4. Solution of the Question

35. From this the fourth article [n.10] is clear, namely the solution of the question: for whether the satisfaction be understood to be proper as determinate, that is, in species, or proper as determinate, that is, in number, a proper satisfaction does not necessarily correspond to each sin; because both the same satisfaction in species and the same in number can correspond to this sin and to that.

36. That the same in species can correspond is plain, because contrition can correspond to this sin and to that, and it is the same in species, especially if the objects be the same in species.

37. That the same in number can correspond is plain, because contrition about several sins together in general can on its own correspond to those several sins; but then, for the satisfaction to be total, it must not be lessened, because let something of it suffice for one sin and something for another, the something and the something of it, I say, are not of parts really in act, but of degrees of intensity, namely such that the contrition be in so great a degree of intensity that in a far lesser degree it would suffice for one sin, and in the degree it super-adds it would suffice for another sin beyond

38. Several satisfactions too, whether total or partial, can correspond to a single sin: Total indeed because there is no sin that cannot be remitted through contrition alone, and then the contrition alone is a total satisfaction. The same sin can also be remitted through a weak contrition and through other penalties supplying for the imperfection of the contrition. But a contrition intense on one side, and the same weak on another (along with other penalties), differ also in species, though they be equivalent in divine acceptation.

39. Briefly, then, I say that a proper satisfaction does not belong to every sin, as if, forsooth, it correspond to no other sin, and not any other sin correspond to it. But to every sin a satisfaction proper for the moment now corresponds, even though another could be proper to it. I understand by ‘proper for the moment now’ either as in itself a distinct satisfaction or as something virtually included in satisfaction.