Third Part. On the Object of Theology

Question 1. Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

124. The question is whether theology is about God as about its first object.

And that it is not is argued in two ways:

[Argument in the First Way] - The first way is that something else is the subject of theology, therefore this is not.

The antecedent is proved in several ways:

125. First thus, from Augustine On Christian Doctrine 1 ch.2 n.2: “All Scripture is of things or of signs;” therefore things or signs are the subject.

126. Again, Scripture has four senses: the anagogical, the tropological, the allegorical, and the historical or literal; but to each of these senses there corresponds some first subject, just as to any other science having one sense there corresponds a subject in accord with that sense; therefore here there are four subjects.

127. Again, that man is the subject is proved by the authority of the Commentator on Ethics bk.1 in the prologue, because, according to him there, moral science is of man as to his soul, medical science is of man as to his body. From this is received the proposition: ‘every practical science has for first object that for which the end of the practical science is acquired and not the end itself’; but the end of this science is acquired for man, not God; therefore man is the subject of this science.

128. Again in another way, though it comes back to the same: the end of a science is to attain through its act the first object by introducing into the act the form principally intended by the science, to wit: as in the case of speculative science, to introduce into it ‘being known’, because knowledge is principally there intended; in the case of practical science, to introduce the form to which its action is ordered; but the end here intended is moral goodness, and the intention is not to introduce it in God but in man; therefore man is its first object.

129. [Argument in the Second Way] - The second way to the proposed conclusion is to show that God is not theology’s first object.

This is proved first by the authority of Boethius On the Trinity ch.2: “The form,” he says, “cannot be a simple subject.”

130. Again, the matter does not coincide with the other causes in the same thing, whether in number or in kind (Physics 2.7.198a24-27); but God is the end and efficient cause of this science; therefore he is not the matter of it.

131. Again, from Posterior Analytics 1.28.87a38-39, the subject of a science has parts: principles and properties. But God does not have integral parts, since he is altogether simple, nor subjective parts, since he is singular of himself; nor does he have principles, since he is the first principle, nor properties, because a property is present in a subject in such a way that it is outside the subject’s essence; nothing is present in God in this way.

132: To the Contrary:

Augustine City of God VIII ch.1: “Theology is discussion or reasoning about God.”

Question 2. Whether Theology is about God under some special Idea

133. The question second is whether theology is about God under some special idea.

That it is so is argued thus:

Hugh [of St. Victor] in On Sacraments at the beginning wants the subject to be “the works of restoration;” therefore if God is this subject, this will be under some special idea of it, namely insofar as he is restorer.

134. Cassiodorus in On the Psalter pref, ch.13 wants the subject to be Christ, the head with his members; therefore he will be the subject specifically as incarnate or as head of the Church.

135. Again, God absolutely is the subject of metaphysics; therefore if he is the subject here, this will be under some special idea. The proof of the consequence is that the subject in this case and in that is not taken under wholly the same idea. The proof of the antecedent is from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 6.1.1026a21-23: “The most honorable science should be about the most honorable subject;” metaphysics according to him is the most honorable science. A confirmation for this indeed is that he there calls metaphysics theology [1026a18-19].

136. Again, Averroes on Physics 1, final comment [com.83], says that Avicenna was greatly at fault for laying down that metaphysics proves that there is a first cause, since the class of separate substances is there the subject and no science proves that its subject exists; but Averroes’ reason would not be valid unless he understood God there to be the first subject; therefore etc.

137. Again, this science is most honorable, therefore it is about the noblest subject under its noblest idea; of this sort is the idea of end and good. The proof, as to the end, is in Avicenna Metaphysics 6 ch.5 (95rb): “If the science is about causes, the one that is about the end would be noblest.” More properly: “But if there is a science per se of each of the causes, certainly the science about the final cause would be the nobler among them.” ⁴³From this the conclusion about the good follows, because - according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 2.2.994b12-13 - he who posits an infinity in respect of ends destroys the idea of good, because he destroys the idea of end. From this is taken the conclusion that the idea of good is the idea of end.

138. On the contrary:

Knowledge with a restriction presupposes knowledge without a restriction, or absolute knowledge. But absolute knowledge is more certain, from Metaphysics 1.2.982a21-23, 25-28; therefore if this science is of God under some special idea, there will be some other science, prior and more certain, about God taken absolutely; but no such science is posited; therefore etc.

Question 3. Whether Theology is about Everything by Way of Attribution of them to its First Subject

139. The question is whether theology is about everything by way of attribution of them to its first subject.

That it is:

Metaphysics 4.1.1003a21-22: the science about a thing and about the attributes of the thing is the same, as is shown there by the example of health; but all other things are attributed essentially to the first subject of this science; therefore etc.

140. [Augustine] On the Trinity 14 ch.1 n.3: “And must not be attributed to this science etc.”More fully: “Certainly I do not attribute to this science everything that can be known about man in human affairs, but only that whereby most salutary faith, which leads to true beatitude, is generated, nourished, defended, strengthened.” ⁴⁴

I. Preliminary Remarks

141. As to the solution of this question [nn.124-140] I proceed thus: first I distinguish between theology in itself and theology in us; second I will designate the idea of its first subject; third I will distinguish theology into its parts.

[About theology in itself and in us] - On the first point I say that any science taken in itself is that which is naturally had of the object of the science in accord with the way the object naturally manifests itself to an intellect commensurate with it; now doctrine for us is what is naturally had in our intellect about the object. Therefore theology in itself is the sort of knowledge that the object of theology naturally produces in an intellect commensurate with itself; but theology in us is the sort of knowledge that our intellect naturally has about the object. - An example: if some intellect could not understand geometrical matters yet could believe someone else about geometrical matters, geometry for it would be faith, not science; however geometry in itself would be a science, because the object of geometry naturally produces science of itself in an intellect commensurate with it.

142. [On the Idea of the First Object] - On the second point I say that the nature of the first object is to be what first contains virtually in itself all the truths of the habit of the science. Which I prove thus: first, that the first object contains the immediate propositions, because the subject of those propositions contains the predicate, and thus it contains the evidence for the whole proposition; now immediate propositions contain the conclusions; therefore the subject of the immediate propositions contains all the truths of the habit of the science.

