THOUGHT, SOUL, LIFE, SENSATION.
(Opinion of Dicæarchus concerning.)

Dicæarchus, a disciple of Aristotle, composed a great number of books, which were very much esteemed. Cicero, and his friend Pomponius Atticus set a great value upon them, and I even believe their esteem extended also to that book, wherein he opposed the immortality of the soul. He composed two treatises upon that subject, each divided into three books. “Dicæarchus in eo sermone, quem Corinthi habitum tribus libris exponit doctorum hominum disputantium, primo libro multos loquentes facit, duobus Pherecratem quendam Phthiotam senem, quem ait a Deucalione ortum, differentem inducit; nihil esse omnino animum, et hoc esse nomen totum inane, frustraque et animalia et animantes appellari, neque in homine inesse animum vel animam, nec in bestia. Vimque omnem eam, qua vel agamus quid, vel sentiamus, in omnibus corporibus vivis aequaliter esse fusam, nec separibilem a corpore esse, quippe quæ nulla sit, nec sit quicquam, nisi corpus unum et simplex, ita figuratum ut temporatione naturae vigeat et sentiat. Cicero Tusc. 1, fol. m. 250. ¹³⁹- - -Acerrime delitiæ meae Dicæarchus contra hanc immortalitatem disseruit. Is enim tres libros scripsit qui Lesbiaci vocantur quod Mitylenis sermo habetur, in quibus vult efficere animos esse mortales. Ibid. fol. m. 250. ¹⁴⁰—Dicæarchus, in his discourse between many learned philosophers, disputing at Corinth, which he divides into three parts, introduces in his first several speakers: in the other two he makes one Pherecrates of Phthia, whom he derives from Deucalion, to argue that the soul was nothing but an empty name, and that the word animal was an insignificant term, since neither man nor beast had either soul or mind, and that the power by which we either act or think was

equally diffused through all living bodies, inseparable from them, being nothing but a simple and uniform body, so modelled as to move and think by the direction of nature. My beloved Dicæarchus has argued very .warmly against this immortality; for he has written three books called Lesbian, because the scene is supposed to be at Mitylene, wherein he endeavours to prove the soul to be mortal.” Cicero says, in one of his Letters, “that he wanted these books, and desires Pomponios Atticus to send them to him.”

I must observe, by the way, that this opinion of Dicæarchus is unworthy a philosopher. Such a way of arguing betrays a want of principle, and overthrows the harmony of a system. If once you lay it down, as this author does, that the soul is not distinct from the body, that it is nothing else but a power equally common to all living things, and which forms but one simple being with the bodies called living, either you know not what you say, or you are obliged to maintain that this power is always inseparable from the body; for what is not distinct from body is essential to body, and, according to the first principles, it is a contradiction to say that a being is ever without its essence. Whence it plainly results, that the power of sensation ceases not in dead bodies, and that the parts of living bodies preserve each their life and soul when they are corrupted. Then there is no room to Batter ourselves that sensation ceases after death, and that we shall not be subject to any pain. If a body be capable of pain when it is placed in the nerves, it is also capable of it wherever it is found, either in stones or metals, in the air or in the sea, and if an atom of air was once destitute of all thought, it seems utterly impossible that being converted into that substance, which is called animal spirit, should ever make it think. This seems as impossible as it is to give a local presence to a being that has been for some time without any local presence. So that

to argue consequently, it must be concluded either that the substance which thinks is distinct from the body, or that all bodies are thinking substances, since it cannot be denied that, men have thought, Whence it follows, according to Dicæarchus’s principle, that there are a certain number of bodies that think. Cicero argues very ill against Dicæarchus; he pretends that, according to this philosopher, a man must feel no pain, since he cannot feel that he has a soul. “Dicaearchum vero cum Aristoxeno æquali et condiscipulo suo doctos sane homines omittamus, quorum alter ne condoluisse quidem unquam videtur qui animum: se habere non sentiat: alter ita delectatur suis cantibus, ut eos etiam ad hæc transferre conetur. Cicero, Tuscul. I, fol. 248. ¹⁴¹— I shall pass over Dicæarchus with his cotemporary and school-fellow Aristoxenus, the one of which never seems to have been concerned at his not perceiving he had a soul. The other is so pleased with his fiddle that he would make the soul to consist in harmony, so great a bigot was he to his profession.” This philosopher might easily have answered, “I do not deny that man feels, and that he is conscious of his feeling, but I deny that he knows that that which feels in him is a soul distinct from body. It is very true he does not feel it, for he knows it only by reasoning.” Lactantius makes use of this fallacious syllogism of Cicero.

