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II. Doubts
10. Here, however, there are three doubts.
The first about how the will can be this principle of communicating nature, since it is not so in creatures.
11. The second about how the will might be a principle also of producing necessarily, and what necessity is necessarily required in this production.
12. Third about how, if the production is necessary, it is not by way of nature but is distinct from nature and free.
A. Response of Henry [of Ghent] to the Two First Doubts
13. [To the first doubt] - As to the first doubt [n.10] it is said [by Henry] that “nature in divine reality is said in four ways:
In one way nature is called the divine essence itself, in which the three persons consist, - and in this way nature is said purely essentially.
14. In a second way nature is called the active natural principle, - and in this way nature is the productive force ‘of similar from similar’; and thus the power in the Father of generating actively is nature, and thus it is an essential feature contracted to a notional one, because it is the divine essence itself as said in the first way; for nature, which is the divine essence itself as it exists under the property of the Father determined to an act of generation, is the active power of generating, existing in the Father alone. - And these two modes of nature are touched on by Hilary On the Trinity V n.37 when he says of the Son ‘from the virtue of nature into the same nature, by nativity, does he subsist.’
15. In a third way nature is said to be any force naturally existing in nature said in the first way, which yet, although the force is free, can in this way be called nature, - and thus the will in God is nature, namely because it is a natural power existing naturally in the divine nature.
16. In a fourth way nature is said to be unchangeable necessity about some act.”
17. As to the intended proposition, it is said that nature in the third way is called the principle of inspiriting, because the will is the elicitive force of inspiriting “as it is free and freely acting.” In the fourth way it concurs with the will, in the first way it concurs “not elicitively but only subjectively,” in the second way it does not concur at all.
18. From these it is, as to the intended proposition, said that “neither the intellect nor the will, in the idea in which they are simply intellect and will, are elicitive principles of notional acts (by which is produced a thing similar in natural form to the very producer), because then, in whatever they would exist, they would be elicitive principles of acts by which would be produced a similar thing in natural form to the very producer, and this is false in the case of creatures. For in divine reality they are only elicitive principles of natural acts as these exist in the divine nature, and, as such, they have in themselves a certain naturality for notional productions.
19. It was according to this, then, that we [sc. Henry] said in a certain question ‘About emanations in general’ that the intellect and will, as they are simply intellect and will - namely as acting in an intellectual and voluntary way - are only elicitive principles of essential acts (which are those of to understand and to will), although this is passively on the part of the intellect and actively on the part of the will; but as they are nature and active principles naturally elicitive of acts, they are elicitive principles of notional acts (which are those of to generate and to inspirit), and this ‘by the necessity of naturality, whereby it is impossible for God, by the principles that are nature in him, not to elicit these sorts of acts.’
20. To make this clear, one must know that the principles have this naturality from the divine nature (in which intellect and will are), but in different ways, - since the divine intellect has naturality by being coincident with divine nature in idea of nature, which is the principal elicitive idea of the notional act (and this according to the aforesaid mode of nature), so that this naturality is altogether first, and the idea of intellect is concomitant, or quasi-concomitant; for which reason it elicits its notional act only by way of nature and natural impulse, so that the Father is more properly said to generate by intellectual nature than by natural intellect, so that the intellect is understood to quasidetermine nature rather than conversely; and, in this respect, the idea by which the Son is produced by the eliciting nature is first, and the idea by which he is called the Word is, in respect of it, as it were second.
21. But the will has its naturality, not by being coincident in idea of nature as said in the second way, but by having annexed to it a certain force of nature as said in the first way, from the fact that it is founded in that nature, so that this naturality in the will in no way precedes its liberty (nor does the elicitive idea of the notional act precede, in the sense of according to nature, - for this would be altogether contrary to liberty itself), but rather so that it is consecutive to and annexed to liberty; and this not as something by which the will elicits, by way of principle, its notional act, but as something by which, with the assistance of the will, the will itself - from the force which it has from the fact it is will and free - can elicit its notional act, which, without that assistance, it could in no way elicit.”
22. [To the second doubt] - To the second doubt [n.11] it is said [by Henry] that “there is a triple action of the will:
The first is that which is elicited by the will as it is simply will without any naturality or necessity, as it is that which proceeds from a choice of freedom (whether in God or in an intellectual creature), and as it tends in us only to a loved good which is below the supreme good.
23. The second is that which is elicited by the will as it is simply will along with the sole naturality of immutable necessity, annexed to that action, as it is what proceeds from a choice of freedom, and as it tends to the supreme good loved and openly seen.