143. I make the same clear in a second way thus, that ‘firstness’ is here taken from Posterior Analytics 1 ch.4 73b32-33, from the definition of ‘universal’ in the sense in which ‘universal’ indicates adequacy: the object Note by Scotus added before ‘the object’: “He proceeds to a difficulty about the causality of the object, and, as this is omitted here, say.” ⁴⁵would not be adequate to the habit unless it virtually contained everything that such a habit inclines one to consider, because, if it did not, the habit would exceed the object.[A note that Scotus cancelled here reads: “but the object is related to the habit as cause to effect; now a cause is not adequate unless it virtually contains the whole effect; therefore etc.” The note was cancelled by Scotus because of the addition just made: “He proceeds to a difficulty about the causality of the object.”] ⁴⁶

144. By the phrase ‘first.. .virtually’ [n.142], I mean that it is first in the sense that it does not depend on another but other things depend on it; in this sense, then, ‘first contains’ means that, in its containing, it does not depend on other things but other things depend on it, that is, that if,per impossibile, all other things in the idea of the object were removed and only it remained understood, it would still objectively contain them. But it does not contain anything else save through its idea.

145. That its essence, once known with the habit of science, contains ‘first virtually’ the knowledge of all the truths of the habit:

The habit that is called science is an intelligible likeness (species) of the first object; it regards immediate truths and mediate ones, not formally, but by implication, and its formally adequate object is the quiddity of which it is the likeness. What wonder, then, if the first object, qua known, contains the knowledge of the things which its intelligible species moves one, although mediately, to consider? Nay rather, it is the same thing for the intelligible species of A to contain virtually knowledge of B, and for the A itself, as known with the habit of science, to contain it, that is, that the intelligible species of the A itself in memory is able to generate knowledge of B in the intelligence. In this way, then, the first object of the intellect and of the science are the same; and then the first object distinguishes, not them, but what proximately follows them, which is immediate and mediate truth, and the first object of the two of them is related in a certain order to the proximate objects and to the habit of science of the proximate objects. In this way it is impossible to use the habit of the science save by using first in nature, and also in time, the habit of intellect, because I never contemplate anything in scientific knowledge save by considering it as true, evident to me because of some other truth. Either, then, they are the same habit, and I first use the habit about the object to which it first inclines me (nay rather, according to Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 9 q.4, both are the same as the habit which is the quiddity of the first simple object, which habit you say is called science by Aristotle in his distinction of sciences);This opinion of Henry’s is discussed and rejected by Scotus in Metaphysics 6 q.1 nn.3-7. ⁴⁷ or they are more than one habit - nay rather, any truth at all has its own habit, and, in addition to it, there is the habit of the quiddity of the first object, which you say is the intelligible likeness, and it virtually includes all of the habits - and then he who uses the later habit must at the same time be using all the prior ones.

Can it be, then, that a habit, when compared with many acts or with one act, has an act proper to both of what it is compared with? And, besides this, an act of comparing it as well with that chief act of discursive reasoning? - My own proper act is set down as that whereby I am inclined to perform a demonstration, that is, to infer this from that; for which extremes I have two acts; look for the passage with the triangular mark below, against Henry of Ghent and Richard of St. Victor [1 d.2 p.2 q1.4 nn.35, 36] - If a plurality of habits may be made sense of, a fewness of them should be preferred.

146. On the contrary, namely against the designation of the above posited idea of the first object [nn.142-145], there are two arguments. First thus: as the first object is to the power, so is the first object to the habit; but the first object of the power is something common to all the per se objects of that power; therefore the first object of the habit is something common to all its objects, and not something that virtually contains other things.

147. Again second: because what is commonly designated for first object in the sciences is something that is common to all the things that are considered in that science, as line is in geometry, number in arithmetic, being in metaphysics.

148. To the first argument [n.146] I reply and say that the way the object is commensurate with the power is the way the mover is commensurate with the thing moved, or the way the active thing is commensurate with the passive; the way the object is commensurate with the habit is the way the cause is commensurate with the effect. Now whenever some agent acts on some patient, any agent also of the same nature can act on any patient of the same nature. Therefore the first extremes of the commensurate relation of the active thing to the passive thing are common to all the per se extremes of that relation; for among those most common things is adequacy, because anything that the nature of one is in has regard to anything that the nature of the other is in. But the first extremes of the commensurate relation of cause to effect are not most common, because there is no adequacy between them; for not anything contained under what is common has respect to the habit as to its effect, but only some first object or content does, which virtually respects or contains everything that the habit extends itself to.

149. To the second argument [n.147] I reply that, in the case of many habits differing in species, there can be some common object in the way that from their objects an object that is common can be extracted; and in this way there is a common object designated in the sciences that gives rise to a habit, not one in species, but only one in genus.

150. [On the Parts of Theology] - On the third [n.141] I say that theology not only contains things that are necessary but also things that are contingent. The matter is plain, because all the truths about God relating to what is extrinsic to him, whether they are about him as triune or about any of the divine persons, are contingent, as that God creates, that the Son is incarnate, and the like; but all the truths about God as triune or as a determinate person are theological, because they have regard to no human science; therefore the first integral parts of theology are two, namely truths necessary and truths contingent.

II. About the Necessary Part of Theology

A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

151. On the basis of what has been said I give my reply to the first question. And first, speaking of theology in itself as to its necessary truths, I say that the first object of theology in itself cannot be anything but God; which I prove with three reasons.

