1. First Conclusion

103. About the first transfer [n.102] let this be the first conclusion in this article, that transfer of ownership by authority of just law is just.

104. The proof is that, if a just law could have justly determined the first ownerships, and the authority of the law or the prince is not lesser (which I hold here to be the same after the division of ownerships as before), therefore can ownership be for the same reason and the same effect justly transferred after it has been appropriated to someone.

105. And from this I say that prescription in fixed property, and long use in movable property, is just transfer.

106. The proof is from Gregory IX, Decretals, with glosses, II tit.26 ch.5, ‘On Prescriptions’, ‘To the Vigilant’, gloss on ‘Others’ Property’.“Others say, which seems truer, that he who possesses another’s fixed property by prescription is no longer bound to give it back, because it would not now be another’s but his own, and he possesses it justly.” ²²

107. There is proof also through reason, in two ways:

First as follows: justly can that be established by the legislator which is necessary for the peaceful conversation of the subjects; but the ownership of something neglected, as it is neglected in prescription and long use, must be transferred to the occupier of it for the peaceful conversation of the citizens; because if ownership were not transferred to this occupier but were to remain with the former one, who treats the thing as abandoned then, after a time however long, there would be lawsuits undying, for, after a time however long, he who neglected the thing or his heir would ask for the neglected thing back, however long occupied by some other or others; and the lawsuits would be such that it would be impossible to cut them off, because impossible even to get sufficient proof; and from such perpetual lawsuits would arise disputes and perhaps feuds between the litigants, and thus the whole peace of the republic would be overthrown.

108. The second reason is that the legislator can punish justly by law a transgressor whose transgression turns to the detriment of the republic - and if he can punish with a bodily penalty, much more so with a monetary penalty, and do this by applying it to the treasury. Therefore he can, for equal reason, punish him with this sort of penalty and do so by applying what he is punished in to someone who is, in this regard, a minister of the law. But he who is for so long a time negligent about his own property transgresses in such a way that his transgression is to the detriment of the republic, because it is an impediment to peace. Therefore, as the law can justly apply the neglected thing to the treasury, so can it, for greater peace, transfer it to him, as to someone serving as minister of the law, who is for so long a time in occupation of it.

109. And from this is plain how one should understand the presumption of right and from right against which no proof is admitted, namely because someone thus negligent of his own property treats it as abandoned. For even if this not be true in fact, yet the legislator did punish him as if he had treated it for abandoned; because he is in some respect like one who treats it as abandoned, and that respect, wherein he is like someone who abandons it, justly requires a like penalty.

110. This also appears probable by the fact that, if anyone at all be able to transfer his ownership to another, the whole community can transfer to anyone the ownership of anyone from the community (because I am supposing that in the factual reality of a community the consent of everyone is included). Therefore, the community, which possesses this consent as having been in a way already offered to it (by the fact that everyone has consented to the just laws that need to be passed by the community or the prince), can transfer, through a just law, anyone’s ownership [of property] to anyone.