24. The third is that which is elicited by the will not as it is simply will but as it is nature, with naturality said in the second way [n.21] annexed to it, as it is that which proceeds from freedom of will or from choice of will in God alone, and as it tends not only to the supreme good loved and seen but also to that good proceeding into love itself (by which it is incentively loved), although it tends in different ways to each, and this according to different necessities of immutability annexed to the action; for insofar as an action is ordered to the supreme loved thing, there proceeds from the will alone itself -by the idea by which it is free - an immutability of necessity in its second action and in its third action; but insofar as an action is ordered to the produced love that tends to the terminal loved thing, there thus proceeds from the naturality annexed to the will a necessity of immutability about the sole notional act elicited by the will, or rather by the liberty itself of the will as to it such naturality is annexed.”
B. Against the Response of Henry
25. Against these remarks.
First: as to what he posits about the assistance of nature for the will, so that the will, by force of that assistance, can communicate nature [n.21], I ask what is that assistance? It seems that it is not necessary for the communication, because, once there is in place a perfect agent supposit and one that is appropriate to the action, and a perfect ‘by which’ principle for the acting, it does not seem that anything else is necessary for acting; but for you the will alone is the ‘by which’ principle in respect of the notional act, and it is clear that the supposit is perfect and appropriate to the action; therefore the assistance does not seem necessary for such production.111
26. Further, that a single necessity is posited in the will and a double one in the inspiriting [n.24] seems to be against both him and the truth, because he himself posits that the notional acts are founded on the essential ones, and everyone commonly concedes that the essential acts in some way precede the notional ones. But it does not seem that in something founded there can be any necessity formally greater than the necessity in that on which it is founded, or it does not seem that a double necessity will exist in the thing founded and a single one in the foundation; the proof is that then, when, per impossibile or per incompossibile, one necessity is separated from the other (namely the necessity which the founded thing had from the foundation), the founded thing will remain necessary, because only one of the necessities it had will, in the foundation, be removed; therefore - once this position [of a double necessity] is supposed - necessity could exist in the founded thing and not in that on which it is founded. This to the proposal, because if the act of inspiriting has necessity from the freedom of the will and -besides this - from the necessity of naturality annexed to the will, and if the act of simple love has only the one first necessity, then, with the first necessity removed, all the necessity will be removed that there was in the foundation, and yet there will still remain the other necessity in the production, namely that which is from the naturality.
27. Further, it seems that the whole of the naturality is not consequent to the act of will, because - for him [Henry] - it belongs to the will from the fact that it is founded in the divine essence [n.21]; therefore, since the idea of the divine essence is prior to the idea of the will, whatever is consequent to the idea of the essence, or to the will by reason of the essence, will be consequent to the essence before that which is consequent to the will, as it is will, will be; and so it seems that the naturality in some way precedes the liberty, and as a result it will impede the liberty.
28. Further, against the opinion.
What would that argument be which he himself makes, ‘if the intellect and the will were principles of communicating the nature whereby they are such principles, then such powers in creatures would be principles of communicating nature’ [n.18], if there were an altogether different formal idea of intellect and will in God and in creatures?
29. Further, what necessity is there for distinguishing between the will, which he posits as the principle of eliciting the act, and the nature, which he posits as co-assistant of the eliciting will [n.21], if there is between them only a distinction of reason, as he seems elsewhere to think about the distinction of attributes in divine reality?
C. Scotus’ own Response
30. [To the first doubt] [n.10] - I say in another way that the will can be a principle of communicating nature, - and not the will as commonly taken for created and uncreated will, but will whereby it is infinite; for infinity is the proper mode of the divine will, just as it is of any other essential perfection.
31. This is plain from the reason posited above, to the solution of the question [n.9], that the will is a principle of a love adequate to itself, that is, of as much love as the will is of a nature to love the object with; but it is of a nature to love an infinite object with infinite love, therefore it is also productive of infinite love; anything that is infinite formally is the divine essence, - therefore the will itself is a principle of communicating the divine essence to the produced love.
32. And if you ask me about the co-assistance in any way of nature, I say that for the will, as it is a principle of communicating nature, there is no need to posit that nature co-assists it in some special mode of assistance (supposing nature could be the principle of communicating nature), unless some lesser perfection were posited for the will than for nature; but there is no such imperfection, because an infinite will is simply as perfect as an infinite nature.
33. There is a threefold argument against this answer [n.30].
First as follows: infinity is, of itself, of the same idea in the intellect and in the will; therefore there is no formal idea of distinct products, but they have to be distinguished by the formal principles.
34. Again, I argue thus: what does not belong to something - or what is repugnant to something - in its absolute idea, does not belong to it if it is infinite either; for infinity does not give to an active virtue the idea of another active virtue, but gives it intensity, both in itself and in its action; to this add this minor: but to the action of the will, as it is such an active principle, there does not belong - but there is repugnant to it - the communicating of nature; 
therefore etc 
.