The first is taken from the idea of first object, and I argue thus: the first object contains virtually all the truths of the habit of science of which it is the first object; nothing contains virtually all the theological truths except God; therefore etc. - Proof of the minor: nothing else contains those truths as cause, or as that to which they are attributed, except God, because God is attributed to no other thing; nor does anything contain those truths as an effect does by way of ‘proof that’, for no effect proves that God is triune [cf. n.41], which is the greatest theological truth, or the like truths; therefore etc.Note by Scotus: “This is valid against the opinion about Christ;” cf. n.134 above and n.173 below. ⁴⁸

152. Secondly thus: theology is of things that are naturally known only to the divine intellect, therefore it is of an object naturally known only to God; but only God is naturally known to himself; therefore etc. - Proof of the first proposition: if this science is about things naturally known to another intellect, then there are, in addition to these things, some other things naturally knowable only to the divine intellect, because the divine intellect is infinite and therefore has cognition of more things than a finite intellect; therefore there will still be another science superior to the one that is about things naturally known to a created intellect. - Proof of the minor: every created essence can be naturally known by some created intellect; therefore only an uncreated essence can be known only by the uncreated intellect.

153. Third thus: in no science is as distinct a cognition or knowledge handed down about any other thing that is not the first object of that science as would be handed down in the science that is about that other thing as about its first object, because in no science is as distinct a cognition handed down about what is not its per se object as about what is its per se object; for then there would be no reason for that subject rather than something else to be its subject. Therefore if God is not here the subject, there is not handed down here as distinct a cognition of him as would be handed down in some other science in which he could be the subject; but he can be the subject in some other science; therefore the latter science would be prior to the former.Note by Scotus: “Note: valid against the opinion about Christ.” ⁴⁹

154. Besides these three reasons there are other persuasive considerations.

The first is as follows: theology according to Augustine On the Trinity 13 ch.1 n.2 and 14 ch.1 n.3 is in one part of itself wisdom and in another part of itself science; but if it was formally about anything non-eternal, science would be formally about that thing, and wisdom would not in any way be about it, because eternal things are not attributed to temporal things.

155. The second one is that the superior part of reason has some perfection corresponding to itself. But if this perfection is about a non-eternal subject as about its first object, since the eternal is not attributed to the non-eternal, the result is that in no way is it about eternal things, and thus neither does it perfect the superior part of reason.Interpolation: “But if it is not about eternal things, it does not perfect the superior part of reason.” ⁵⁰ Therefore there would be some other intellectual habit nobler than it perfecting that part of reason, which is inappropriate.

156. The third is that, according to Augustine On the Trinity 13 ch.9 n.12 or 14 ch. 1 n.3, this science is about things whereby faith is “generated, defended, and strengthened” [cf. n.140], therefore it is about the object which is the same as the first object of faith; but faith is about the first truth; therefore etc.

157. The fourth is that “the most noble science is about the most noble kind of thing,” from Metaphysics 61.1026a21-23 and On the Soul 1.1.402a1-4; but it is conceded that this science is most noble; therefore it ought to be about God as about its object [cf. nn.40, 135].

B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

158. From these statements I make reply to the second question [nn.133, 141]. To make it intelligible I posit an example: man is understood as rational animal, as substance, as tame, as noblest of animals. In the first sense he is understood according to his proper quidditative idea, in the second in a general way, in the third per accidens in a property, in the fourth in relation to something else. But the most perfect knowledge of man cannot be in relation to something else, because knowledge of relation presupposes knowledge of what is non-relational or absolute; nor can the most perfect knowledge be about man under the idea of a property, because knowledge of a property presupposes knowledge of the subject; nor can it be about man in general or universally, because that is confused or unspecific knowledge. Therefore the noblest cognition of man is according to his quidditative idea. Thus one could posit some science of God under the idea of relation to something extrinsic, in the way that some posit knowledge of him under the idea of repairer [cf. n.133], or of glorifier, or head of the Church [cf. n. 134]; or one could posit some science of God under the idea of some attribute, which is a sort of property, in the way that some posit that knowledge of God under the idea of good [cf. n.137] is this science; or one could posit some science of him under a general or universal idea [cf. n. 146-147], as under that of being, or infinite being, or necessary being, or some such thing.

159. Argument against all these positions.

First against the one about general idea, for no general concept asserted of God contains virtually all the properly theological truths that pertain to the plurality of persons; for if it did, since those general concepts are naturally conceived by us, then the immediate propositions about those concepts can be naturally known and understood by us, and through those immediate propositions we would be able to know the conclusions, and so acquire naturally the whole of theology.

160. Second, because since general concepts are not naturally known only to God, then neither are the truths included in those general concepts naturally known only to God; therefore theology, if it was of God under such a general concept, would not be naturally known only to God, the opposite of which was shown in the first question [n.

152].

161. Against the other position about the idea of attribute [n.158] one could argue through the same reasons, but I argue nevertheless through certain special reasons.

First, because cognition of a thing according to its essence is the most perfect cognition, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.1.1028a36-b2; therefore knowledge of God’s essence is a more perfect cognition of God than is knowledge of any attributable property which is related to his nature as a characteristic of it, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.4.

162. Second, because if those properties differ really from God’s essence, his essence would be really cause of them; therefore, just as they differ in idea from the essence, so the essence in its idea has the idea of being uncaused but these other properties, although, because of their identity with the essence, they are uncaused, yet, in their formal idea, do not include as a primary datum their own being uncaused.

163. Third, because that thing, according to its own proper idea, seems to be more actual in itself which has a greater repugnance to being communicable with many things extrinsic to it; but communicability with many things extrinsic to it is repugnant to essence in itself and not to any attributable property, except insofar as the property is of the essence, or is the same as that essence as infinite.

If it be said that any property is infinite and therefore incommunicable, on the contrary: its infinity is because of an infinity and identity with the essence as with the root source and foundation of every intrinsic perfection.

164. Against the way also about relations to what is extrinsic [n.158] one can make the same arguments as against the other two ways, but I have special reasons.

First, because relation to what is extrinsic is a relation of reason; but a science that does not consider its subject under its idea as real is not a science of real things, just as neither is logic a science of real things, although it considers things as having second intentions attributed to them; therefore theology would not be a science of real things, which is false.

165. Second, because what is absolute and what is relational do not form a concept that is per se one; therefore a concept that gathers these two into itself is a concept that is per accidens one. But no primary science is of a concept that is per accidens one, because such a concept presupposes the sciences of both its parts; and therefore, if a subalternate science is about anything that is per accidens one, it presupposes the two sciences that separately treat of the parts of the whole. Therefore if theology were of such a per accidens unity, there could be another science prior to it, which would be of a concept that is one per se.

