘nature’ in the first mode [n.13]), in which the three divine persons consist, is prior to the will; therefore if nature joins in for the action in this way, as assisting the will, it will necessarily be more principal in this production; therefore a contradiction is involved in its joining in as assistant, concomitant to the will, and not, as they themselves say, preceding it.
Point G. [See n.62]
Concerning the tenth distinction, where the Master [Lombard] determines what one must see if the divine will is the principle of inspiriting the Holy Spirit, - and because there are three things that cause difficulty, namely the consubstantiality of the product, the necessity of the production, the apparent incompossibility of liberty and necessity, therefore I ask three brief questions about these three points; the first is whether the divine will can be per se a principle of communicating the divine nature; second, whether it can be per se a principle of producing necessarily; third, whether necessity and liberty are compatible with each other in the very same respect of the same production. Fourth -the principal question - whether the divine will is per se the principle of inspiriting the Holy Spirit.
To the first question it is argued no: Averroes Physics 8 com.46, ‘Whether each thing’ [I d.2 nn.212-214].
Again, the common description of nature is convertible with it.
Again, the image is the principle in artificial things.
On the contrary: the will is not less perfect than the memory.
As to the second question it is argued no: Aristotle Metaphysics 9.2.1046b4-11, a rational power is to opposites.
Again, the ways of being a principle are opposed.
On the contrary: that which is perfect in production is not repugnant to the production of a perfective productive principle.
As to the third question it is argued no in this way: the necessity of a principle naturally determines necessarily; therefore the principle is from its nature necessarily determined; therefore by natural necessity.
Again, necessary dominion does not dominate [sc. cannot determine itself to this or that], otherwise anything natural would be called free.
On the contrary: perfection in productive principle is not repugnant to a perfect productive principle.
To the fourth question it is argued no: as doing and making are, so are operation and production.
Again, it would be precognitive.
On the contrary: the Master [Lombard] Sentences I d.10 ch.2 n.102, through Jerome On Psalm 14 [=Abelard, Christian Theology IV: “Hence there is this from Jerome on psalm XVII: ‘The Holy Spirit is not the Father nor the Son but the love which the Father has in the Son and the Son in the Father’.”], and Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.5 n.7, and Richard [of St. Victor] On the Trinity VI ch.17.