A. Response of Henry [of Ghent] to the Two First Doubts

13. [To the first doubt] - As to the first doubt [n.10] it is said [by Henry] that “nature in divine reality is said in four ways:

In one way nature is called the divine essence itself, in which the three persons consist, - and in this way nature is said purely essentially.

14. In a second way nature is called the active natural principle, - and in this way nature is the productive force ‘of similar from similar’; and thus the power in the Father of generating actively is nature, and thus it is an essential feature contracted to a notional one, because it is the divine essence itself as said in the first way; for nature, which is the divine essence itself as it exists under the property of the Father determined to an act of generation, is the active power of generating, existing in the Father alone. - And these two modes of nature are touched on by Hilary On the Trinity V n.37 when he says of the Son ‘from the virtue of nature into the same nature, by nativity, does he subsist.’

15. In a third way nature is said to be any force naturally existing in nature said in the first way, which yet, although the force is free, can in this way be called nature, - and thus the will in God is nature, namely because it is a natural power existing naturally in the divine nature.

16. In a fourth way nature is said to be unchangeable necessity about some act.”

17. As to the intended proposition, it is said that nature in the third way is called the principle of inspiriting, because the will is the elicitive force of inspiriting “as it is free and freely acting.” In the fourth way it concurs with the will, in the first way it concurs “not elicitively but only subjectively,” in the second way it does not concur at all.

18. From these it is, as to the intended proposition, said that “neither the intellect nor the will, in the idea in which they are simply intellect and will, are elicitive principles of notional acts (by which is produced a thing similar in natural form to the very producer), because then, in whatever they would exist, they would be elicitive principles of acts by which would be produced a similar thing in natural form to the very producer, and this is false in the case of creatures. For in divine reality they are only elicitive principles of natural acts as these exist in the divine nature, and, as such, they have in themselves a certain naturality for notional productions.

19. It was according to this, then, that we [sc. Henry] said in a certain question ‘About emanations in general’ that the intellect and will, as they are simply intellect and will - namely as acting in an intellectual and voluntary way - are only elicitive principles of essential acts (which are those of to understand and to will), although this is passively on the part of the intellect and actively on the part of the will; but as they are nature and active principles naturally elicitive of acts, they are elicitive principles of notional acts (which are those of to generate and to inspirit), and this ‘by the necessity of naturality, whereby it is impossible for God, by the principles that are nature in him, not to elicit these sorts of acts.’

20. To make this clear, one must know that the principles have this naturality from the divine nature (in which intellect and will are), but in different ways, - since the divine intellect has naturality by being coincident with divine nature in idea of nature, which is the principal elicitive idea of the notional act (and this according to the aforesaid mode of nature), so that this naturality is altogether first, and the idea of intellect is concomitant, or quasi-concomitant; for which reason it elicits its notional act only by way of nature and natural impulse, so that the Father is more properly said to generate by intellectual nature than by natural intellect, so that the intellect is understood to quasidetermine nature rather than conversely; and, in this respect, the idea by which the Son is produced by the eliciting nature is first, and the idea by which he is called the Word is, in respect of it, as it were second.

21. But the will has its naturality, not by being coincident in idea of nature as said in the second way, but by having annexed to it a certain force of nature as said in the first way, from the fact that it is founded in that nature, so that this naturality in the will in no way precedes its liberty (nor does the elicitive idea of the notional act precede, in the sense of according to nature, - for this would be altogether contrary to liberty itself), but rather so that it is consecutive to and annexed to liberty; and this not as something by which the will elicits, by way of principle, its notional act, but as something by which, with the assistance of the will, the will itself - from the force which it has from the fact it is will and free - can elicit its notional act, which, without that assistance, it could in no way elicit.”

22. [To the second doubt] - To the second doubt [n.11] it is said [by Henry] that “there is a triple action of the will:

The first is that which is elicited by the will as it is simply will without any naturality or necessity, as it is that which proceeds from a choice of freedom (whether in God or in an intellectual creature), and as it tends in us only to a loved good which is below the supreme good.

23. The second is that which is elicited by the will as it is simply will along with the sole naturality of immutable necessity, annexed to that action, as it is what proceeds from a choice of freedom, and as it tends to the supreme good loved and openly seen.

24. The third is that which is elicited by the will not as it is simply will but as it is nature, with naturality said in the second way [n.21] annexed to it, as it is that which proceeds from freedom of will or from choice of will in God alone, and as it tends not only to the supreme good loved and seen but also to that good proceeding into love itself (by which it is incentively loved), although it tends in different ways to each, and this according to different necessities of immutability annexed to the action; for insofar as an action is ordered to the supreme loved thing, there proceeds from the will alone itself -by the idea by which it is free - an immutability of necessity in its second action and in its third action; but insofar as an action is ordered to the produced love that tends to the terminal loved thing, there thus proceeds from the naturality annexed to the will a necessity of immutability about the sole notional act elicited by the will, or rather by the liberty itself of the will as to it such naturality is annexed.”