166. Third, no relation to what is extrinsic is shown to belong necessarily to God; therefore nothing theological will belong necessarily to God as he is the subject of theology, which is false. - Proof of the consequence: that which belongs to anything under a reason for inherence that is not necessary does not belong to it necessarily; but every relation to what is extrinsic is of this sort; therefore etc. And thus no theological truth is necessary. And this conclusion is proved by the first and second reasons set down for the first question, namely about the idea of the first subject and about what is naturally known only by God.

167. I concede, therefore, the fourth member [n.158], that is, that theology is of God under the idea by which namely he is this essence, just as the most perfect science of man would be of man if it were of him as he is man, but not if it were of him under some universal or accidental idea.

C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

168. To the first question about our theology [nn.124, 141] I say that when a habit exists in an intellect which gets evidence from the object, then the first object of that habit, as it belongs to the habit, does not only contain the habit virtually but, as known to the intellect, it contains the habit in such a way that the knowledge of the object in the intellect contains, as it is in the intellect, the evidence of the habit. Interpolation: “because the intellect knowing such an object can draw out every conclusion or concept of that habit.” ⁵¹But in a habit that does not get evidence from the object, but gets it caused in some other way, one must not grant that its first object has the two conditions just stated; nay rather one should not grant either condition, because it is just like a habit that would in this respect be about things contingent, which contingent things do not have the first object in either way. To such a habit, then, which does not get evidence from the object, there is given a first subject about some first known thing, that is, some most perfectly first thing, that is, in which the first truths of the habit immediately inhere. - Our theology is a habit which does not get evidence from the object; and also the theology that is in us about necessary theological matters, as it exists in us, does not more get evidence from the known object than the theology that is about contingent theological matters does;Interpolation: “to wit, the fact that God is three and One does not have evidence from the object known, because we do not know God under the idea of God, but from elsewhere; we believe it because we find it written. Therefore if you then find a written science of geometry, the object of geometry would not then contain the written properties as they are seen by my intellect, because it would not be known to me under the idea of first object; therefore a first object of such a sort should, with respect to such habit, be assigned as the intellect would assign first those truths to.” ⁵² therefore to our theology, as it is ours, one should only give a first known object that has first truths immediately known about it. That first object is infinite being, because this is the most perfect concept which we can have about what is in itself the first subject, which subject, however, has neither foresaid condition, because it does not virtually contain our habit in itself, and much less does it, as known to us, contain the habit itself. Yet because our theology about necessary things is about the same as what theology in itself is about, therefore to it is assigned an object that is first to the extent of containing the truths in itself, and this object is the same as the first subject of theology in itself; but because it is not evident to us, therefore it does not contain those truths as it is known to us, indeed rather it is not known to us.

When you argue, then, that “therefore it is not the first object of our habit” [n. 146], I reply: it is true that it is not a first object that gives evidence to us, but it is a first object that contains all the truths in itself, naturally fit or capable of sufficiently giving evidence, were it known.

These things are said to the question, or to the two questions, about the theology of necessary things [nn.124, 133, 141, 151-168].

III. On Contingent Theology

169. But now we must see in the case of contingent theological truths [n.150] what the prime subject is here. And as to these truths I say that no subject contains anything but necessary truths about itself, because, as to contingent truths about itself, it is of itself related to them and to their opposites equally. There is, however, an order in contingent truths, and some contingent truth is true first; and thus that can be posited as first subject of many contingent truths about which is stated first, that is immediately, the predicate of the first contingent truth (which truth is as it were the principle in the order of contingent truths), or the predicates of several first contingent truths, if several are first. But the first subject of the first contingent truth is said to be that which, when seen as such, is naturally seen first to be conjoined with the predicate of that truth, because the first thing known in contingent truths is only known through intuition of the extremes; therefore the first thing one can intuit in which the predicate of the first contingent truth inheres, that is the first subject of all the contingent truths in order.

170. On the basis of these statements I say to the issue in question that the divine essence is the first subject of contingent theology and that, when taken in the very same way as was said before, it is the first subject of necessary theology [n.167]; - and this holds as much of contingent theology in itself the way it is in the divine intellect as it also does of it the way it is in the intellect of the blessed. Of the whole of theology in itself, then, both of God and of the blessed, the first subject is his essence as this essence, the vision of which by the blessed is like what the cognition of being is in metaphysics; and for that reason blissful vision is not theology but a sort of perfect simple apprehension of the subject, which apprehension naturally precedes the science.

171. Of our contingent theology the first subject seems to be the same as it is also of necessary theology, and in the way expounded above [n.168], because it is not the subject as containing - even if it is seen in intuition - but as knowable by us, proximate to that in which, when known in intuition, the predicate of the first evident contingent truth naturally inheres [n.169].

On the contrary: it seems that the Word is the adequate object of contingent theology, both of that theology as it is in itself and of it as it is in the divine intellect, because it is the first subject of all the articles about our reparation.

I reply: some other contingent thing can be first said of the Word, and some other contingent thing of the Holy Spirit, and some other contingent thing of the triune God, namely ‘to create’; therefore the persons will be as it were parts of the subject, just as some necessary things are also first true of the diverse persons.

IV. On Christ as First Object

172. [The Opinion of Bonaventure] From what has been said the refutation of the opinion that posits Christ as first subject Bonaventure On the Sentences 1 prologue q.1 in corp. (1 7b): “The subject too, to which, as to ‘the integral whole’, all the things determined in this book are reduced is Christ, insofar as he embraces the divine and human nature, or the created and the uncreated, about which are the two first books; and as he is head and members, about which are the two following books. And I take ‘integral whole’ in a broad sense, because it embraces many things not only in composition but in union and in order.” ⁵³is plain, because then the necessary truths about the Father and the Holy Spirit - to wit, ‘the Father generates’, ‘the Holy Spirit proceeds’ - would not be theological truths, nor would the contingent truths about them be, to wit ‘the Father creates through the Son’, ‘the Holy Spirit is sent in time visibly and invisibly’; nor the necessary truths about the triune God, as that he is omnipotent, boundless, nor the contingent truths, as that God creates, God governs the world, remits sins, punishes, rewards, and the like. - The proof of all these consequences is that no truth belongs per se to any science unless it be about its first subject, or about a part of it, whether integral or essential, or about something essentially attributed to the subject. It is plain that the Father or the Trinity is not Christ, nor part of him in any of the stated ways, nor anything essentially attributed to Christ; both because since Christ signifies two natures - and that insofar as he is subject, according to those who posit him as subject - it follows that, as having a created nature, he will be essentially prior to the Father and to the Trinity (because an essential attribution is only made to what is essentially prior), which is false; and because Christ even in his divinity does not have any such priority according to which the Father or the Trinity could be attributed to him.