I just now perceive that some may prepossess themselves against the argument I have opposed to Dicæarchus’s system, which obliges me to obviate an objection. It may be said that sensation may be only a modification of body, whence it would follow that matter, without losing any thing of what is essential to it, may cease to feel when it is no longer inclosed in the organs of a living machine. I answer, this is an absurd doctrine, for all the modes

of existence, that we have any knowledge of, are of such a nature, that they do not cease, but only to give place to another mode of the same kind; there is no figure that is destroyed but by another figure, and no colour that is destroyed but by another colour. I confess that, according to the old philosophy, cold and heat, which expel one another from a subject, are not accidents of the same species; but it must be owned that at least they belong to the same genus of qualities' that are called tactiles, so that to argue aright, it ought to be said that no sensation is expelled from its substance, but by the introduction of some other sensation; nothing hinders but that sensation should be a genus, having other genus’s under it, before we arrive at what we call species infima. According to this, my objection loses no strength by the answer I have refuted, and I shall always affirm, that if the animal spirits have not the sensation out of the nerves which they have in them, it is because they lose it by acquiring another kind of sensation.

It will be said, perhaps, that there are modifications which cease without any other positive modification succeeding to them, as motion, for instance; for they will say nothing of figure, as being too plainly contrary to Dicæarchus’s abettors; but I answer that motion and rest do not differ, as they suppose, after the manner of positive modifications and privations. Both rest and motion are a most real and positive local presence; their difference consists only in external relations which are perfectly accidental. Rest is the duration of the same local presence: motion is the acquisition of a new local presence, and, consequently, that which ceases to move does not lose its modification without obtaining another of the same nature; it has always a position equal to its extension among the other parts of the universe. When they can give us an example of a body that loses one place without acquiring another, we will agree that certain bodies

may lose a sensation without obtaining another; but as it is impossible to produce such an instance as this, we have a right to maintain that every body that once has had a sensation will always have it. Is not the conversion of being to nothing impossible in the order of nature? Would not the conversion of a figure into the privation of all figure, or the conversion of local presence into the privation of all local presence, be the conversion of something real and positive into nothing? Therefore they are impossible in the order of nature, and therefore the conversion of sensation into a privation of all sensation is impossible, for this would be the conversion of something real and positive into nothing.

Lastly, I say that all the modes of bodies are founded upon the essential attributes of bodies which are the three dimensions. This is the reason that the loss of one figure, or of one local presence, is always accompanied with the acquisition of another figure, or of another local presence. Extension never ceases, nor is ever lost, therefore, the corruption of one of its modes is necessarily the generation of another; for the same reason, no sensation can cease but by the existence of another; for by the system which I am refuting, sensation would be a mode of body as well as figure and place. If you would found sensation upon some attribute of matter different from the three dimensions and unknown to our minds, I answer that the changes of that attribute ought to resemble the alterations of extension; the latter cannot make all manner of figure or local presence to cease, and so the alterations in this unknown attribute would never cause all sensation to cease; they would be but the passage from one sensation to another, as the motion of an extended body is but the removal of it from one place to another.

Moreri makes Dicæarchus the author of several books since Suidas, who perhaps is the only one that

mentions this Dicæarchus, ascribes no books to him at all; neither ought Vossius to have imputed to him a treatise upon dreams. A person who was not pleased to make himself known, has sent me some objections to the argument I have proposed against Dicæarchus, concerning his opinion of the nature of the soul, which I shall here examine, as it will give me an opportunity to allude to a dispute which has made a great noise in England.

The author of those objections to which I allude, begins by explaining the system of our philosopher. He pretends that Dicæarchus’s meaning is, that living bodies differ only from bodies void of life, in this that their parts are figured and disposed after a certain manner; he compares this opinion With that of Descartes thus: if a dog differ from a stone, it is not that he is composed of a body and a soul while the stone is only body; but it is solely in this, that he is composed of parts arranged after such a manner as to form a machine, which the ranging of the particles of a stone does not; this is the opinion of Descartes. This idea is very proper to make us understand the opinion of Dicæarchus: we are only to suppose that he extended to all sorts of living bodies, what the Cartesians say only with respect to beasts: we are only to suppose that he reduces man to the condition of a machine, whence it will follow, that the human soul is not distinct from the body, but that it is only a machinal construction and disposition of several parts of matter. This being supposed, the author of the objections pretends that the difficulty I have started is so far from being considered as invincible, that it does not in the least affect the system of Dicæarchus. I affirmed that Dicæarchus either did not know what he said, or that he was obliged to maintain that the virtue which he made the soul to consist of, always accompanied the body. He answers that he was obliged only to

