I. Solution of the Question

6. I say yes to the question.

The proof is that there is will in God, - as was evident from question 1 of distinction 2, and also from the question about attributes in distinction 8 [I d.2 nn.75-88, d.8 nn.177-217].

7. For it is plain from this that God is blessed from his nature; but beatitude is not without the will, or without an act of will.

8. Also the will exists in him under the idea of productive principle, because productive principles, from the fact that they do not of themselves state an imperfection, are reduced to some single perfect thing, or to as small a number of perfect things as they can be reduced to; but they cannot all be reduced to a single principle - whether productive or active - because that single thing would have the determinate mode of acting of one or other of them, namely of nature or of will, because between these modes of producing there is no intermediate mode; therefore these principles cannot be reduced to a fewer number than two, namely of principles productive by way of nature and by way of will. And since the things at which, as at things perfect, this whole reduction of principles stops are simply perfect, both of these principles are posited in their proper idea in God as he is a producing principle [I d.2 nn.305-309].

9. And from these further. In whatever there is some principle which, of its idea, is a productive principle, in that thing the principle, if it is in it without imperfection and is not understood to have already some product simply adequate to it, will be a productive principle; in God, as has been proved [d.8 nn.177-217], there is will formally from the nature of the thing, and this under the idea of a productive principle free in respect of love, and it is plain it is there without imperfection; therefore in God there will be a principle of producing love, and this in proportion to his perfection, such that, just as a created will is as great a principle of producing love as is the love it can love the object with (which is called adequate love), so this [divine] will is as great a principle of producing love as it is of a nature to love an infinite object; but it is of a nature to love an infinite object with infinite love, therefore it is of a nature to be a principle of producing infinite love, - but nothing is infinite save the divine essence itself,     therefore that love is the divine essence. Now the love produced is not of a nature to be an inherent form, because there is nothing such in divine reality; therefore it is per se subsistent, - and not the same subsistent thing as the producer, because nothing produces itself, Augustine On the Trinity I ch.1 n.1; therefore it is distinct in person; this person I call ‘the Holy Spirit’, because the Son (as is plain from d.6 nn.16, 20, 27) is not produced in this way but by act of nature or of intellect, - therefore etc     .Note by Scotus: “Every perfect productive principle, when some supposit possesses it perfectly, can be a principle of producing (or thus: for every perfect productive principle some supposit, perfectly possessing it, can produce) a term that is adequate in comparison with the presented object; a perfect will, having a perfect or first object actually presented to it, is a perfect productive principle of as much love as such an object should, by such a will, be loved by; therefore etc. But such a will exists in a divine person, therefore some divine person can produce a love adequate to that will. - This is sufficient here; hence here there is nothing about ‘prior’, but in distinction 11 - because ‘the Son inspirits’ - the point about ‘prior’ is required [sc. there is no need to add here ‘prior to the term being produced’, as there is later in I d.11 q.1 n.2]. This minor of the first syllogism does not assert, nor does it deny, anything about a second object [sc. a secondary or finite object], but it asserts what is certain, namely about the first object. Thus are here solved all the doubts [nn.10-12], for from the minor is inferred that an infinite will, having an infinite object present to it, is a productive principle of infinite love, because with that much love should an infinite object be loved (this is certain, whatever may hold of a secondary object, because it loves it with all its effort, if it is a correct will), or in another way, because it can love with that much love, - this is what the minor says; therefore the will loves. This follows from what is maintained later [n.48] ‘about the necessity of the act with respect to the object’, because, in the case of a necessary thing, what can be is. And thus is the first doubt [n.10] solved, about how it is a principle of communicating nature. - The second doubt [n.11] is solved by adding to the minor ‘an infinite perfect will, with respect to a present object that must necessarily be loved by it, is a necessary principle of producing as much love as such an object should by it be loved by’; therefore the will, with respect to a present infinite object is a principle necessarily productive of infinite love. Once it has been proved that that object must necessarily be loved by the will, and with that much love, this one minor proposition contains everything, both ‘necessary’ and ‘infinite’, - both in the ‘communication of nature’ and in the ‘inspiriting of a divine person’.” ¹¹⁰