IV. To the Initial Arguments

547. To the main arguments. To the first [n.401] I say that the argument of the Philosopher On the Soul 2 does well prove that the senses are not the total cause with respect to sensation, which I concede. And thus was it argued against the first opinion [n.414], that the soul is not the active total cause for intellection, and this I concede. But it does not prove it without the soul being a partial cause, because it does not follow therefrom that the soul is always in act save when another partial cause goes along with it.

548. As to the second [n.403] (not treating the difficulty whether the activity belongs to the agent intellect or the possible intellect [cf. n.512, and the note added to n.554]), I say that the possible intellect (according to what the Philosopher says about it [n.537]) is that by which we are formally understanding, and in this way is it precisely “that by which there is a becoming everything,” because, as was said before [nn.537-539], we are formally understanding by it insofar as it receives, not insofar as it acts (although it does act, because this happens to it as it is that by which we understand).

549. As to the third [n.404], although the consequence is not necessary, because the sun can be the cause of many differences in species (on account of the distinct powers in it, which are sufficient in idea of effective cause for distinguishing effects), yet the consequence can be conceded for the issue in hand; for it concludes that the soul is not the total cause of all intellections, which has been conceded [n.547].

550. As to the first argument for the opposite [n.405], I concede that the soul, because it is immaterial, is receptive of any intellection (it is also active as to any intellection of an object other than itself as partial cause, and active as to intellection about itself as total cause,a according to Augustine On the Trinity 9.12 n.18 [n.413], but such intellection we do not have for this present state of life) - but from its immateriality does not follow that it is the total cause of any intellection of an object other than itself.

a.a [Text canceled by Scotus] because as generator and as generated

551. As to the second argument [n.406] I concede the conclusion, that cognitions of diverse species, namely those had by the proper virtue of them, are different in species. I prove this because, for individuals of the same species, there is not required a total cause diverse in species (or anything in the total cause diverse in species) from that which in the total cause belongs to another individual. That for individuals of the same species there is not necessarily required a cause of another species the proof is that the form is the principle of acting and is the formal term of action; therefore a perfect form of one idea is a ‘by which’ of the same idea with respect to a formal term of the same idea; therefore with respect to such term there is not required another ‘by which’. But now, for the intellection of white and black, there are required things diverse in species, namely a white thing and a black thing, or things including them. Therefore, these two differ more than individuals of one species; therefore, they differ in species.

552. When you argue further that then all habits of such things would differ in species [n.406], I concede it about habits that are had by the proper virtue of such objects, and this conclusion is proved like the preceding one, through the causes [n.551].

553. And when you say: how then would there be one science about several most specific species [n.406]? I reply that one most specific species can include many other species virtually (either the properties of them, or by way of cause, or according to another essential order), and then the habit that is formally of the first thing that includes the others is virtually of the other objects, though not formally and first. The habit, therefore, is one by unity of first object, virtually containing everything that is contained in that science - but it is not proper to everything contained virtually in that first object, but habits that would be proper to them would be distinct as they are distinct.a

a.a [Note added by Scotus] On this Metaphysics 6.1.1026a18-19, ‘Why there will be three theoretical philosophies: mathematics, physics, theology’, first question [Scotus, Metaphysics 6 q.1 nn.8-12].