173. Against this opinion too are the reasons placed last in the solution of the second question against the position about relation to what is extrinsic [nn.164-166]. -Against the same is the first reason set down for the solution of the first question [n.151], because the necessary truths about the Father, about the Holy Spirit, and about the Trinity cannot be virtually contained first in Christ, because if the Word had not been made incarnate, those truths would not have been necessary, which is false. The third reason too in the same place [n.153] is valid here, because no knowledge would have been handed down about God except as it is included in Christ; this knowledge is about the Word only and thus is not the most distinct knowledge that could be handed down; therefore some other knowledge prior to it would have to be required.

174. The same point is shown by some of the persuasive reasons there set down [nn.154-156], because the unity which belongs to ChristIn the position of Bonaventure, see the previous footnote ⁵⁴ as he is one supposit in two natures is not an eternal unity; but it would be necessary to assert that formal unity of the first subject; therefore the first subject as first is not something eternal only.

The persuasive reason about faith Again in the position of Bonaventure. ⁵⁵seems also to be conclusive; for it is not a theological belief or truth that this man was crucified, as it does not in the subject term implicate the Word, because the Jews were able naturally to see this man on the cross. But it is a theological belief and truth that the Word was a man born of a Virgin, that the Word was a man crucified, that the Word was a man rising from the dead, and so on about the articles pertaining to his humanity; but as for those that pertain to his divinity, it is plain that they do not belong first to Christ as he is Christ, but some to the other persons, some to the Trinity.

Therefore the adequate object of theology is not Christ but something that is as it were common both to the Word, about whom primarily are believed the articles pertaining to reparation, and to the Father and to the Holy Spirit, about whom are some other theological truths.

175. It seems then that one must say that things are like the way they are in medicine, on the supposition that the human body is the first subject about which health and sickness are there considered as the property: if the kinds of human body were body mixed thus and so, to wit blooded body, phlegmatic body, etc., this whole thing, healthy blooded body, would not there be the first subject, both because it is too particular and also because it includes the need to consider a property about the subject, and a property cannot be the nature of the subject, because a subject, as it is subject, is naturally prior to its property, and thus a property would be prior to itself. And in brief, whatever might be said about any medicine handed down that was about such a subject, although this subject was a particular and a per accidens being, it would at any rate be impossible for the first science of the body of man to be about a healthy blooded body. Nay rather, if there were a science about it, some other science would be prior: either about the body of man in general, because it has in its generality certain knowable properties that belong to it in its general nature, in the way it is prior to the things that come under it; or about blooded body, whose nature is naturally prior to healthy blooded body, and this prior nature virtually contains the other properties; or about the healthy body of man, because its nature precedes healthy blooded body. Thus also is it in the proposed case. Christ signifies the Word-man, according to Damascene [De Fide Orthodoxa 3 ch.4]; therefore before knowledge about Christ as about the first subject there would naturally be another prior knowledge about the Word, if there are things present in Christ by reason of the fact he is the Word, and there would, before that knowledge, be another knowledge about God as to what is present in him by reason of God as God is common to the three persons.

176. Therefore, if we hold theology to be in itself a first knowledge, it will not be first about Christ; and if it is equally about truths common and proper to the three persons, it would not be about any person as about some adequate subject, but about God as God is common to the three persons. And then the thesis will be saved that either every theological truth is about the first subject, to wit any truth that is in God by reason of God, or is about a subjective part, as it were, of the first subject, to wit any truth that is properly in one of the persons, or is about what is attributed to the first subject or to a part as it were of the subject, to wit about the creature as to the relation it has to God as he is God, and about the assumed nature as to the relation it has to the Word who sustains it [n. 172].

177. [The Opinion of Lincoln] Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, The Work of Six Days ch.1: “.. .And this is the one subject of this wisdom [theology] which the Savior expresses in John when he says: ‘And that they too may be one in us’. Consider what is said, how the ‘one’ by which we are one with the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit - which is also expressed in John when he says ‘And that they too may be one in us’ - seems to bind together in itself the ‘one’ of the substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the ‘one’ of the union of the two natures in the person of Christ, and the ‘one’ whereby we are one in Christ, and ‘one’ by the renewal of the Spirit of our mind with the Supreme Trinity!” ⁵⁶- However Christ is in another way posited as the prime subject according to Lincoln in his The Work of Six Days, and this way is that in which Christ is one by a triple unity, of which the first is unity with the Father and the Holy Spirit, the second the unity of the Word with the assumed nature, the third the unity of Christ the head with his members.

And on behalf of this opinion about Christ seems to be the first reason and the second to last reason set down for the first question [nn.151, 156], because the seven articles of the faith that pertain to Christ’s humanityThese seven (from the Creed) are: conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, descended into hell, rose again from the dead on the third day, ascended into heaven, will come again to judge the living and the dead. ⁵⁷ are not contained in God as subject, because they do not belong to him by nature of his divinity. However that subject does contain the property by whose form the property is present in him. But Christ does contain those articles, because they are present in him according to his humanity, and really so present; he also contains the other articles pertaining to his divinity, These seven articles are: I believe in one God, Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, I believe in the Holy Spirit, creator of heaven and earth, forgiveness of sins, resurrection of the body and life everlasting. ⁵⁸because they are seen to be present in him according to his divinity.

