1. About Losses in Goods of the Soul

220. On the first point [n.219], the understanding is not about the natural goods of the soul, because no one can in this way inflict loss on another, since the natural goods are incorruptible goods. But the understanding is about the goods of morals, either the acquired ones that are corrupted or the ones that should be acquired whose acquisition is impeded - as namely it is about the sins and vices by which acquired virtues are corrupted (and vices at length generated), and by which virtues that ought to be generated by good acts are impeded.

221. In these things too no one can directly inflict loss on another, because sin and every vicious act is to such an extent voluntary that, if it not be voluntary, it is not a sin, from Augustine, On True Religion ch.14 n.27; therefore, by one’s own will alone can one thus suffer loss.

22. But someone can inflict loss on another in these things indirectly, by inducing him to sin and to vicious acts, by which virtues are corrupted and vices and sins generated. And this inducing can be multiple, namely by counsel, persuasion, request etc.

223. About this first case, then, I say that the one who inflicts the loss is bound, in the way it is possible for him, to restore the loss to him, namely by efficaciously inducing him to penitence and to virtuous acts. And if inducement alone not suffice (because it is easier to persevere than to convert), he is bound both by his own prayers and by prayers procured of others to obtain conversion for him; also through other efficacious persuaders, provided however he not betray to them the other’s hidden sin.

224. And from this is plain how great a danger it is to solicit another or to compel or induce him to sin, because scarcely is one able to make restitution worthily, since a will now attracted to sin one could scarcely by persuasions and many other ways bring back to virtue.

225. The reason for this is sufficiently plain, because since “the goods of virtue are the greatest goods,” according to Augustine, Retractions 1 ch.9 n.4, he who causes harm in these things causes more harm than he who does so in all other things whatever; and consequently, he is the more bound, according to justice, to restore such good to his neighbor, to the extent it is possible for him