maintain that it always accompanies the living body; he adds that if I had always joined together these two terms, body and living, my consequence might have been entirely admitted by Dicæarchus, and so would have done no injury to his system: he pretends then that Dicæarchus may deny that, because the soul is a virtue of. living bodies, it therefore follows that this virtue is found in dead bodies; for if it do consist in nothing but the machinal disposition of certain bodies, as he supposes, it evidently follows that it ought to cease as soon as that disposition ceases, as soon as the machine is dissolved. Thus, continues he, a Cartesian would answer those who should maintain, that according to his hypothesis; the souls of beasts subsist even after they are killed. You are mistaken, would he say, for since I suppose that it consists only in a certain disposition of the organs, I must necessarily suppose that it perishes as soon as that disposition is destroyed. The author of the objections supposes, that it was never concluded against the Cartesians that the virtue of sensation does, not cease in dead bodies, and that the parts of living bodies preserve in themselves their life and soul when they are corrupted. It is certain this consequence is not objected to the Cartesians, but it is because they attribute no sensation to the soul of brutes; for if they made it sensitive, the same difficulties that I have objected to Dicæarchus, would fall upon them, and they would be obliged as well as he, to obviate them. Lastly, he objects that what I have said that all the modifications we know of, do not cease to be, but by making room for other modifications of the same kind, whence it follows that a body which once has had sensations, will always continue to have them; he objects, I say, that Dicæarchus is little concerned in this, for he never attributed life to matter till after the requisite modification to make it a living body; to wit , by the various disposition of its parts, so that I had no right to make him ascribe life to any part of matter after its dissolution, though before and after it is body, but not living body. This is the conclusion of the author of the objections. Observe, he does not enter the lists in defence of the doctrine itself of Dicæarchus; he acknowledges the falsehood and impiety of it: his design is only to show that I was in the wrong to charge him with inconsistency, and that the system was justly connected together, although the philosopher did not admit of sensation and an imperishable life, in bodies that had been once alive.

You see here the full state of the question: the question is, to know whether a philosopher who believes that there are bodies who think and bodies that do not think, reasons consistently: I say he does not, and that whoever once admits that, for example, a collection of bones and nerves feels and reasons, ought to maintain, on pain of being declared guilty of not knowing what he says, that every other system of matter thinks; and that thinking, which once subsisted in a combination of matter, still subsists under other modifications in the separated parts, after the dissolution of that combination. I shall not repeat the proofs I have already given upon this subject, nor is it necessary to strengthen them, for the author of the objections has not attacked them. He has only observed that Dicæarchus ought not to trouble himself about it, considering he has declared that matter does not begin to live till after a certain disposition of its parts. But it is chiefly upon this very thing that I would charge him with not knowing what he said. He did not mean by life merely breathing, eating, walking. He meant all the operations of a man, the action of the five external senses, the imagination, reflection, reasoning, &c. I maintain that he supposes what has hitherto been inconceivable to all mankind, if he suppose that the sole

disposition of the organs of a human body should cause a substance to become thinking, that never thought before. All that the disposition of these organs can do, is confined to local motion variously modified, as in a clock, all the difference being only from more to less; but as the ranging of the several wheels which compose a clock, would signify nothing to produce the effects of that machine, if each wheel before it was placed after a certain method, had not actually an impenetrable extension, the necessary cause of motion, as soon as it was pushed forward with a certain degree of force; so I say also the ranging of the organs of a man’s body would be of no service to produce thought, if each organ before it was fixed in its place, had not actually the faculty of thinking. Now this faculty is quite another thing from impenetrable extension, for all you can do to this extension by pulling, striking, or pushing it all manner of ways, is a change of situation, the whole nature and essence of which you can fully conceive without having recourse to any sensation, and even when you deny there is any sensation in it. There have been some men of great genius who have showed themselves a little too slow of heart to believe the distinction of the soul of man from the body, but nobody that I know of, ever dared hitherto to say that he clearly conceived that in order to make a substance pass from the privation of all thought to actual thinking, it was sufficient to put it into motion, so that this change of situation was, for instance, a sense of joy, an affirmation, an idea of moral virtue, &c.; and though some should boast that they had a clear conception of it, they would not deserve to be credited, and we might apply to them a passage of Aristotle that I have quoted in another place. What an absurdity would it be to maintain that there are two species of colour, one which is the object of sight and no more, and the other the object both of sight and smell. It is yet more absurd to maintain that there are two species of roundness, one which consists merely in the parts of the circumference of a body being equally distant from the centre, the other, which together with that is also an act by which the round body perceives that it exists, and sees round about it several other bodies. It is the same absurdity to assert that there are two kinds of circular motion, one which is nothing else but the change of situation upon a line, the parts of which are equally distant from the centre; the other which together with this, is an act of love to God, of fear, hope, &c. What I have said of roundness with respect to vision, may be applied to all sorts of figures with respect to all kinds of thought; and what I have said of circular motion is equally strong with respect to all other lines in which a body can move slowly or swiftly; and therefore we ought to conclude that thought is distinct from all the modifications of body that are come to our knowledge, since it is distinct from all figure and from all change of situation: but this not being the question here, I shall content myself with concluding that Dicæarchus in order to argue consistently, ought to have admitted that every system of matter is endued with the faculty of thinking, for without that, it was absurd to pretend that provided several veins, arteries, &c. were placed one by another as the different parts of a machine, it would produce the sensations of colour, taste, sound, smell, cold, heat, love, hatred, affirmation, negation, &c.