178. A confirmation is that the subjects of the parts of the doctrine should be contained under the subject of the whole of it, either as subjective parts or as integral parts; the subjects of the parts of Scripture are not thus contained under God. The thing is proved by many glosses at the beginnings of books, assigning as their material causes certain things that are not anything in God, to wit, a gloss on Hosea says that the matter of Hosea is ‘the ten tribes’.

179. Again, third: in some places of Scripture nothing proper to God is narrated, because no fact is there narrated where anything is required on the part of God save only his general influence; therefore such a book is not about God.

180. To the first argument [n.177] I say that the contingent truths asserted of Christ are not contained virtually in any subject in the way a subject is said to contain a property, because then those truths would be necessary; yet they do have a subject of which they are immediately and primarily said, and that subject is the Word, for the theological truths about the incarnation, nativity, passion, etc. are these: ‘The Word became man’, ‘the Word was born a man’, ‘the Word suffered as man’ etc.

When you say that ‘the property is present according to his human nature’, I reply that humanity is not the first idea in the subject wherein the resolution of the property rests, but is as it were a prior property, which mediates between the first subject of those truths, which is the Word, and the other later properties, as ‘born’ etc. It is plain that humanity cannot be the idea of the subject in its relation to the first property, which is ‘was incarnate’, because that property is said of the Word without humanity being preunderstood as present in it as in a subject; this is the first reason.

181. To the second [n.178] I say that it would be enough if the attribution of the parts of the science to the first subject is of the sort that the attribution to God can be saved in respect of any matter assigned by the glosses. Otherwise put: God is the matter of any book at all that narrates there about him how he governed the human race; the race or person governed, however, is the remote matter. The glosses are to be understood in this way.

182. Hereby is clear the response to the third [n.179], that although there be some book containing no miracle of God, yet any book contains God’s providence and government of man in general or of a determinate race or person, so much so that if Moses writes about Pharaoh in Exodus the same history as some Egyptian writes in the Egyptian Chronicles, the subject of Moses’ history is God, whose government of man is treated of there, in his merciful liberation of the oppressed Hebrews, in his just punishment of the Egyptian oppressors, in his wise ordering of an appropriate form of liberation, and in his performing, with a view to making the liberated people receive the law with joy, so many signs proper to himself. But the subject of the Egyptian historiographer’s history would be the kingdom, or the king, or the Egyptian people, whose actions and the events that happen to them he intends to write, such that what God did is incidental to him, but what the race did or suffered is principal. For Moses the principal thing is what God did or permitted, and the matter in which it happened is for him as it were incidental. And granted that in some places no miracle is narrated, yet that which God permitted, by giving assistance through his ordinary influence and not preventing, is what is principally intended in that book insofar as it is part of Scripture; and the way this thing was fittingly ordered to some good, if it was capable of being so ordered, or the way it was punished, if it was made, is frequently added in the same or another book; or if the thing was permitted and not in this place punished, Scripture is not silent in other places about it in general that it will be punished somewhere else.

V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

183. [To the Arguments from the First Way] - To the first argument of the first question [n.125] I say that the authority states that the matter of this science, not the first and formal subject of it, is things and signs and the like.

184. To the second [n.126] I say that whatever sense is not literal in one part of Scripture, is literal in another part of Scripture; therefore, although any part of Scripture may have diverse senses, yet Scripture as a whole takes all those senses for the literal sense.

185. To the third [n.127] I say that the argument is to the opposite conclusion, in two ways. First, because in moral science and medical science man is posited as subject for that which contains virtually all the truths of the science. For the human body contains the idea of health virtually; for that is why the health of man is the sort it is, because the human body is the sort of complex it is. Likewise, the soul of man contains the idea of natural felicity virtually, as is clear in Ethics 1.9.1097b22-98a20, where the idea of the natural felicity of man is deduced from the soul, or from the idea of the soul. It is not in this way that man contains the idea of the end of this science (of theology), because supernatural felicity or the object of this science is not included in the idea of man; and therefore man cannot be the first object of this science; therefore etc.

186. Second thus: man is the final end of the sciences just mentioned, and to this end both health and natural felicity are ordered. The proof is that all love of concupiscence presupposes love of friendship [2 d.6 q.2 n.3]; but health and felicity are loved with love of concupiscence; therefore what is loved with love of friendship by him who has love of concupiscence is a further end beyond any of these ends. Such a further end is the body, on one side, and the soul, on the other. Therefore if man in his body or soul is the subject of this science, it follows that his end is the subject of this science.

187. To the fourth [n.128] I say that the first proposition is false, because the fact that nothing else is the end of a science except what, by its own act, attains the object of the science is not because it induces some form in the object by its act, for science is not a quality for making things.

188. [To the Arguments from the Second Way] - To Boethius [n.129] I say that he is speaking of subject in the sense of subject of an accident, not in the sense of subject of study.

To the text from the Physics [n.130] I say that it means matter in the sense of matter ‘from-which’, for this matter and the efficient cause do not coincide, and not that it means the matter ‘of-which’ or ‘about-which’. Or better, one should say that the subject of a science with respect to truth does not belong to the genus of material cause but to the genus of efficient cause; yet the subject of a science is said to be its matter by a certain likeness to the act of making, where the idea of the object ‘about-which’ comes together with the idea of the susceptible matter, because the act of making is a doing that passes over to something outside it. Things are not like this in the case of the proper act of a science; still, a science is understood to pass over, because it does not terminate in itself but in that about which it is, although it is not received in the ‘about-which’ but remains in the knower. And on account of this one property of matter, namely ‘to be that about which’, the object is said to be the matter in relation to the science and to its act.Interpolation: “because the artisan works on something, and in that same thing his making is received; by reason of the first is the object said to be the matter in a science, not by reason of the second, because the act of a science does not pass over [sc. into something else].” ⁵⁹

189. To the text of the Posterior Analytics [n.131] I say that the obj ect of any science naturally discovered is something universal; therefore the subject of such a science should have subjective parts. But of this science (of theology) the object is this essence here (sc. God) as a singular, because it is a mark of imperfection in universal created nature that it is divided among many singulars; once this imperfection has been removed, the result is that this essence is knowable without divisibility of it into subjective parts. Yet it could be said that the divine persons are a sort of subjective parts of the divine essence itself; but the essence itself is not numerically multiplied in them the way it is in other and imperfect things, where the subject is divisible into many parts.