35. Further, whence does the will get infinity? If from itself, then it is infinite everywhere, - if from the essence, then the will is infinite as having the assistance of nature or of essence, which is what the other opinion says [Henry’s opinon, n.21].
36. To the first [n.33] I say that the two things in the act, namely liberty and infinity (which is a mode intrinsic to a thing), have two things corresponding to them in the principle ‘by which’, namely liberty and infinity, as the mode of that principle (look in the final Parisian collation);112 whence I do not say that infinity is the formal idea of inspiriting, but that infinite will is, - nor do I say in this respect that there are two formal principles, because ‘infinite’ is a mode intrinsic to both principles, namely the free and the non-free. - In another way it can be said that the will, whereby it is will, is altogether simple (that is, not combinable with the nature of which it is the power, nor with its act); for from this it follows that it is productive of an act, because this belongs to it as it is will, - and further, the act is the same as the nature, and this because it is altogether simple; therefore it is communicative of nature.
37. To the other [n.34]. If ‘repugnance’ is taken for the middle term, the major is true and the minor is false, for the transcendent idea of the will (which idea abstracts from finite and infinite) is not a reason for repugnance, but the limitation supervening on it. But if ‘does not belong’ is taken for the middle term, I say that to an active infinite principle there only belongs an infinite action, of the transcendent sort that belongs to something transcendent; but now, just as a ‘to will’ belongs transcendentally to a transcendent will, so also belongs to it the producing of a ‘to will’; therefore to an infinite will there belongs the producing of an infinite ‘to will’, not so much per se but concomitantly (the deity is an infinite ‘to will’, but the finite ‘to will’ of an angel is not the essence of the angel). - Then to the minor I say that to communicate nature is not the transcendent action of the will generally, but that the producing of a ‘to will’ is that is proportionate to itself and to the object, - and therefore an infinite will produces something infinite, and consequently it produces nature.
38. To the third [n.35] the answer is plain in distinction 8 [I d.8 nn.209-222], that it gets it from what it is fundamentally - because it gets it from the essence, from which it formally is; I concede that the essence is required as foundation and as really the same, but it is in its own moment of nature - in which it is formally infinite - a precise ‘by which’ principle (along with the object) of thus producing as it is also of operating.
39. [To the second doubt] - To the second doubt ‘about necessity’ [n.11], the answer is plain through the same fact [through the will whereby it is infinite, n.30], that a perfect productive principle can give to a perfect product all the perfection which is not repugnant to itself; and an infinite will is a perfect productive principle, therefore it can give to its perfect product the perfection that is fitting to itself; but necessity is not repugnant to it (nay necessity necessarily belongs to it, because no infinite can be a possible, a non-necessary, thing), therefore that principle, which is infinite will, will be a sufficient principle of giving necessity to this product. If it is a principle by which necessity can be given to the product, then necessity is given, because to nothing which is not necessary can necessity of itself be given, - and further, if it is a principle by which necessity is given to the product, therefore also to the production; for the product gets being by the production, - nothing can get necessary existence through a non-necessary production.113
40. This as it were a posteriori argument [n.39] seems to deduce the necessity of the production from the necessity of the product. If an a priori reason, or a reason from the cause, is sought, what it is by which the will gives necessity to the production, I reply that neither does a will infinite of itself alone give necessity to the produced love, comparing it to any object whatever, nor does the loved object alone - which is the end -, compared to any will whatever, give necessity to the act of willing or to the production of love.
41. I prove the first point [n.40] by the fact that the will is not a necessary principle of producing love of any object unless it is a necessary principle of loving that object; but an infinite will is not a necessary principle of loving an object save an infinite one, because then God would necessarily love any creature at all, nay also any lovable thing at all; therefore it is not a necessary principle of producing its love, comparing it to any object whatever.114
42. The second point [n.40] was proved in distinction 1 ‘On enjoying’, that the will, by reason of will in general, does not tend necessarily to the end [I d.1 nn.91-133, 136-140].
43. And if you reply that the will can be considered as will or as nature [nn.19, 22-24], or as by comparing it to the end or to what is for the end; but as it is compared to the end it is nature, and thus there is merely necessity, - this is refuted by both authority and reason.
44. The reason is that there are not opposite modes of acting of the same active power, and especially not these modes ‘naturally’ and ‘freely’, which first distinguish active power; because if the will is compared to the end by way of nature and to ‘things for the end’ by way of freedom, it will not be one active power with respect to them, and then there will be no power that chooses ‘a thing for the end’ for the sake of the end; for no power chooses this because of that save by willing both extremes, just as no cognitive power knows a conclusion because of the principles unless it knows in the same cognition both the principles and the conclusion, as the Philosopher argued about the common sense in On the Soul 3.2.426b15-29.