Methinks, if I had even plainly and absolutely affirmed, that nobody had hitherto boasted of having a clear idea of a modification of matter, which is an act of sensation, I should not have proceeded with rashness; for I see in the “News from the Republic of Letters,” that Mr Locke, one of the profoundest metaphysicians in the world, confesses ingenuously, that a body endowed with thought is an

incomprehensible thing: and observe, he makes this confession in answer to an objection founded upon this incomprehensibility. It was therefore very much his interest to deny the foundation of this objection, whence it must be concluded that this confession was very sincere, and an effect of the power of truth, and a proof that all his utmost endeavours to comprehend the union of thought with a material substance, were fruitless. Now since so great a man confesses this, is it not probable that never any person durst boast to comprehend the union? This would be too general, if I added nothing more to it. Let it be observed then, that the question whether the soul of man is distinct from matter, is part of the famous dispute between Dr Stillingfleet and Mr Locke: the former maintained, that matter is incapable of thinking, and thereby became the defender of a fundamental article of philosophical orthodoxy. Among other arguments, he makes use of this; “that it cannot be conceived how matter can think.” Mr Locke confesses the truth of this principle, and contents himself with denying the consequence; for he pretends that God can do things which are incomprehensible to human understanding, and therefore, because man cannot comprehend that a portion of matter cannot acquire the faculty of thinking, it does not follow that God, who is Almighty, “cannot give if he please some degree of sense, perception, and thought, to certain collections of created matter, combined together as he thinks proper. All the difficulties that are raised,” says he, “against the possibility of there being thinking matter, derived from our ignorance, or the narrow limits of our conceptions, do not in the least affect the power of God, if he please to communicate to matter the faculty of thinking, and they do not prove that he has not actually communicated such a faculty to certain parts of matter, disposed as he thought fit, till it can be made out that it is a contradiction to suppose such a thing.” This is a formal confession of the incomprehensibility of the thing, and a recourse to the almighty power of God, for effects which sure beyond the limits of our understandings. It is much after the same manner that the schoolmen suppose an obediential power in the creatures, whereby God might, if he would, raise them to any state whatsoever. A stone might become capable of the beatific vision, and a drop of water capable of washing away all the pollution of original sin. In order to confute this obediential power of matter with respect to knowledge, we might make use of an argument which it does not appear that Dr Stillingfleet has used. That argument always seemed to me very proper to show the impossibility of joining thought, and the three dimensions, together in the same subject. You will find the particulars of this proof in the book I quote. Nouvelles de la Repub. des Lettres, August, 1684. Art. VI. ¹⁴² A passionate divine, arguing against the abbot de Dangeau, who bad urged this argument, criticised him as well as he could; but he only talked impertinently.

Consider well my expression of philosophical orthodoxy; for I do not pretend that, with respect to theological, evangelical, or Christian orthodoxy, Dr Stillingfleet is superior to Mr Locke. To affirm that, because the soul of man thinks, it is therefore immaterial, is I think right reasoning, and is also establishing a most solid foundation of the immortality of our souls, a doctrine which ought to be considered as one of the most important articles of true philosophy; but this truth, as it is grounded upon such a principle, does not belong to Christian theology. A Christian divine, every Christian in general, as a Christian, believes the immortality of the soul, heaven, hell, &c, because these are truths which God has revealed to us. It is upon this account only, that his faith is a true act of religion, a meritorious act, acceptable to God, the

state of a child of God, and of a disciple of Jesus Christ; and those who should believe the immortality of the soul, purely upon those philosophical ideas with which their reason furnishes them, would be no farther advanced in the kingdom of God, than those who believe that the whole is greater than its part. Therefore, since Mr Locke founds his belief of the immortality of the soul upon the scripture, he has as much Christian, evangelical, and theological orthodoxy as he can have. What he says upon this subject is admirable; I shall probably cite it in some other place.—Art. DicÆarchus.