190. As to the point that is added about properties [n.131], some say that the attributes are a sort of properties of the essence itself. But this does not hold, because any attribute as this can properly be known of God theologically, while any attribute as known confusedly is known of him metaphysically. For just as God taken in this way and in that, that is, as this and as confusedly known, pertains to the theologian on the one hand and to the metaphysician on the other, so too does any attribute pertain to them when taken in this way and when taken in that. Text canceled by Scotus: “because a consideration of attributes naturally known to us is a metaphysical consideration, save when there are some attributes that belong per se only to this essence as this and not to it as it is now naturally known by us, namely confusedly.” ⁶⁰As to what is added about the property being outside the essence of the subject [n.131], this is true when the property is really caused by the object; but in the deity that which has the nature of a property is not caused, because it passes over into essence by way of identity; yet, as far as its knowability is concerned, it is known through the idea of the essence as if it were really distinct from the essence.

191. As to what, third, is said about the principle of the subject [n.131], I say that it is not necessary that the principles of the subject as knowable be principles of the subject as it is in itself, because in the case of being qua being, which is set down as the subject of metaphysics, there are no principles, because then they would be principles of any being whatever; but what is necessary is that in the case of any subject whatever there are principles by which its properties are demonstrated of it, and from these principles, as from the means of demonstration, propositional principles are formed, such as are the self-evident principles. In this way there can be principles of any subject whatever, insofar as the subject is the principle-without-principle in relation to its properties.Interpolation: “On the contrary, the principles of being and of knowing are the same, Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31; if therefore something has principles of knowing then it has principles of being. The principles of being are said not to be complex but in-complex, and from these are formed the propositions which are the principles of knowing; but the first cause lacks a principle of being, though not of knowing, because some things belong to it in a prior way and through these are posterior things known.” ⁶¹

VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

192. To the first argument of the second question, when the argument through Hugh of St. Victor and Cassiodorus is made [nn.133-134], the response is that they are speaking here, not of the formal object, but of the proximate matter which is more extensively dealt with in Scripture, because of the more immediate order to the end they are holding to.

193. To the second [n.135] I say that metaphysics is not about God as about its first subject. The proof is that, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science in which are proved all the things that are common to the special ones; therefore, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science about being, in which the knowledge of the properties of being are dealt with, which knowledge is presupposed in the special sciences; if then there is some science about God there is, in addition to it, some naturally known science about being insofar as it is being.

But when it is proved through the Philosopher in the Metaphysics [n.135] that the science of metaphysics is about God, I say that his argument thus concludes: ‘the noblest science is about the noblest class of things’, whether as first subject or as considered in that science in the most perfect way in which, in any naturally acquired science, it can be considered.Interpolation: “because the properties of being that are convertible with being are known supremely about any being, then knowledge of the more nobly distinct properties of a being, which knowledge divides them to the same supreme belonging, is the most noble that can naturally be had of God; but all this knowledge is metaphysics, because that which has the job of considering a property in general about a subject in general has the job of knowing the same property supremely about the same subject in particular.” ⁶²

194. To the Commentator on the Physics [n.136] I say that Avicenna - whom the Commentator contradicts - spoke well and the Commentator badly. The proof is: first, that if the existence of any separate substances were a presupposition in the science of metaphysics and a conclusion in natural science, then physics would be simply prior to the whole of metaphysics, because physics would show the ‘whether it exists’ about the subject of metaphysics, which fact is presupposed to the whole knowledge of the science of metaphysics. - Second, that a proof can be given about the existence of a cause through any condition of the effect that could not exist in the effect unless the cause existed; but many properties are considered in metaphysics that can only be present in beings from some first cause of such beings; therefore, on the basis of such properties, metaphysics can demonstrate that there is some first cause of those beings. The proof of the minor is that the multitude of beings, their dependence, composition, and the like -which are the properties of metaphysics - show that there is something that is simple in its actuality, altogether independent, and necessarily existent. Also, the existence of a first cause is much more perfectly shown from the properties of caused things considered in metaphysics than from the natural properties by which is shown that there is a first mover; also it is a more perfect and more immediate knowledge of the first being to know it as first being, or as necessarily existent, than to know it as first mover.

195. To the other citation [n.137] I say that relation to an end is not the noblest idea of knowledge but that which the end is - as being the idea of the foundation of that relation - is the noblest idea; but the deity is the founding idea of the relation of end for creatures; therefore the deity will be the first object, which I concede. And thus proceeds the argument to the opposite.

But when the proof from the Metaphysics about the good is given [n.137], I say that if the good, by a certain appropriateness, is foundation of the end, still the deity is the root and first foundation of it. But the consequence is good: ‘if there is no final end, then there is no good’, because if there is no perfect good there is no good; but no good is perfect which is ordered to some further good, because a good of this sort has a diminished goodness. However it is not necessary that goodness be the proper idea of end itself, but essence is more proper and fundamental. Hereby is it clear, in respect of the remark of Avicenna on the Metaphysics [n.137], that the remark must be understood, not of the end, but of the fundamental idea in respect of the end.

VI. To the Third Question

A. Opinion of Others

196. To the third question [n.139] it seems that it can probably be said that theology is not about all knowables, The opinion of Henry of Ghent. ⁶³because quiddities distinct from the divine essence as it is this singular essence contain first many truths virtually about themselves. The proof is that, after everything else per impossibile has been removed, these quiddities, if they were uncreated, would still contain such truths, as is clear of line and number with respect to the immediate propositions about them. And, accordingly, one could set down that in the divine intellect there were habits distinct in idea, I mean habits of science,Again the opinion of Henry of Ghent. ⁶⁴ namely: theology would be the one that the divine essence as this essence would cause in the divine intellect, while geometry in his intellect would be the one that was in his intellect by virtue of line, and arithmetic in this way by virtue of number, and so on about others.

