II. To the Initial Arguments of Both Parts

59. To the arguments:

To the first two [nn.3-4] the answer is plain from the fifth article of the first member [nn.40-42] and the fourth member of the second article [nn.55-58].

60. To the third [n.5] the answer is plain from the third article of the second member [nn.46-51].

61. To the fourth [n.6] the answer is plain from the fourth article of the first member [nn.35-39].

62. And if you argue that contrition can destroy any sin, therefore to no sin does any other proper satisfaction correspond - this does not follow. However, because contrition does include some satisfaction, in desire at least (as will be said in d.17 nn.77-78), and although sometimes a contrition so intense may suffice or make satisfaction for any penalty to be inflicted, yet the precept about inflicting some penalty is not unreasonable, because contrition as a rule is only a partial satisfaction, and general precepts are for general remedy and accord with the conditions that are found in men for the most part.

63. To the first argument for the opposite [n.7], I concede that some penalty corresponds in some way to the guilt, either a penalty distinct in itself or a part contained virtually in another penalty; and thus there is a satisfaction proper to it, whether actual or virtual, and so a penalty proper to it, because no other now corresponds to it, speaking of total satisfaction, even if another could correspond to it. Also this penalty does not now correspond to another guilt, though it could correspond to another one.

64. To the authority from Revelation [n.8], I say that it is speaking of the penalty of the damned. The thing is plain from the text, 14.8: “Babylon the great has fallen, has fallen etc.” And it is true there that very precisely and properly is the penalty commensurate with the guilt; but neither as great a precision nor as great a commensuration exists or is required in a penitential penalty.