II. To the Principal Arguments

12. To the first argument [n.1] I say that ‘principle’ is said in many ways (as is clear in Metaphysics 5.1.1012b34-1013a23), and, if it be taken in the same way, one can well concede that, if it is the principle of anything, it is the principle of what is the same as it. But ‘principle’ is not wont to be construed with the ‘of duration’ in the sense of a principle of origin, but only in the sense of a principle that is as it were the term of the ‘from which’ of the duration, just as an instant is said to be the principle of time; and, whether this comes from the use or from the power of the words, one should not concede this proposition ‘the Father is the principle of the duration of the Son’ without further determination - but one could well concede this proposition ‘the Father is the originative principle of the eternity of the Son’.

13. When, therefore, you argue on the basis of the identity of being and duration, because ‘whatever is principle of the one is principle of the other’ [n.1], - I concede it if ‘principle’ is taken uniformly with respect to being and duration. But ‘principle’ is not construed with the ‘of duration’ under the idea of such a principle as that under the idea of which principle is construed with ‘being’, because in respect of being it is an originative principle, and so the consequence does not follow, but there is a fallacy of equivocation or of amphiboly;I.e. in the proposition ‘whatever is principle of being is principle of duration’, which seems to be a particular case of the general proposition ‘whatever is principle of the one is principle of the other’, there is in fact an equivocation in the term ‘principle’ or in the phrase ‘principle of’, so that the particular proposition is not in fact a case of the universal proposition, but is instead a fallacy. ¹⁰⁹ but in order for the consequence to hold, one must determine principle in the consequent by the terms ‘originating’ and ‘original’, - in this way: ‘the Father is the original principle of the duration of the Son’, which I concede, as has been said [n.12].

14. To the second [n.2] I say that our word is in a state of becoming in two ways; in one way it is in the becoming which is the proper generation of the word itself, in another way it is in the becoming which is the investigation preceding the generation (which investigation Augustine calls ‘flowing cogitation’). But that our word is in a state of becoming in this second way is a matter of imperfection both on the part of the word, because it posits novelty, and on the part of our intellect, because it posits imperfect causality, - and in this way the divine Word is not in a state of becoming; and therefore Augustine concedes that our word is formed by cogitation, so that it is, in the preceding investigation, formable before it is formed. But that our word is in a state of becoming as to generation is not a matter of imperfection in it; nay this is necessary for the per se idea of a word (and it will also exist in the fatherland), and so it is not a matter of imperfection in the eternal Word that it is always in a state of becoming, that is, of being begotten without investigation preceding.

15. To the third [n.3] I say that Augustine seems to deny that the Son is always being born (in the aforementioned question [n.3]), although however Origen says the opposite (as the Master [Lombard] says in the text) on the verse of Jeremiah 11.9-10: “There is found.” [Origen Homilies on Jeremiah IX n.4], and also Gregory Moralia XXIX ch.19 n.36 on the verse of Job 38.21: “Did you know when you would be born...?” - Can it be that they are contradicting themselves? - I reply. Gregory in the Moralia passage seems to be saying things with which what has been said can be made to agree: “We cannot,” he says, “assert that he is always being born, lest he seem to be something imperfect.” He says ‘lest he seem to be something imperfect’; he did not say ‘it is an imperfection if he is said to be always being born’, but he said ‘imperfection seems to be signified’, - that is, this way of speaking does not signify that the generation is as perfect as is signified by this statement ‘he is always born’; for this ‘he is always born’ is more expressive of the truth than is ‘he is always being born’, although both are true.

16. To understand this one must know that verbs of any tense are said truly of God, whether they signify personal or essential acts. The fact is plain from Augustine [On the Gospel of John tr.99 nn.4-5] on John 16.13: “For he will not speak of himself but whatever he will hear that will he speak.” Augustine says about the Spirit ‘whatever he will hear’, because indeed the Spirit has heard and hears, because the hearing of the Holy Spirit is his proceeding from the Father and the Son; and, consequently, that ‘he will hear’, has heard, and hears, just as he knows and has known and will know. Therefore Augustine himself wants the verbs of all tenses to be truly said of God, and the thing is clear from what the Master [Lombard] adduces [I d.8 ch.1 n.80].

17. But what do these verbs of diverse tenses signify when they are said of God? - I reply. They can more properly be said to co-signify the ‘now’ of eternity than differences of time; and yet they do not signify the ‘now’ absolutely, because then there would be no variation of diverse modes of signifying time, but they signify it insofar as it coexists with the parts of time, as when one says, ‘God has generated’, the ‘now’ of eternity is co-signified, so that the sense is that God has an act of generation in the ‘now’ of eternity insofar as that ‘now’ was co-existent with the past, - when one says, ‘God generates’, this means he has an act of generation in the ‘now’ of eternity insofar as it coexists with the present. From this is plain that, since the ‘now’ truly coexists with any difference of time, we assert truly of God the differences of all the tenses.

More expressly however - according to blessed Gregory - is the truth of divine generation signified by this statement ‘he is always born’ than by the statement ‘he is always being born’; because by the ‘is born’ is the nativity signified as perfect, by the ‘always’ is it signified as perfect with every difference or part of time, and thus it is not only signified to coexist with every part of time (as is signified by this statement ‘he is always being generated’), but it is also signified to coexist with every part of time under the idea of being perfect, and in this way does the truth of this procession seem to be most truly signified.