197. Against this in three ways:

First, because the divine intellect would be cheapened by reason of the fact that it would be opened up by an object other than its essence; for in the instant of nature in which it understood line, it would still be in a state of potentiality with respect to knowing the truths that exist in line - and it recognizes those truths by virtue of the quiddity of line - , therefore line would as it were be the efficient cause imprinting the knowledge of those truths on the divine intellect, and so line will be the mover of the divine intellect.

198. Second thus: the first object of every power that is made actual by diverse objects through their per se proper virtue is something that is common to those objects; but if line, by virtue of itself, caused truth in the divine intellect, by equal reason other things too will cause truth in God’s intellect, and so the first object of the divine intellect will be common being, not his own singular essence. Nor is it an objection here that other objects are attributed to his essence; for thus are other beings attributed to substance, and yet the first object of our intellect is being.

Third, because if his essence is the first object, it is clear that it is not first by commonness of predication; therefore it will be first by virtual-ness. But it would not be the first object virtually if anything else were to effect, in accord with its own virtue, a change in his intellect.

B. Scotus’ own Response

200. [About divine theology] - Therefore I say differently that divine theology is about all knowables, because the first object of God’s theology makes everything else actually to be known in his intellect, such that, if in the first moment of nature his essence is known first in his intellect, and in the second moment of nature the quiddities are known that contain virtually their own truths, in the third moment are known to him the truths that are virtually contained in those quiddities; if this is so, the order of the second to the third is not according to causality, as if those quiddities caused something in his intellect, but there is only an order of effects ordered in respect of the same cause, to wit, that his own essence causes those quiddities to be known first in nature, as it were, before the truths about them are known [cf. 1 d.3 p.1 q.4 nn.18-19].

An example: if the sun illuminated some part near itself, and another part more distant from the sun was only capable, on account of its opacity, of being illuminated by the sun, the sun, and not the part first illuminated, would illuminate that distant part; the order, however, between the near and distant part would be like the order of effects of the same cause, and yet it would not be an order of the cause to the effect, because the illuminated part performs no action on the dark distant part.

So it is in the proposal. The essence of God in his own intellect makes other quiddities to be actually known, and later as it were it naturally makes the truths contained in them to be known to his intellect; yet those quiddities have no virtue in respect of effecting a change in God’s intellect, because God’s intellect is not of the nature to be perfected by those quiddities, because it is infinite and those quiddities are finite, and the infinite is in no way perfected by the finite.

201. In this way, then, does God have only theological knowledge about all knowables, because he has knowledge only by virtue of the theological object actuating his intellect, such that the theology of God is not only about all things but is also the whole knowledge possible for God about them, and it is absolutely about anything about which there is any knowledge that does not of itself include some imperfection, because it alone includes no limitation about any knowable at all; but any other knowledge, because it is limited by a cause, necessarily includes a limitation.

202. [On the theology of the blessed] - But as to the created intellects of the blessed things are otherwise, because their intellects are of the nature to be changed by the created quiddities so as to know the truths included in them; and therefore, in addition to the theological truth, which they have about those quiddities as displayed in the divine essence, they can have a natural knowledge of the same things by the proper movement of those things. Therefore the theology of the blessed about certain created things is not the whole knowledge about them which is possible for such intellects.

203. But there is a doubt whether their theology is about everything, although they have some other knowledge about some of the knowables. Here a distinction must be drawn about theology in itself and as it is a habit perfecting the blessed created intellect. In the first way it is about all knowables, because these are all of a nature to be known by virtue of the first theological object; in the second way I say that it is possible for it to be about any knowable, because it is about all knowables, for all the knowables are not infinite.Interpolation: “because it alone does not include limitation about any object; but any other one, because it is from a limited cause, necessarily includes limitation.” ⁶⁵ De facto, however, it has no limitation save from the will of God displaying something in his essence; and therefore the knowledge of the blessed is in actuality about all the things that God voluntarily displays in his essence.

204. [On our theology] - About our theology I say that is not about all things, because, just as the theology of the blessed has a limit, so also does ours, from the will of God revealing. But the limit fixed by the divine will as to general revelation is the things that are in divine Scripture, because - as is contained in the last chapter of Revelation -“he who adds to these things, to him will God add the plagues that are set down in this book.” Therefore our knowledge is de facto only of the things contained in Scripture and of the things that can be elicited from them.

205. About the power of our theology I say that it cannot be about everything, both because of the defect of our intellect, which is not able to conceive specifically many quiddities, - but revelation according to ordinary law is only of things whose terms can commonly be conceived by us naturally, - and because of the defect of our theology, because it cannot stand with evident knowledge of the same knowables, in the opinion of some, and consequently our revealed theology cannot stand with evident knowledge of some things naturally known to us.Possibly a reference to the teaching of, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas that one cannot have knowledge and faith at the same time about the same thing, as say about the existence of God. ⁶⁶

206. [On theology taken all together] - However all theology, whether God’s or the blessed’s or ours, is about all beings as to some things that are knowable about them, namely as to the relations they have to the divine essence as it is this essence, because a relation cannot be known without knowledge of both extremes; and in this way the relation that is to this essence as this cannot be known without knowledge of this essence as it is this.

Thus, then, to speak truly, theology is about everything, and it is all knowledge that does not include imperfection. Therefore to the intellect of God, who cannot have any imperfect knowledge, it is all knowledge, but it is not simply all knowledge, because in addition to it another knowledge can be had about some special quiddity that is moving the created intellect. Also it alone is knowledge of all things as to some knowables, namely as to their relation to this essence as this, provided however this essence as this terminates some relation of a creature and not under the idea of some attribute naturally intelligible to us. And this perhaps is the reason that we cannot know about the created intellect that it is ordered to this end as it is this, because we cannot know the relation founded in intellectual nature to this essence as to its proper end, because neither can we know the extreme to which it is the relation, and therefore we cannot know the relation of the image of this nature in itself, in the way the saints speak about the image.The reference is to man as made in the image of God, as spoken of in particular by Augustine On the Trinity 14 ch.8 n.11, 15 ch.27 n.50. ⁶⁷

VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

207. To the first argument [n.140] I say that it concludes about theology not in itself but as it is handed down in Sacred Scripture.