Question 2. Whether Theology is about God under some special Idea

133. The question second is whether theology is about God under some special idea.

That it is so is argued thus:

Hugh [of St. Victor] in On Sacraments at the beginning wants the subject to be “the works of restoration;” therefore if God is this subject, this will be under some special idea of it, namely insofar as he is restorer.

134. Cassiodorus in On the Psalter pref, ch.13 wants the subject to be Christ, the head with his members; therefore he will be the subject specifically as incarnate or as head of the Church.

135. Again, God absolutely is the subject of metaphysics; therefore if he is the subject here, this will be under some special idea. The proof of the consequence is that the subject in this case and in that is not taken under wholly the same idea. The proof of the antecedent is from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 6.1.1026a21-23: “The most honorable science should be about the most honorable subject;” metaphysics according to him is the most honorable science. A confirmation for this indeed is that he there calls metaphysics theology [1026a18-19].

136. Again, Averroes on Physics 1, final comment [com.83], says that Avicenna was greatly at fault for laying down that metaphysics proves that there is a first cause, since the class of separate substances is there the subject and no science proves that its subject exists; but Averroes’ reason would not be valid unless he understood God there to be the first subject; therefore etc.

137. Again, this science is most honorable, therefore it is about the noblest subject under its noblest idea; of this sort is the idea of end and good. The proof, as to the end, is in Avicenna Metaphysics 6 ch.5 (95rb): “If the science is about causes, the one that is about the end would be noblest.” More properly: “But if there is a science per se of each of the causes, certainly the science about the final cause would be the nobler among them.” ⁴³From this the conclusion about the good follows, because - according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 2.2.994b12-13 - he who posits an infinity in respect of ends destroys the idea of good, because he destroys the idea of end. From this is taken the conclusion that the idea of good is the idea of end.

138. On the contrary:

Knowledge with a restriction presupposes knowledge without a restriction, or absolute knowledge. But absolute knowledge is more certain, from Metaphysics 1.2.982a21-23, 25-28; therefore if this science is of God under some special idea, there will be some other science, prior and more certain, about God taken absolutely; but no such science is posited; therefore etc.