A. Opinion of Others

196. To the third question [n.139] it seems that it can probably be said that theology is not about all knowables, The opinion of Henry of Ghent. ⁶³because quiddities distinct from the divine essence as it is this singular essence contain first many truths virtually about themselves. The proof is that, after everything else per impossibile has been removed, these quiddities, if they were uncreated, would still contain such truths, as is clear of line and number with respect to the immediate propositions about them. And, accordingly, one could set down that in the divine intellect there were habits distinct in idea, I mean habits of science,Again the opinion of Henry of Ghent. ⁶⁴ namely: theology would be the one that the divine essence as this essence would cause in the divine intellect, while geometry in his intellect would be the one that was in his intellect by virtue of line, and arithmetic in this way by virtue of number, and so on about others.

197. Against this in three ways:

First, because the divine intellect would be cheapened by reason of the fact that it would be opened up by an object other than its essence; for in the instant of nature in which it understood line, it would still be in a state of potentiality with respect to knowing the truths that exist in line - and it recognizes those truths by virtue of the quiddity of line - , therefore line would as it were be the efficient cause imprinting the knowledge of those truths on the divine intellect, and so line will be the mover of the divine intellect.

198. Second thus: the first object of every power that is made actual by diverse objects through their per se proper virtue is something that is common to those objects; but if line, by virtue of itself, caused truth in the divine intellect, by equal reason other things too will cause truth in God’s intellect, and so the first object of the divine intellect will be common being, not his own singular essence. Nor is it an objection here that other objects are attributed to his essence; for thus are other beings attributed to substance, and yet the first object of our intellect is being.

Third, because if his essence is the first object, it is clear that it is not first by commonness of predication; therefore it will be first by virtual-ness. But it would not be the first object virtually if anything else were to effect, in accord with its own virtue, a change in his intellect.