45. The authority is from Augustine, Handbook of the Faith ch.105 n.28 (and it is placed by Master Lombard in II d.25 ch.4 n.218): “Nor must it not be called will - nor said not to be free - because we so wish ourselves to be blessed that not only do we not wish to be miserable but we altogether cannot wish to be miserable;” therefore he intends to say that the will whereby we wish for beatitude is free; the will has a respect for no end more necessarily than for beatitude in general, therefore it has a respect for no end necessarily.
46. Again, this response [n.43] would posit that the Holy Spirit is not inspirited freely but by way of nature, because his principle would be will not as free but as nature.
47. Therefore I say [n.40] that the necessity of this production of adequate love -just as also the necessity of the love by which what possesses the will formally loves - is from the infinity of the will and from the infinity of the goodness of the object, because neither suffices for necessity without the other.
48. Now these two [n.47] suffice in this way, that an infinite will cannot not be right; nor can it not be in act, because then it would be potential; therefore necessarily it is in right act. But not every ‘to will’ is right precisely because it is from that will only, as if nothing is to be willed of itself but only because it is willed by that will; for the divine essence, which is the first object of that will, is to be willed of itself; therefore that will is of necessity in right act of willing the object which is of itself to be rightly willed, and just as it is of necessity a principle of willing, so it is of necessity a principle of producing love of that object.
49. And then I say that neither precisely the infinite will alone (not determining the object it has), nor the infinite good alone (not determining which will it has, as object, a respect to), is the total cause of necessarily loving, nor even of necessarily producing adequate love; but the infinite will - having such an object, which is of itself to be rightly loved, perfectly present to it - is the necessary reason both for loving that good and for inspiriting love of that good;115 and such a will, having such an object present to it, is a principle of communicating divine nature, because it is a principle of producing a produced infinite love; for such a produced love is proportionate both to the power and to the object, - it is not thus when an infinite will has a respect to a finite lovable good, because although there the act is infinite as concerns the part of the divine will, yet it is not infinite as concerns the part of the object.
50. But whether the will is a principle not only of loving an infinite but also a finite good, and of producing love of such a good, - and this either with the same production in fact, though different in idea, by which the Holy Spirit is produced, or with an altogether different one, or with none, - of this matter elsewhere [I dd.18, 27], because it has a similar difficulty to the production of the Word, whether the divine intellect is the principle of producing a Word of the same essence or a word of any other intelligible thing, and then either by a production the same in fact, though different in idea, as the production of the divine Word, or by one different both in fact and in idea.
51. [To the third doubt] - There remains the third doubt [n.12].
Here the statement is made in this way, that nature acts through impression (as does the intellect), not the will. - See Henry.
52. On the contrary. This is false, and was rejected in distinctions 2 and 5 [I d.2 nn.283-289; d.5 nn.52-92]; again, it is not to the purpose, because it is asking about a distinction of the active principle in its mode of acting (or of eliciting an action), whether it acts on something or not.
53. Another response [to the same doubt, n.12]. The word is formally of the knowledge of memory; the will, when eliciting, gives to the object the first gift (because it gives love and, in this, gives itself), nor is it gift for this reason, - hence neither is it something similar to the object presented; therefore love is not generated, nor is the Holy Spirit an image as the Son is.
54. This [n.53] indeed is true, and well said about the image, but the point about how these principles can elicit is not saved, although some distinction is posited in the terms, compared to the principles in act of assimilation.
55. Third way [to solve the doubt, n.12]. That if there exists some necessity as the act tends to the object, yet not as it is elicited by the power; or in another way: if, as it is in an act already as it were elicited, it is confirmed, yet it does not as quasi-prior in act elicit that object.
56. In another way. On the part of the principle, as it quasi-precedes the act, there is a necessity to elicit, nor is will repugnant to the necessary, because a perfect will can have the condition of a perfect elicitive principle.
57. Again, conversely, necessity does not take away liberty (because of what has just been said [n.56]).
58. Again, to act necessarily is a condition of a way of acting, therefore it is not repugnant to one of the things that divide active principle, just as neither is the mode repugnant to that whose mode of positing it is; just as there is a double principle - nor is there any other reason for distinction than that this is this [sc. that the will is will, the intellect is intellect] - so there is a double fitting necessity, because this and this [sc. this is the necessity of nature, this the necessity of will]; not every necessity, then, is natural necessity. - Taking ‘natural’ strictly, how is will nature? Another difficulty: whether this is what ‘freely’ is, because of an identity between producer and the product?